THE UNREST OF THE WORLD. T HE year comes to an
end in a cloud of unsettled inter- national questions, any one of which in other times might have been the cause of war, or at least of a serious war scare. There is little talk of war at the moment because, we imagine, the feelings of mankind work in a kind of ebb and flow, and international emotions have their cycles like the tidal changes in trade which man can only partly explain. It has been said that every generation wants its war. One great advantage of the present time, which is the outcome of many past disadvantages and much tribulation, is that men have had their fill of fighting. As we said last week, they have had their fill whether they were participants in, or spectators of, the recent Balkan War, which, according to the details that are continually becoming better known, was one of the most horrible and ferocious in history. Then, apart from the fact that there is no warlike feeling in the air in spite of the existence of ample material for the making of wars, there is the consciousness, particularly in Germany, that the raising of money cannot be carried much further except by the employment of fiscal devices which defeat their own ends. The business interests have taken alarm. Even in rich France it is obvious that the huge sum of £52,000,000 required for national defence and for the payment of expenses already incurred in Morocco cannot be raised without forms of direct taxation that have been traditionally unpopular with Frenchmen. For these and other reasons we are not in fear of war ; but it must be remembered that feelings will change as soon as short memories lose the vividness of their impressions, and that we cannot call the world a safe place to live in until the more difficult questions which now puzzle the nations on every side have been satisfactorily settled.
We may summarily review the state of foreign affairs as the New Year will find it. To begin with, it becomes daily more obvious that the Treaties of London, Bucharest, and Constantinople have not really settled the problems of the Balkans. It seems possible that the Concert of Europe, which really was a Concert for the purpose of dealing with the Balkans during the war, even though its maximum of agreement was not great, may fall asunder again into two camps. It has been announced that Sir Edward Grey's Note on the Aegean islands will be considered by the three members of the Triple Alliance, who will then send a united answer to it. The disposal of the islands was expressly loft to the Great Powers, so we hope that the Bench of Judges will not disagree in this matter, as there is no Court of Appeal above them. Sir Edward Grey implied, if he did not say, in his Note that the conditions which Turkey had to fulfil before Italy abandoned the islands occupied during her war with Turkey were already fulfilled. We do not know whether the Italian Government main- tain that the conditions are not fulfilled, for their statements on the subject are reticent and vague. At all events, there is no appearance of an immediate abandon- ment of the islands. Greece, we have always held, ought to have all the Aegean islands, which have immemorially been associated with her by sentiment and belong to her by geographical right. But Greece is not in such favour with the Powers as she used to be, and it will be necessary for her not to insist on making unjustifiable claims to territory in Southern Albania—claims which would be certain to pro- voke Italy to dangerous resentment. One point already scored by Greece, which ought to be an enormous source of pride to her and a makeweight against any minor dis- appointments, is the fact that the Greek flag has been hoisted in Crete with the consent of the Powers. At least we read in the Times that the Consuls were present at the ceremony, and that may be taken as a sign of consent. It is a signal fact that the Cretan question is at last ended, and we trust that the Greeks will remember that the Venezelos policy to which they owe this result was sub- stantially one of prudence. A kindred question to that of the islands is the tentative claim of Russia to a direct influence in the administration of Mount Athos. " Influ- ence " is one of those vague words which may cover any- thing, and Italy and Austria-Hungary already pretend that Russia wishes to upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Against this anti-Russian suspicion must be set the anti-German suspicions of Russia. The latter have become rather acute owing to the appointment of a German general, General Liman von Sanders, to the command of the 1st Army Corps at Constantinople. It may or may not be that the duties of the German general are different in kind from those of the naval "advisers" whom Great Britain lends to Turkey. On the surface it would seem that there is no justification for a German general actually taking command of the 1st Army Corps, and the action of Germany in arranging for him to do so is not one that can be described as scrupulously framed to maintain the public confidence of Europe. But it must be remembered that foreign protests at the Porte are so much of an everyday occurrence—so much part of the familiar game of diplomacy as played in Turkey—that the Turkish Government provide against them in advance by saying that they are going to do things which they have no real expectation of being allowed to do. The protests in France have been more active than those of Russia, who indeed is accused by Frenchmen of negligence. It is difficult to get to the bottom of this conflicting play of rival interests, but we may say in general that while we have no doubt that Russia is as anxious to serve her own interests as she always has been, she is also sincerely desirous of peace. She has nothing whatever to gain by
war. She honestly stands with the Triple Entente for the maintenance of peace—a subject upon which we shall have a few more words to say presently. In the meantime we fear that the financial condition of Turkey is going from bad to worse. The Young Turks, who formerly made a point of paying salaries regularly, are no longer able to do so, and they have fallen some months into arrear. After all its vicissitudes the Committee is still the core of govern- ment in Turkey. It is not that the Committee is strong so much as that there is no other group strong enough to supersede it. Unless some bold spirit suddenly arises to change the complexion of affairs, the Committee will probably be reinstated in power at the next elections.
