CORRESPONDENCE.
THE NAVY ESTIMATES.
[To THE EDITOR Or yes *SPROTATOR." J
Sire,—The Navy Estimates for 1908-9, issued on Monday, are of exceptional interest. "Parliament is asked to vote 2900,000 more money this year than last," says Lord Tweed- mouth in his Explanatory Statement, but "the total outlay for the year will stand at a figure of 213,984 only in excess of that for 1907-8." This apparent discrepancy, which has
puzzled some commentators on the Estimates, is due principally to the fact that last year "stores were drawn from stock without replacement" to the value of 2740,000, and the "expenditure from loans" was about 2238,000 greater than it will be in the coming year. It is universally agreed that the decision to carry Navy Loan Bills no further, but to charge to current Estimates expenditure on works for naval purposes, is a wise one. On the other hand, in future the Vote for Works will be larger, and the expenditure on Rosyth will swell the total for some years to come. Taking the gross expenditure on Naval Services during the four years 1904-5 to 1907-8, loans were drawn upon to the aggregate amount of nearly 210,300,000; and the annuity charged on the Estimates in redemption of the loan has risen from 2634,000 to 21,214,000. For 1908-9 the annuity will be £1,264,000; the gross expenditure on Naval Services will be 234,458,000 (round figures). Of this gross expenditure a little less than 2900,000 will be taken from the loan. Four years ago the Vote was nearly 237,000,000,—the high-water mark of British Navy Estimates; it fell to 233,152,000 in 1905-6; stood at a little less than 231,500,000 in the two years following ; and next year will be 232,319,500. Once more an "ascending scale" has been reached, and there are good- reasons for thinking that the increase of expenditure now begun will be considerable in the immediate future,—largely because of circumstances beyond control or of action dependent upon that taken by foreign Admiralties. In previous letters atten- tion has been drawn to the real causes of the large reductions made in Navy Estimates in the years 1905-6 and 1906-7, as distinct from the alleged causes,—removal of ships from the Effective List, improved administration of dockyards, &c. It is unnecessary, therefore, to repeat the explanations given, and in the following remarks attention will be restricted to the most notable features of the new Estimates, and the conclusions which may be drawn therefrom.
First as to Repairs of the Fleet—Lord Tweedmouth calls attention to "an increased provision of 2700,000 for repairs for the coming year." He makes no allusion, however, to the fact that for 1908-9 there is also proposed an increase of £135,000 in sea-stores, &c., for the Fleet, bringing the total addition for repairs and maintenance up to nearly 2860,000 as compared with the provision for last year. This addition, be it noted, is made upon a total provision in last year's Estimates of 22,969,000. Last year also Mr. Robertson informed the House of Commons that be had insisted on a larger provision being made in the Estimates than was first thought necessary by his naval colleagues ; and what is now happening confirms his wise provision on that occasion. It is not yet known what the actual expenditure on repairs and maintenance for the Fleet will be in the financial year now ending ; but in the preceding year (1906-7) when the provision was 22,778,000, the expenditure was 23,116,000, and it is probable that this year will show similar excess. The simple fact is that after starving the expenditure on repairs and maintenance for more than three years—since the new regime was established on the accession to office of the First Sea Lord—and claiming great economies in expenditure, a point has been reached when the game can be no longer played. In 1904-5 the provision made for repairs and maintenance was nearly four millions. This was arranged before Sir John Fisher took office. The expenditure that year was about 23,674,000, and credit was claimed for the saving of about 2325,000; but it was then pointed out that there had really been a postponement of work considered necessary when the Estimates were framed. In 1905-6 the provision made was about 23,317,000; in 1906-7 only 22,778,000; in 1907-8 not quite 23,000,000; and for 1908-9 it is 23,828,341. All that has been said by the opponents of the "starving" policy is justified. Lord Tweedmouth's lengthy explanations of the increased expenditure on repairs might have been compiled from the criticisms, published in previous letters of this series and elsewhere, as to the impossibility of keeping down expenditure to the limits of recent Estimates, and maintaining the Fleet in full efficiency. The Admiralty has executed a complete voile-face, and the country has reason to rejoice that this has been done. There is no need to inquire too curiously as to the causes which have brought about this change of policy ; but it may be permitted to suggest, after Mr. Robertson's public assertion of his con- viction that there must be no question of the efficiency of the
provision for repairs and maintenance, that his influence must have been potent in the matter. It is also a fact, even if it be a mere coincidence, that the present Second Sea Lord, as Controller of the Navy, had to carry out the special Programme of Repairs which became necessary under the administration of Lord Selborne, in order to clear off arrears that had been allowed to accumulate in consequence of inadequate financial provision in preceding years.
