THE LIBERAL LEADERS AND THE WAR. T HE Mahommedan papers miss
the point in their attacks on the leaders of Opposition. Their speeches during the Recess helped to prevent war on behalf of Turkey, not to hasten it, and were of the very highest service, not only to the cause of humanity, but to that of peace,—causes which are not invariably identical. But it is quite true that the responsibility for the great war which has commenced, and the much greater one into which, as we believe, Lord Beaconsfield may succeed in plunging us, rests in a grave degree upon their shoulders. Their timidity, their want of frank confidence in the people, their over-strained respect for one or two powerful colleagues, have assisted materially to bring affairs into their present most threatening position. If they had not shrunk back so visibly from the only policy which could with their views be logically. pursued, the policy pointed out by Mr. Gladstone in one of his first speeches, though he never pressed it afterwards—the policy of coercing Turkey, if needful, by sinking her fleet and separating Europe from Asia—there would have been no serious war at all, for European Turkey would have been placed in the hands of provincial Governors appointed by the Powers, and the causa causans of war, the provocation which rouses Russia, if it does not rouse her Government, would have disappeared. The Emperor, who detests war, would have been able to restrain his people and satisfy his army without it. The Government was fax too much appalled by the excitement of the country to have resisted such a course, and a Tory Government without Lord Beaconsfield would have made the threats in Lord Derby's philanthropic despatch executive. The Liberal leaders, however, hung back, they avoided debate or I made it purposeless, and the excited electors, seeing no definite policy proposed, fell once more into their usual dependence in all foreign questions upon the responsible chiefs of Departments. The country, which would have controlled its representatives, whether Tories or peace-men, sank back into languor and left them free,—the Tories to become Turks in feeling, and the peace-men to congratulate themselves that at least the guilt of arresting misdoers did not rest on the police. As the Liberals would not act with Russia, but only cried for an fin- possible concord of all Europe, Russia was at last compelled either to retreat—that is, to submit to a historical humiliation before Europe, a humiliation which would have involved a quarrel between the people and the dynasty—or to face all the risks and incur all the losses of a first-class war.
The war has began, and it finds English opinion in this situation: —It is assured by the Government, through its offi- cial spokesmen, through its strongest supporters—men like Mr. Chaplin, who are almost Vinisters—and through a hundred unrecognised organs, that the Russian Government is guilty in the war ; that it is not seeking to rescue the Christians, but is pursuing its own schemes of aggrandisement, many of them, it is more than hinted, being specially directed against the dearest interests of Great Britain. Russia is denounced as at once meanly treacherous and cynically insolent, regard- less of mankind and fanatically humanitarian, till the people begin to believe that all to whom they look for guidance hold that Russia, either by moral or material means, should be resisted. The anti-Russian feeling always latent in the people, who believe Russia to be the enemy at once of demo- cracy and of England, is studiously provoked, and the whole country is told in grandiloquent terms that the "Impe- rial position of Great Britain" is endangered by Russian aotion. The people, bewildered and irritated, turn to hear what can be said on the other side—turn not to the journalists but to the leaders—and find nothing, neither guidance, nor impulse, nor even thought. Not one idea of a policy to be pursued in the event of war have these leaders given oat, not one indication of the line in action which separates them from Tories. They acknowledge that their sympathies are against Turkey, but with the partial exception of the Duke of Argyle, who also has of late suffered himself to be silent, that is all. It is positively the fact that the country at this moment does not know what policy, Lord Harlington, the leader of the Liberal party, would preferentially pursue. He has given a clue to his sympathies, but of clue to his advice there is as yet no trace. Does he think Constantinople the "key of the world?" Does he believe that Russia, if vic- torious, will menace India ? Does he hold it necessary to fight Russia, or is there an alternative course which it is possible to pursue ? Nobody knows, and the average Englishman, not knowing, sees—with his rare and usually most admirable in- stinct for political action—no course for him but to follow, how- ever distrustfully, in his Government's wake.. There is no policy proposed from the other side, and consequently no hard centre round which opinion may concentrate itself and accrete to itself a body. There are thousands of men in England at this moment, each of them able to influence a county, a borough, a ward, or