BOOKS.

THE UNION OF ITALY.*

TELE new "Cambridge Historical Series," which is under the editorship of Professor Prothero, makes a good beginning with Mr. Stillman's Union of Italy. Few episodes of modern history possess the romantic charm which belongs to the struggle of the Italians to free themselves from the yoke of the Hapsburgs and of the Bourbons. Not to Italians alone, but to many sympathisers in other lands, the venture of Italy was a Holy War, waged on behalf of the highest hopes of humanity. "Italy," wrote Mazzini, "is the Divine Infant called by God to be the Moses of the peoples of Europe." Mr. Swinburne's "Song of Italy" echoed in noble poetry the pre- diction of the Revolutionary chief. An historian, writing of the movement to-day, naturally makes use of more measured language. Italy is now free ; the desired union has been accomplished, with results considerably more modest than were anticipated fifty years ago. Mr. Stillman writes as a friend of Italy, but in the tone of a disappointed friend. He went to Italy in the year 1861, with an ardent love for the land, and the most exalted anticipation of the future of the Italian people. A prolonged residence in the country, however, under circumstances favourable to an intimate acquaintance with its political life, convinced him that the remark was true, once made to him by an Italian statesman: "The union of Italy was accomplished too quickly and too easily." It would have been better for Italy, in Mr. Stillman's judgment, to wait many more generations in order to fulfil the prophecy of Carlo Alberto,—Italia fara da se. This view, which Mr. Stillman terms the moral of his history, is fortunately not much obtruded in the excellent narrative portion of the work, which contains not a little to lead one to distrust it.

Although a friend of Austria, the author of The Union of Italy does not conceal the horrors of Austrian rule, and of the still fouler despotism under which Southern Italy suffered. The Austria of which he writes was vastly different from the Austria known to us, which, chastened by disaster, has abandoned most of the principles and methods of despotism. It was the Austria of Metternich, of Francis I., "the Imperial jailor and inquisitor," of Radetzky and Haynau. Those who guided its policy were distinguished alike by moral callousness and by limited intelligence. They could not understand that a high-spirited nation with a great past were not to be reduced to subservience by the use of means that might have been suitable enough in a convict-prison. The risings and con- spiracies excited by their insults to Italian feeling were met by torture and by repressive measures of a disgraceful character. The Emperor constituted himself jailor-in-chief, and, with an industry that would have done credit to Philip II. of Spain, prescribed the various tortures and privations to be inflicted on the victims. The effect on public opinion was

• what might have been expected. "The indignation of the civilised world," writes Mr. Stillman, "at the sufferings of Silvio Pellico, Confaloniere, and their companions in torture did more to relax the chains that held Italy down than all the risings which Austria suppressed."

It was not by the common people that the insulting oppressions of Austria and of the Neapolitan Government were most keenly felt ; the latter kept the lower classes in good humour by corrupting them. It was among the culti- vated classes, among the students and the educated young men, that the revolutionary movement took deepest root. "Young Italy" found its spokesman in Martini, whose mystic propaganda did a great deal to prepare the minds of the Italians for the changes that were to come. The early risings were, however, acts of despairing courage,—the ventures of men who felt that if they could not free their country, they • Tau Union of Italy, 1815-1895. By W. J. Stillraan, late Correspondent to the Tanta in Vitae. Cambridge: At the Univereity Prea3. De.] would die as a protest against her shameful servitude. The

expedition of the Bandiera brothers—well remembered in England because of the supposed complicity of the English Government in their capture—may be taken as a type of them all. The brothers had worn the Austrian uniform. They organised their expedition in Corfu, and landed in Italy with nineteen followers to overthrow the rule of the Bourbons. They had been warned by friends and sympathisers not to throw their lives away. They replied that they foresaw that the material influence of their attempt would be slight, but they hoped to give an eloquent example to others by dying in the cause of Italian freedom. Mr. Stillman writes as follows of the ill-fated expedition :—

"The absolute recklessness of the Bandieras, seen in the light of history. affords example at once of the folly and the heroism of the Italian insurrectionary movement. Judged by its immediate and practical results, it was folly ; judged by its moral influence, none of the futile attempts was more potent for Italian liberation. Mazzini has been charged with responsibility for this unfortunate effort. That he did constantly stimulate to rebellion at any cost and against any riek there can be no doubt : this was a characteristic of the Mazzinian agitation. The Bandiera enterprise was the legitimate fruit of Mazzini's propaganda, and the fact that at the last moment he condemned as rash that particular movement in which the Bandieras perished does not affect the accusation that he urged men recklessly and without any regard to the consequences to attempt insurrection, even in the most desperate circumstances. It is impossible, however, to judge or to condemn the general policy except with reference to the general result., and there is no question that the general result of Mazzini's policy was to develop in the most direct and powerful manner the insurrectionary tendency amongst all the youth of Italy. The enthusiasm of men who die for an idea has the effect of martyrdom, whether political or religious, and Mazzini's teaching must always be judged as a religions propaganda and not as practical politics. The names of the Bandieras undoubtedly acted subsequently as powerful incentives, and the faith of the brothers, expressed in their own words, caused their example to be contagious to forty thousand Italian lovers of their country and bound by oath to her fortunes.' It is necessary that those who are given to martyrdom should throw themselves absolutely into any enter- prise, even though it be destined to failure, hoping to induce by their example the inert and the timid and those of little faith to follow them."