Lord Tweedmouth, of course, in this matter is guided by his naval advisers; his public utterances are based upon their statements. It is singular, however, to compare what be has said recently in public speeches with passages appearing in the Explanatory Memorandum. At Liverpool on Decem- ber 16th last he dealt heavily with those who asserted that "the naval repairs were not efficiently attended to." He said he "should like those who criticised to know what they were talking about"; he clinched the argument about repairs by saying :—" Now they had on every warship a workroom with modern equipment to effect repairs. They bad a great number of duplicates of different parts of machinery so that they could easily be restored if anything went wrong. Hence the ships were kept constantly in repair. Then, again, with every fleet they had a repair-ship, the business of which was to look after the more serious mishaps that had occurred. That was an enormous advance, and would be a great advantage in the future." Probably Lord Tweedmouth may be surprised to learn that workshops have been established in ships of the Royal Navy for twenty or thirty years past ; that it has always been the rule to have "spare parts" of the machinery; and that repair-ships were provided long ago. Of course the growth of the Fleet has necessitated the provision of more and larger repair-ships ; but the policy is no novelty, and it has no real bearing on the large repairs of the Fleet. This is, indeed, admitted by Lord Tweedmouth himself in his Memorandum, where he says : "Excellent work continues to be done by repair-ships and the artificers of the Fleet in correcting small defects which might otherwise develop to such an extent as to necessitate dockyard assistance before
the annual refit was due ; but nevertheless an increased provision for repairs is needed for the coming year." The Liverpool speech, be it noted, was made at a date when the preparation of the Estimates must have been far advanced, and the difference between the two statements is therefore the more remarkable. It looks as if the originators of the policy now abandoned were resolved "to die fighting." Further evidence of this resolve is to be seen in articles more or less inspired published in the Press about the same time. On December 28th, for instance, our old acquaintance "A Civil Engineer" published a long article in the Times on "Navy Estimates and Navy Repairs." It bristled with figures as to tonnage of ships, outlay on repairs, &c.; indeed, one wondered how a "Civil Engineer" could have accumulated all this data without assistance front quarters specially well informed. His personal acquaintance with the subject could not have been great; even the most painstaking research in musty Blue-books could not suffice to secure a true and complete account of incidents that happened twenty years ago. His broad conclusion was that the "new repair system" was a splendid success; that it secured efficiency and economy: all was well in this respect. In 1904-5 the repairs of fifty- three battleships kept efficient for commission were said to have "cost about 21 103. per ton; in 1906-7 fifty-two battleships cost £1 4s. 3td. per ton for repairs." "Upon this basis a. total saving of £213,000 on repairs to battleships in one year" was said to have been effected. "Civil Engineer's" method might be pushed further no doubt : the phrase "kept efficient" is open to many interpretations: expenditure on repairs in any year might be reduced by neglecting to execute them, and the rate per ton might be nil. One fears that the publication of the new Estimates must have been a terrible shock to all such advocates and admirers of the "new repair system."
Second, as to Expenditure on Naval Stores.—It has been repeatedly pointed out that during recent years the stocks of stores held in reserve for the Fleet had been seriously reduced, and that consequently there was a less margin for urgent requirements arising in case of sudden war. No one desires to have unnecessary accumulations of stores that might deteriorate or become obsolete; but, on the other hand, a sufficient reserve of stores is essential, and the cost must be met. On many previous occasions depletion of stocks has been carried on for limited periods in order to keep down expenditure temporarily. In the end it has been always felt that the game was too dangerous to continue. Figures now published in the Estimates show that in the last three financial years the "value of stores drawn from stock without replacement" has aggre- gated more than three millions sterling. Lord Tweedmouth endorses the view that "reforms in dockyard administration, and the redistribution of the Fleet, which were determined on and carried out by the late Board of Admiralty," produced "a large redundancy of stores." His opinion on that subject can hardly be taken as conclusii,e, and one may be permitted to doubt the soundness of his conclusion when it is remembered that the official Estimate of the total value of stocks of naval stores at home and abroad in April, 1903, showed a grand total of only 25,152,000. Moreover, when reference is made to details of the Store Vote for the coming year, it is found that on three sections alone—metals and metal articles, paint materials and miscellaneous, and electrical apparatus—the increased expenditure proposed in 1908-9, as compared with 1907-8, shows an addition of more than three-quarters of a million. One need not wonder that Lord Tweedmouth says that "a fresh sum of some £700,000 has to be provided to buy the balance of Naval Stores required for 1908.9"; but it is necessary at the same time to note that no less than half-a- million's-worth of stores will also be drawn from stock in that year "without replacement." One of the subjects requiring careful inquiry is obviously the sufficiency of the stocks retained to meet the exigencies of war, and make the Navy safe against possible demands of an urgent character. The " waste " of modern naval war is terrible, and an error on the full side is preferable.