As the result of the Balkan War, the Triple Alliance probably feels more doubtful of its strength than the Triple Entente does. Austria-Hungary has pursued a policy at once ambitious, jealous, and curiously un- successful. For the moment her suspicion is directed almost wholly against Servia. Servia has got more out of the war than any of the Balkan Allies. She has won great military renown ; besides doubling her territory, she was able to help the Bulgarians in front of Adrianople, and the other day to suppress quickly, if ruthlessly, an Albanian revolt that would have occupied the Turks for months. Her pride and ambition naturally match her achievements, and it is in the way of her ambition that Austria-Hungary sets innumerable stumbling-blocks. It would be well if the Austrians could forget their anti- Slav prejudices, but they will probably continue in the old manner, and one does not see what the end will be of this clash of ambitions. Servia appears determined to possess the Orient Railway which runs through her newly acquired territory, and Austria-Hungary declares that she, for her part, cannot consent to the paralysis of her trade with Salonica. This is one of the more dangerous disputes. In the meantime it is interesting to watch the reaction of Austria-Hungary's political paralysis upon the state of the Triple Alliance. Germany can feel confidence in neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy. Italy, in proportion to her success in Northern Africa, is necessarily an even less zealous member than before of the Triple Alliance. Her attention is turned away from Europe to her new posses- sions. Her interest in watching the policy of the Triple Entente is as nothing compared with her anxiety to develop her administration and trade in the Tripolitaine. If Germany proposed any speculative or fanciful policy for the Triple Alliance, the approval of Italy would be almost freezing in its formality. Italy thinks that she has a "good thing" in Northern Africa, and she wants nothing less than to follow wills-of-the-wisp elsewhere. It may be said that all this tells in favour of peace, and we are glad to be able to say that we think it does. Russia, so far from suffering from the events in the Balkans, is in a stronger position than ever. The motive of the Triple Entente as a league of peace has, indeed, worked admirably. It is proved, in fact, that the Triple Entente is necessary. In all our dealings with Russia we should remember this. She may do things that we had rather were left undone, but we repeat that her desire for peace is honest, and that if we were ever to split with Russia because of minor disagreements, we should be false to our interests and to those of Europe. To split with her would at once expose us to the old legendary charge of perfidy. We should be the object of attack from every country in Europe, and we should have fairly earned our fate. That is why we must never allow the Triple Entente to collapse. Heroic isolation means death— possibly heroic, but at all events certain. We are a member of the Triple Entente by force of circumstances. The alternative is a disaster by comparison with which the admitted inconveniences and the minor disagreeable responsibilities which our obligations force us to incur at present are negligible.
For the other outstanding events in foreign affairs we must look further afield—to China and Mexico. In China the Republic has already become little more than a name. Yuan Shih-kai has answered his critics in the traditional non-Republican manner by removing them. Parliament (which, however, is not in active being) has been purged by the suspension of the whole of the advanced Radical group. This was the not unexpected sequel to the suppression of the revolt in the South, whence the strength of philosophic Radicalism was derived. The
absence of any striking news from China in recent days enables us to hope that nothing tragic is happening. It may be that the dictatorship of a prince of oppor- tunists like Yuan Shili-kai may be much better for
the country in the end than a chaos of benevolent but impotent Republicanism. The news that a con- cession for a British railway has been gained by Lord
Ffrench is of particular interest, because it is the first great private commercial enterprise which has been negotiated since the collapse of the authority of the Five Power group. The Powers still regulate the raising of State loans in China, but for the rest foreigners are free in their private capacity to enter into any undertakings they please with the support of their respective Legations. We only hope that British traders will depend mainly upon their own efforts, and not try, by unnecessary complaints of the inaction of our Legation, to force the Foreign Office into a bagman diplomacy, which is a very undesirable kind of diplomacy. As to Mexico, President Wilson is still trusting to the financial collapse of General Huerta. That General Huerta will collapse if given time enough is quite likely. Everyone except Porfirio Diaz has always collapsed in Mexico. But the new candidate for the Presidency, be he Federal or rebel, is not likely to be much less "blood-stained" than General Huerta himself, against whom, by the way, assassination has never been proved. We recognize the fine intentions of Mr. Wilson, but we cannot see how his policy can end ultimately in anything but failure or effective intervention. You cannot order the daily conduct of any country without establishing such a control as is indistinguishable from a Protectorate, which in its turn is often indistinguishable from annexation. Yet annexation is repudiated by Mr. Wilson as something inconceivably wrong.
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