THE GREATEST OF ALL OUR NEEDS. T HE British people take

the accomplished management of our sea affairs so much for granted that they are now in serious danger of failing to recognize that the character of the war has been gradually changing. To-day we are more exposed to disaster by sea than by land, and that through no fault whatever of our Navy. The Navy has done to admiration everything that it could reasonably have foreseen that it would be called upon to do ; nevertheless, the new German submarines which are being turned out in increasing numbers are able to take a dangerously heavy toll of British and neutral shipping. We are threatened, not with defeat by land, not even with the prospect of being unable to win decisive victories by land, but with having to pay the penalty of living in small islands. We are threatened first with a . shortage of food, and secondly with a shortage of the materials which are necessary for manu- facturing many essential articles. Probably many of the new German submarines have been disposed of, but the German rate of construction is, we may be sure, being speeded up continually. No longer do small submarines, with a short radius of action, come close to our coasts, where they can be dealt with. The latest German submarine is a submersible cruiser which is able to carry enough fuel and supplies to stay at sea for a couple of months. Moreover, when she has reached the far-distant trade routes she can be fed by other submarines which serve as supply vessels. There may be remote and undiscovered bases where German submarines run in to refit and revictual, and they are thus able to stay away from home for long periods without accepting tho risks of the dangerous dash back through home waters. We are sure that Sir Joseph Maclay, the Shipping Controller, is doing everything he can by direct and indirect means to make good the losses in our mercantile marine, but he will bo greatly helped in his attempt to master difficulties which are really grave if the public support him by appreciating the true nature of the problem. If they do that, they will not hang back when it is a question of sacrificing personal convenience and comfort in order to make it as easy as possible for the Government to save the situation. It was not without carefully weighing his words that Sir John Jellicoe said the other day that the danger from submarines was greater now than at any period of the war. Ho added that he believed the danger would bo overcome, and so do we believe it with the deepest conviction ; but let us all be sure of this, that it will not be overcome without taking thought and exerting the last ounce of effort of which the nation is capable. As we conceive the situation, the future of the war will be a kind of race between the ability of the Germans to cut off our supplies to the point where we should be prevented. from effectually making war, and the ability of the Allies to deal a decisive blow by land before that point can be reached. It is important to fight the war with that con- ception in our minds. It will direct our energies in the right channels. If we concentrate on the vital needs at the right moments, we shall win the race, and win it handsomely. Wo want more merchant vessels, and must have them at the earliest possible date. That is the obvious need now. Of course the physical increase of the carrying-power of our merchant navy is mixed up with a large number of auxiliary matters which must never be forgotten. It would be useless., for instance, to build. more merchant ships if there were a failure of labour at the docks to handle them. Earlier in the war we heard continually of congestion at the docks, and that although some fifty per cent. of our merchant shipping had already been allotted to military purposes. By quickly turning round ships in dock the amount of our tonnage is in effect increased in exact proportion to the acceleration of the work. Again, the arrangement which is being made to take over a number of Greek merchant vessels will help us, but the help will not justify us in relaxing our resolution to build as many new ships as we possibly can, and to build them as speedily as possible. Yet again, to some extent the pressure on tonnage can be relieved by producing more food at home. But we should delude our- selves if we imagined that food can be grown quickly enough to ward off the immediate danger. Too much attention cannot be paid to increasing the productivity of the land, but crops do not grow like the mango-tree under the hand of the Indian conjurer, So that when we have made every allowance for indirect means of making our mercanais tonnage go further, the need for building remains a paramount and immediate necessity.

