It may be said: "The Germans surely know this feet
as well as we do, and therefore they will not attack." Thoae who argue thus, however, forget that all German military policy favours taking and keeping the offensive, and, further, that the effect of Germany deliberately refusing to go on must be very depressing not only on German public opinion, but also on her Austrian and Turkish allies, and still more upon the wavering Powers—upon Italy and the Balkan States. Lastly, the Germans recognize that if they acquiesce in the status quo in the west there is always danger of the allies organizing a third campaign from the south, which must draw away troops from the east and the west—troops which can be very badly spared. If we were Germans, we should regard stale- mate in France and Flanders and stalemate in Poland, plus a new danger, as the worst of all things. Therefore we hold that the Germans must make another desperate effort to break the line.
