The Salonica Side-Show. By V. J. Seligman. (Allen and Unwin.
10s. 6d. net.)—The tedium of a long campaign in un- healthy Macedonia did not affect Mr. Seligman's spirits. His second book is even more amusing and also more instructive than the first was. He gives a very clear account of the final offensive, which justified, by its great political results, the main- tenance of the army at Salonica, and he describes his experiences as a supply officer after the surrender and occupation of Bulgaria. Mr. Seligman says that the Second Bulgarian Army offered a stubborn resistance to the last British and Greek frontal attack near Doiran, which served its purpose in pinning that force to its own sector while the Serbs were pursuing the First Bul- garian Army. He speaks highly of the Greek troops, as well as of the Serbs. Our airmen turned the Bulgarian retreat into a rout. Mr. Seligman estimates the total strength of the Allied armies at 750,000, of which Great Britain maintained 200,000, France 250,000, Italy at least 50,000, Russia 40,000 until 1917, Serbia 125,000—a dwindling force—and Greece from 50,000 upwards, as the troops were gradually trained. His chapter on " The Tragedy of Constantine " is worth reading ; nothing that he says about the Allied diplomacy in regard to Bulgaria is too strong, but he errs in putting all the blame on the British Foreign Office.
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