It is notorious that we have been unable to build as many merchant ships as we should' have liked during the war, because the needs of the Navy very rightly came first. As everything—the whole cause of the Allies—depends finally on the British, Navy, it was essential to go on building ships of war in every available yard till there was a handsome margin in hand. We do not know how far the Admiralty may be satisfied with the results of this immense effort, but whether the dreams of the Navy are completely fulfilled or not, we must face the question whether the margin is now so ample that the balance of importance has shifted and that the time has come to treat merchant-ship building to such a rush of activity as it has not known before. The abnormal disparity .between the construction of ships of war and the construction of trading ships has been indis- putably right so far during the war. But the abnormality can now at least be adjusted, even if it be not considered desirable and safe—as we hope the experts may consider it to be—wholly to invert the abnormality and give merchant ships their innings. In 1913, two million tons of merchant shipping were built as against two hundred and fifty thousand tons of war shipping. If such a proportion as that were reasserted for at least a temporary burst of activity, we might be able in a few months to look upon the situation with something like confidence. It has been the custom for some time to state our losses in merchantmen with as little emphasis as possible. Still, they have been stated for those to see who have eyes to see, and it would be an easy calcula- tion to compare the rate of loss with the total volume of our tonnage, and to estimate how we are progressing in the race in which we are now engaged. We take the following table of losses of British and neutral merchantmen from the Daily News of Wednesday

Oct. 26—Nov. 9

• ■••

82

28 Nov. 10—Nov. 24 • •

0, •

62

29 Nov. 25—Deo. 9

• •

105

••■

42 Dec. 10—Deo. 24

••

•••

70

27 Deo. 25-L-Jan. 8

• •

•••

03 • • 21 Jan. 9—Jan. 23

OM.

•••

83

40 Total

470 .. 187

Neutral ships which act as carriers for us are of course almost as important as British ships.

The labour required for an exceptional burst of merchant- ship building is of course skilled labour. There is no question of taking men away from the land, and exposing ourselves to the charge that in reducing the pressure on tonnage in one way we have merely increased it in another. We must make sure, however, that we do not allow competent workers to be diverted from the yards to the land. The majority of skilled workers for the yards will undoubtedly have to be found in the Army. Here we find ourselves in contact with the familiar British difficulty that we are not a record-keeping nation. No record has been kept of the particular trades of the men who have joined up, and it is in itself a work of magnitude and complexity to trace the skilled men who once worked on the Tyne or the Clyde, but are now scattered among the various units at the front. A good many of them are already in military jobs requiring the skill of the riveter, the mechanic, or the carpenter, and if they are contented with their jobs (as they very well may be in the A.S.C., or one of the transport services, or in railway work) it is no easy matter to get them to volunteer to be removed. Commanding officers, again, are not at all anxious to lose men who, by the nature of their accomplishments, are likely to be among the most handy men in their battalions. But such difficulties as these will be surmounted. The next point to be considered is the character of the ships to be built. The type must be virtually standardized, in the sense that it must be a model that can be produced very quickly, and that possesses no unessential features. The delightful and almost personal arts of naval architecture must be forsworn. It may be objected that a ship built in a hurry will shake to pieces in a very few years. Even if that were true, it would not be a sound objection. A ship that will last only five or six years will answer the purpose of tiding us over the present dangers. Those who are accus- tomed to build merchant vessels are the true arbiters of the proper designs. It would cause delay and hindering criticism if the Admiralty imposed any authoritative designs on the builders. Let the shipbuilders be made solely responsible, being informed only of the general type of ship wanted. They may be trusted implicitly, the more so that they would take a tremendous pride in their work. Their one test in drawing

Total Of which sunk. British.

up their plans as to what features the ships should or should not have would be the question, " Is it essential ? " The type of vessel decided upon would of course have to be built with a view to carrying guns adequate to her defence. Experience has proved that armed ships are sunk by the German submarines only in exceptional instances. The new ships built to defend themselves would have a con- siderably greater chance of a long life than ships armed in a makeshift manner.

We fear that we shall seem to some of our readers to be the victims of an obsession if we add a last word on the subject of drink. But in these times we cannot hesitate to take the risk of seeming to be tiresome. If victory be won, we shall be well content to put up with the reputation. In the shipbuilding yards drink has notoriously done more to retard work than in almost any other industry. The nation wants every ounce of effort it can command. Nor is the effect of drink upon activity our only concern. Ia the present dangerous dearth of tonnage, ships are still being allowed to carry the materials of the drink trade. Railways, and lorries, and vans which might be pouring materials into the shipbuilding yards are still used to carry spirits and beer- Wo need not labour the point again. We simply ask our readers to consider carefully the gravity of the situation which we have attempted to describe, and to which Sir John Jellicoe and Mr. Prothero have both borne witness, ant then to put to themselves the question : " Is this the time to give a free pass to drink ? "