a circle, fretting their hearts out at the idea of war with Russia to the advantage of Turkey, ready to start into furious action, if only they could obtain guidance, but utterly bewildered and paralysed by the want of definiteness, the political timidity of their natural chiefs. It is nonsense to say they could act for themselves. They cannot act for themselves. It is their habit, the habit of their minds as well as of their training, to act in concert, to wait for watchwords, to look up to their leaders, and when they lead, to follow them with a discipline which, after all has been said about Liberal crotchettiness, has kept the progress of this country steady for fifty years. They can mutiny, if need be against i the immediate representatives. They did it in 1853. But they must, before they can act, hear the words of their ulti- mate representatives, must know which way the Oppoistion. Cabinet thinks they ought to go, and till they know it, they are inert and almost mute. Of all who spoke at St. James's Hall, not one has a word to utter now, and probably not one has altered his opinion. And the Opposition Cabinet has given them no help, has put out no programme, has made no speeches from which the most careful watchfulness can extract one grain of solid purpose. We do not believe such a situation ever occurred in English politics before. Here are half, or a third, or a tenth; if you will, of this great nation strongly opposed to a war visibly drawing nearer, ready to resist it almost by any means, and the leaders, who are equally anxious and equally resolved, have never even placed their views beyond suspicion. We are exaggerating? Well, we will apply one simple test. The " Conference ' at St. James's Hall represented all the most prominent persons in the Liberal party outside the regular politicians. Is there one man in that long list, from the Duke of Westminster down to the smallest representative of a Radical country club, who will venture to say positively and with a sense of, confident trust that he knows what the front Opposition bench would have him do / Their reticence, their inability to look over Members to the people, have destroyed all decision and almost all courage in the ranks of their own supporters, till Govern, meat will be enabled to say, when it plunges over the precipice, that the country had shown no visible hesitation to follow its lead. This is no time to mince matters. If this country goes to war in the worst cause ever disguised from it by plausible allegations, it will be due mainly to the want of political courage which throughout this Session has been the first characteristic of the official Liberal leaders. They have shrunk from forming the opinion without which they are but " Coggeshall captains,"—officers without a host. We shall be told, of course, that it is the fault of the men, and-not of the officers ; that the Opposition Cabinet had to think of its reeources ; that with the peace-men furious, and the Catholics recalcitrant, and the Independents hostile, it was useless for them to go forward ; but those excuses, however aonlid,. do not meet our charge, which is that the Liberal leaders have thought about Members, and have forgotten those who make them. What mattered a defeat in the lobbies, which every Member knew to be inevitable, on .a ques- tion so broad that even Tories will acknowledge that the country„, and not those who accidentally represent it, muet' ultimately decide? Had Lord Hartington condemned the Gov,ernment for the protracted action which has resulted in war,he would. not, it is said, have had. on the division 150 followers. Suppose he had not had fifteen? The people would have heard what his policy and that of his colleagues was, would have had au alternative before them, would have learned. in_the only? way in which English electors ever learn foreign politics.what.it.behoved them to do and wouldhave respondedunmistakably, If the response. had, been_ unfavourable, the -Liberal leaders would have been discharged of their responsi- bility; if it had been favourable, the rank and file would have been compelled to fall into rank behind their leaders, in num- bers swelled every day by those whom they, once convinced, once in movement, once speaking with vigour and decision, would have gradually converted. We should have remained possibly in a minority, but who ever heard of England waging a great war at the bidding of a bare majority, or against the will of a strong minority of the people strong enough to obtain a full hearing, and capable enough to be sure that in- tellectual victory would never be with their opponents ? It is useless in questions so vast as this for leaders of a minority, in a country like this, to care whether their immediate sup- porters understand them or no. If they do understand they cannot carry a measure or a resolution. The point for them is to be sure that the country understands them, that the ultimate tribunal has heard and comprehended their side, before it gives the decision which immediately precedes action. As yet, though permission to plead it has been twice asked, the cause has never been pleaded.
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