Third, Expenditure on New Construction.—For the coming year this expenditure is to be £7,545,000, as against £8,100,000 in 1907-8, £8,862,000 in 1906-7, and £9,688,000 in 1905-6, the first year of the present regime. The two years preceding were exceptional—owing largely to the purchase of two Chilian battleships—the expenditure exceeding eleven millions each year. For the remaining years of the present century the expenditure varied from eight and a half to nine millions. That now proposed is practi- cally identical with the expenditure on new construction in 1899-1900. Much will be said as to this reduction ; the writer's view has been already expressed. In his judgment, the British Navy occupies, and will occupy for the next three years, a satisfactory position apart from any further programme of construction, but taking into account all that the revised German programme includes. Lord Tweedmouth's statement puts the position clearly and correctly when he says that our programme in future years "must depend upon the additions made to their Naval force by foreign Powers." His Majesty's Government "have every intention of maintaining the Standard of the British Navy which has hitherto been deemed necessary for the safeguarding of our national and Imperial interests." The actual programme of further new construction is modest,—one battleship, one large armoured cruiser, six fast protected cruisers, sixteen destroyers, and some submarines. The sum provided for initial expenditure on these vessels is only £750,000; the total liability incurred may be taken as about eight millions ; but this is not officially stated. Parliament certainly ought to be informed of the total liability and given information as to the types proposed. It is a notable fact that small protected cruisers are again to be built, although three years ago many of those we had were relegated to the "scrap-heap," or turned into 'Llamas' and left to deteriorate. Some of these have been quietly brought back into service; others that might have been of great value for North Sea service have been recklessly thrown away. Lord Tweedmouth indignantly denies the statement that the Admiralty has no "plans of campaign" prepared; but it cannot be a matter for surprise that there has been a doubt when it is recognised that Programmes of Shipbuilding, which should be based on such plans and be consistent with them, in practice display most "in and out" running.
Rosyth.—At last a start is to be made with the new naval base at this place. A general scheme has been drawn up : a part is now to be executed ; for this part the estimated cost is to be three and a quarter millions, and 230,000 is to be spent on it in the coming year. The estimated total liability for the "general scheme" is not stated; the partial scheme will
bear heavily on the Estimates for coming years. Memories are short-lived in these days, but the fact may be recalled that at the close of the first year (1905) of " reformed " Admiralty eystem, lists of resulting " economies " were widely circulated La the Press. Amongst these figured four or five millions for Rosyth ; and existing naval bases were said to have been made serviceable for the whole Fleet by the removal of ineffective ships,—the "courageous stroke of the pen." There re many such instances of premature" counting of chickens," but those concerned reckon upon public forgetfulness and proceed gaily. Hesitancy and want of due consideration on the part of the Admiralty are indicated by such changes, and give rise to serious apprehensions. Lord Tweedinouth's attempts at explanation are neither complete nor satisfactory. A great work of this nature ought not to have been begun, or even the site acquired, without full preliminary inquiry. The future of Rosyth will lib watched with anxiety after what has happened.
Lord Tweedmouth records his personal opinion that the series of important changes and alterations affecting all branches of his Majesty's Naval Service" made during the last few years are "entirely well conceived and salutary." This statement must be associated, of course, with the considera- tions that Lord Tweedmouth's acquaintance with naval matters is of very recent date, and that many authorities whose experience and knowledge of naval affairs are vastly greater differ from him radically in their estimate of the present position and the future effect of these changes. Lord Tweed- mouth adds : "Time is now required for the Service to digest and assimilate the new arrangements, and caution will there- fore be used in bringing forward further schemes at present." For this relief much thanks. Is it too much to suggest that there is also a. possibility that the Service may never be able "to digest and assimilate the new arrangements " ; that its welfare has been and will be seriously prejudiced thereby; and that as there are already pronounced and unfavourable symptoms resulting from recent treatment, remedial measures should be taken without delay P-1 am, Sir, &c., CIvis. .
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