MR FAULKNER'S ULSTER
Last chance before direct rule
'Direct rule' as the next stage in the devel- oping political crisis in Northern Ireland has much to recommend it, and much against it. It offers no panacea, of course, else it would have been introduced years ago. It creates new problems without solv- ing any old ones. As a means to an end, it lacks clarity about the end while possess- ing all too much clarity about the means. It cannot be regarded as an end in itself, either; for, in practice, no one supposes that it will be tantamount to governing the six counties much as the Ridings of York- shire are presently governed.
Few will suppose that direct rule over the existing six counties could itself be- come a pacific and acceptable permanent solution. However, it is arguable, and is certainly being argued in government circles and elsewhere, that direct rule could be the prelude either to the handing over of Fermanagh and Tyrone to the south, or to some all-Ireland solution. It could not be the prelude to both, for this would indeed betray Ulster. The quid pro quo for a united Ireland would be concessions from the south on the relations between such a united Ireland and Great Britain together with modifications of the offensive theocratic constitution and catholic policies of the Republic. the more important of which modifications could be oiled with British cash. The alternative—and the one to which British conservatives and union- ists will powerfully incline if it comes to the crunch—of letting Fermanagh and Tyrone go and then treating the Irish Re- public as a foreign country like any other and its citizens as aliens, however forcible its logical appeal may be, abounds with practical difficulties; and additionally may look to some like a further British con- cession to the Fenians, a further abdica- tion of responsibilities towards the protest- ant unionists of the north, and another step backwards.
However, the Irish situation is such that a British government, even if it might like to do so, cannot sit back and do nothing and wait for the IRA people to go away. The IRA Will not go away. Nor by intern- ment can they be put away, for the author- ities are, unhappily, not at all sure that they would end up with the right people behind barbed wire. There is also a limit to the extent to which the morale of the British troops will survive the unpleasant- ness of their Irish duties. Talk of 'hot pur- suit' into the `no-go' areas of Belfast is both unhelpful and potentially dangerous: the language being used is the language of Vietnam. This is not a 'war' against an 'enemy' unless it be .clearly understood that the 'enemy' is a hundred or two people; the army in Ulster supports the civil authority, is not engaged in warfare.
It is unthinkable to put the army in any way whatever under the control of, or sub- ject to the guidance of, the Ulster author- ities themselves. If those who command a majority in Stormont fail to see eye to eye with those who command a majority in Westminster and, by their disagreement make the work of the military in Ulster even more difficult than it now is, some- thing has to go. Either the army has to pull out, or Stormont has to be dissolved. It may yet come to the first of these alterna- tives, in which the people of England, Scotland and Wales will wash their hands of Ireland and insist that the troops be brought home. At the moment, however, neither of the British political parties wishes to contemplate this. Mr Wilson is as prepared to sustain a united approach as Mr Heath was when in opposition; and we may be thankful that this is so. The second alternative can, in consequence, be adopted. If necessary the army stays; Stormont goes.
The removal of Stormont and the trap- pings of parliamentary government would be the necessary concomitant, and the big- gest imniediate advantage of direct rule, removing from the situation the peculiar racial and religious party-political aspect of Ulster politics. It will mean that West- minster, in searching for some solution, has at least one factor the less to deal with. The risk Westminster now fears is easily enough stated: and it is not so much the risk of Chichester-Clark being eventually replaced, after Mr Faulkner, by Mr Craig. It is the risk of the Unionists being re- placed by the Paislcyites. It is thought in- evitable in British government circles that were there to be a general election in Northern Ireland, Paisley and his men would command a majority in Stormont. No Stormont is to be preferred to a Pa isley ite St6rmont.
Some will contemplate a Paisleyite regime with equanimity. A Paisley govern- ment in Belfast, would certainly not lack a kind of crude populist character that has been conspicuous by its absence through- out the past fifty years of Ulster establish- mem hegemony. It would be more pru- dent, however, to regard a Paisleyite government with the very gravest of mis- givings. When gangrene enters a body its progress can be swift, and its one sure cure is the amputation of the infected limb. The English people possess, when pushed to it, the necessary ruthlessness to cut off an infected limb. Better to avoid the infection in the first place. A Paisleyite administra- tion is to be prevented; which means that a Stormont general election in Ulster is to be avoided. Direct rule cannot therefore be more than one Ulster Prime Minister away: for, bad though it may prove and although it may be construed as an ad- mission of defeat, the alternative is worse, the risk too great.
The effort of Mr Faulkner to govern, which may well also mean Ulster's last chance to avoid the necessity of direct rule, should be viewed with all possible sym- pathy and understanding by people on this side of the Irish Channel, and by people in the south Mr Faulkner has for some years appeared to be the Ulster poli- tician who perceives most clearly the over- riding need of the province for sufficient order to enable economic progress to be made. Ulster will not be deserted by Britain while Mr Faulkner tries to rule: nor indeed after that. Terrorism, much of which is purely criminal and the rest of which is quasi-criminal activity, must be vigorously suppressed; but the time has certainly not yet arrived, and may never do so, when such activity is best dignified and flattered by the metaphors and methods of warfare. It would be foolish to pretend that there is much cause for optimism in the present Irish situation; but so long as an acceptable Ulsterman rules at Stormont, and can maintain his majority, and so long as he realises that the British army must keep its hands clean by not taking up a sectarian position, then the 1921 Settle- ment will survive. Direct rule, if and when it comes, will, of course, not extinguish but reinforce the British recognition that Ulster is part of the United Kingdom. It has not yet come to direct rule.
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