The First Phase of Gallipoli
Military Operations—Gallipoli. Official History of the War. compiled 137 Brig.-Gen. C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, C.B., C.M.G., NE first volume on the Gallipoli campaign in the Official History of the War will reward the expectation with which
it has been awaited. It answers several questions which have been commonly in doubt ; it shows how fine was the line between the ghastly failure which the Gallipoli campaign was and the success which it very nearly was ; and it tells for the first time in detail the truth about the sorry confusion which caused the unnecessary and disastrous withdrawal of the troops from Y Beach just at the moment when they were needed_ to clinch the great military argument.
General Aspinall-Oglander says that the failure of the campaign was due to neglect of the ancient principles of war. He certainly proves his case. Indeed, that case always can be proved. The methods of war may change out of all knowledge, but the principles do not. He does not tell us whether he is what was called a " Westerner in the War. He does not say whether he thinks that the Gallipoli campaign shOuld have been avoided, and that all the available men and munitions should have been poured into France. What he does say—and this is what matters from the point of view of the historian of Gallipoli as from that of any writer upon strategy,-is that there should not have been a division of interest between the French theatre and the Gallipoli theatre, a division from which both suffered. If there was really a deadlock in France it might have paid to hold the position there in suspense while enough men and enough munitions to ensure victory were concentrated upon defeating the Turk and thus penetrating the weak spot in the rear of the combined enemy forces. For our part, we hold that the " Westerners " (in the full sense of the term) were in the right. All that the author tells us _ about the apprehensions of the Navy at Gallipoli, in regard to storms and German submarines and the distance from the home base, makes us feel that a very large-scale enterprise against the Turk would have been far too speculative.
This first volume takes the narrative from the entry of Turkey into the War up to the middle of May, 1915 ; that is to say, up to the failure of the attempt on Achi Baba which ended the first part of the campaign. The author points out that just as the naval historian could not describe the sea operations at Gallipoli without referring to the movements on land, so he himself found it impossible to • describe the movements on land without bringing in the work of the Navy. He has not, however, trespassed on the other sphere more than was necessary for elucidation. ft may be hoped that this volume will lay for ever the ghost who has not ceased whispering into the ear of the student that the campaign would have been a perfectly simple affair if the main attack had been delivered at Bulair instead of at the southern end of the Gallipoli peninsula. A glance at the map reveals at once the attractions of Bulair as a landing place—illusive attractions of the sort that ensnare those who consult maps without details and assume that the sea is always navigable, although they have not examined large- . scale charts.
If a .successful landing were made at Bulair where the neck of the peninsula is at its narrowest—so ran the argument —a line of fortifications could be built across the neck and the entire Turkis" h army south of the line would be starved out. How easy to write that down ! Unfortunately, the Gulf of Saros is shoal, and deep-draught vessels could not have approached near the land. When there was one of the violent galis common in those parts the ships would haVe had to steam far away from the land and days might have passed without the possibility of communication with the shore. Then, again, would the Turks in the peninsula really have been starved merely because Bulair was seized ? They certainly would not have been starved unless it had been possible to deprive them of contact with Asia Minor on the' eastern side of the Dardanelles. What were our sub- marines for ? someone may ask. The answer is that a submarine may make short work of a vessel that presents an expansive target under water but that small boats could cross the narrow slit of water, particularly in the dark, almost with impunity. The starvation of an army in Gallipoli, is fine, postulated the holding of the Straits. That, however, was precisely what the Navy was unable to accomplish.
British submarines made gallant raids right up to the Sex of Marmora, but Admiral De Robeck and the Admiralty were at one in refusing to send large ships into what would have been nothing less than a trap. The German Official History of the War agrees. with the British view that the Bulair solution was impossible. It is true that Marshal Liman von Sanders disagrees, but his is almost a solitary German. voice It is not a sufficient reply to all the objections to the Bulair solution which we have mentioned to say that the southern extremity of Gallipoli was a terrible place for landing. Sir Ian Hamilton exclaimed bitterly in one despatch how different was the aspect of the country from what it seemed when he had pored over maps with Lord Kitchener in London. Throughout that lovely coastline and the abrupt rocky. hills there was _hardly a small patch of shelter for the invaders. The heat of summer was like a pursuing monster ; the cold of winter nipped many of the troops with frost-bite. Never- theless, the author proves that if the Turks had not been given (by means of the naval bombardment) a long notice that a military attack was coming, the campaign would have succeeded even with the men and munitions actually at Sir Ian Hamilton's disposal. We have not space to follow the author's careful description of the great opportunity which was lost when Y Beach was evacuated. He reveals all the facts for the first time. There was much misunder- standing and in one connexion he does not hesitate to use the word " panic."
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