FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE 'TITANIC.'
WE trust that the strong public feeling which has pro- cured the promise of a prompt and searching special inquiry into the loss of the ' Titantio' will not continue to con- centrate itself solely on the supply of an adequate number of boats in passenger ships. The want of boats on the 'Titanic' was, of course, the most obvious lesson of the disaster, and it was right and desirable that that point should be taken first and have more importance allowed to it than to any other. For each wreck, like each battle, has its own lesson, and it would be perverse and useless if public opinion tried too subtly to place in the first position some lesson other than the obvious one. But it does not by any means follow that the plain teaching of any particular wreck is of universal application. Let us not run off with the idea that the rule of "boat-room for every person aboard," though we believe that that rule ought strictly to be enforced by law, will save us from loss of life in wrecks. The fact is that the circumstances of the loss of the ' Titanic ' would be unlikely to be repeated once in a million times. It happened that the 'Titanic' was lost in perfectly calm water. If a breeze had sprung up after the passengers had taken to the boats it is probable that several of the boats would have been swamped. Even if immunity from loss of life lay exclusively in the matter of boats it would be necessary to expand the rule of "boat-room for every person," and make it read "boat-room for every person in craft capable of living in a heavy sea." There would have to be so many boats, in fact, that if passengers and crew were all embarked in them there would be no unseaworthiness through over- loading. We do not think this is an impossible condition, but the necessary number of boats certainly could not be carried in the davits. The additional collapsible boats or rafts would have to be placed where they could very easily be got at, and the whole business of drilling the crew in getting them ready for sea and launching them would have to be taken much more seriously than now. At present boats are seldom launched in practice during a voyage, as captains are unwilling to slow down for the purpose.
We should look tragically foolish indeed if we agreed upon a formula to prevent another ' Titanic ' disaster in the future and found that, owing to the omission of some other formula, a similar disaster was quite possible after all. Although everybody on board the ' Titanic' might have been saved had there been enough boats, the ultimate reason of the loss of life was, of course, the choice of a route which was not free from ice. It would be absurd to attach more blame to one company than to others. The summer and winter routes are agreed upon by all, and it is clear that though ice is rare where the "ritanio' struck there is a risk of meeting it any year at this season. Why, then, should such a risk ever be accepted P We cannot think of anything resembling a sufficient reason. If a route were taken southerly enough to pass through waters in which ice has never been known, the loss of the Titanic' would probably never be repeated by any vessel bound for New York. A collision with another vessel would be unlikely to sink a Titanic.' It is probably only the long impact of an unyielding substance ripping along the ship's side that could open up enough of the watertight compartments to sink her. The only thing we can think of that would deliver a shock remotely resembling that of ice would be a submerged derelict. What are the objections to a more southerly route P It would, of course, be longer and the mails would be delayed. There are no other reasons worth counting. We can only say that hurry has been carried preposterously and even wickedly tar if it is seriously con- tended that it is worth while to risk another 'Titanic' tragedy for the sake of saving some hours in landing an American business man or delivering the mails. If the passengers were consulted—and it is to suit their tastes and convenience, after all, that these great. liners are built—we do not suppose that one in a thousand woald prefer the quicker passage with the danger of ice to the slower passage without it. Of course vessels entering the Canadian rivers could never avoid the
danger of ice. But their case is different. They expect ice, and are, indeed, bound to encounter the risk. In the case of ships bound for New York the risk is quite unnecessary.
We puss to the question of wireless telegraphy about which the Committee of the American Senate has drawn forth some curious information. Among those who have had opportunities of heroism and have risen to the occasion wireless operators on board ship hold a high place, as all those who remember the wrecks of the past two years will admit. But it is impos- sible that this tremendously important service should be conducted satisfactorily so long as it is understaffed and is not properly under the control of the ship's officers. We read of a telegraphist in one liner picking up a message by mere accident after his working hours were over; we hear of another refusing a message and not reporting it to his captain ; and we gather that the telegraphists in general send and receive messages more or less as they like. Of course they could not refuse to obey an officer's orders, but they really seem to be left too much to themselves. An officer's first duty is the navigation of the ship, and it would be a great mistake to turn him into a telegraphist ; but we do think that, now that wireless telegraphy has become an essential part of the means of saving life, a full wireless staff is as important as a sufficient supply of boats, and we think that some officer should have cognizance of every wireless message received. Just think what the failure of the ' Carpathia ' to come up to the scene of the ' Titanic ' wreck as quickly as she did would have meant if enough lop had arisen on the sea within a few hours to break into the heavily laden lifeboats.
As to the desirability of building ships as large as the Titanic' we are not competent to speak. It is evident, how- ever, that the mercantile marine, as much as the Royal Navy, has a Dreadnought problem to solve. The large turning circle of these ships which makes it difficult for them to avoid any object in their track that is not sighted at a considerable distance ; their immense weight, which causes them to carry way for a very long distance after the engines have been stopped; their great power of suction, which was illustrated in the ' Hawke '-' Olympic' collision and by the Titanic' herself when her suction snapped the seven stern cables of another liner in Southampton Water—all these things are disadvantages against which very con- siderable advantages must be set to justify the big-ship policy. We believe that the companies find that big ships are economical. On the other hand, what is to happen when the Dreadnoughts of the merchant service are damaged on the other side of the Atlantic P There are no dry docks in America, we believe, large enough to receive them. Unless a Dreadnought passenger ship could be patched up while afloat, so as to enable her to recross the Atlantic, or could be towed home—which would be an awkward job indeed—she would be in danger of becoming a total loss through some absurdly disproportionate injury. But that is rather a question of loss of property, and we are writing here of lose of life,
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