Mr. Stillman remarks with justice that Pio Nono's passing fit of liberalism, although soon repented of, gives him a place, which he would not have coveted, among those who made contributions to the union of Italy. Many who were

repelled by the extreme and free-thinking propaganda of Mazzini hailed with joy the pious and sentimental liberalism of the Head of the Church. Gioberti Balbo and D'Azeglio, in writings which were widely read, advocated the con- federation of the Italian States under the presidency of the Pope, seeking in this way to unite the hopes of young Italy with the more conservative sentiment of the rest of the nation with regard to religion and the Church. The subse- quent conduct of the Pope proved the truth of the saying of Metternich, "A liberal Pope is inconceivable;" but his short- lived display of liberal and Italian sympathies helped forward

the cause which he afterwards came to look upon as the most

fatal enemy of the Church.

A great opportunity came to Italy in 1848. Austria was weakened by internal troubles, and Carlo Alberto was able to lead a large and gallant army against it. The opportunity was lost mainly through the weakness of the King, who was a vacillating dreamer. Mr. Stillman gives a pathetic picture of him during the campaign, spending his nights in fasting and prayer, and during the day wandering about in the camp, a haggard, distraught figure,—unable to give suitable orders, but too vain and obstinate to entreat the leadership to competent hands. He refused the aid of France, which he

might have had on conditions. With the abdication of Carlo Alberto and the succession of his son, the cause of Italian freedom passed from the phase of hope into that of practical

fulfilment. Vittorio Emanuele was free from the unpractical fanaticism which had been the weakness of all former cham- pions of Italian freedom, and he was fortunate enough to secure the services of one of the greatest Ministers of modern times. By inducing Piedmont to join the Allies in the Crimean War,

in spite of the protests of the extreme party, Cavour gained for his country a recognised place in the Councils of Europe at the Congress of Paris. A few years later, at a villagu ln the Vosges, he persuaded Napoleon to join Piedmont in a war against Austria, and to undertake to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic. The price required by France, aad

agreed to by Cavonr, was the cession of Savoy and Nice. "It was a heavy price to pay," writes Mr. Stillman, "but it bought eventually much more than Napoleon ever intended to give." Notwithstanding this acknowledgment of the immense value of the French alliance, Mr. Stillman, un- reasonably, as it seems to us, deplores that Italy owed its liberation to the sword of France. But the hopes of Italy could not be permanently kept alive by abortive risings; and it is difficult to see from what other quarter the physical force could have been obtained to overcome the armed power of Austria. England, it is true, as Mr. Stillman says, had always urged on Austria the progressive liberation and con- stitutional evolution of Italy. But Austria knew too well that in the temper of the Italian people, liberal institutions would only whet the appetite for complete freedom. It was most, unlikely that Austria would part with some of its fairest provinces unless compelled to do so by a great military disas- ter. All movements, religious as well as political, if they are not to disappear leaving not a trace behind them, must pass at a certain stage from the guidance of dreamers and enthu- siasts into the hands of practical men. The transition may rob them of their ideal beauty, and alienate some of their earliest supporters, but it is the price that must be paid for permanent influence.

Mr. Stillman's volume contains an interesting account of an incident in 1870 which was very near bringing Italy into the field by the side of its old ally, the Emperor of the French. Through the medium of the Austs'an Ambassador a proposal was made to Italy to take the froet line as the ally of France, Austria-Hungary engaging to support the alliance with an army of observation on the German frontier. Italy acquiesced on the condition of the surrender of Rome as the price of its assistance. The Emperor, in deference to Catholic feeling in France, refused to give up Rome. After the battle of Woerth, however, negotiations were resumed through Prince Napoleon, who offered any concessions demanded by Italy. The Austrian Cabinet and the Ministers of Vittorio Emanuele decided that the offer came too late, although the King himself desired to join his forces with those of the French Emperor. Mr. Stillman tells a story that when Vittorio Emanuele visited the Emperor William at Berlin in 1873, he said to his host with his wonted frankness : "But for these gentlemen (pointing to his Ministers, Minghetti and Tisconti-Venosta), I should have made war on you in 1870."

Mr. Stillman has much to say regarding the unsatisfactory condition of Italian political life at present. The rancour of political factions, he remarks, and the corruptions of the agencies have developed a contempt for Parliamentary insti- tutions which is at this moment the greatest danger of the nation. It is well to remember, however, when deploring the evils of political faction, the wise remark of Cavour : "The worst Chamber is better than the best Ante-Chamber."