MACEDONIA AND EUROPE.
SIR EDWARD GREY'S policy in regard to Macedonia is not, so far as we can see, in any way open to the criticism passed upon it by Mr. Masterman. No doubt a prima-facie ease can be made out for that criticism. Macedonia is decidedly in a worse plight to-day than when Lord Lansdowne was in office. But to say this is not to say that the change is due to any inaction on the part of Sir Edward Grey. There is no reason to believe that things would have been different if Lord Lansdowne were still Foreign Secretary. It is due rather to an awakening to the situation on the part of the Sultan. He has taken the measure of the European Concert, and he has discovered that he need be under no serious alarm as to its action. Like so many other efforts of the same kind and directed to the same end, its bark has proved worse than its bite. When Lord Lansdowne, had the charge of our policy in the Near East the Concert was still in the barking stage. The mere fact that the Powers had thought it necessary to take the affairs of Macedonia in hand, that the Ambas- sadors were holding frequent meetings, that joint Notes were being drawn up, that sundry demands were being made upon the Porte, and that the very astute diplomatist to whom they were addressed was considering what answer he should return to them—naturally suggested the customary hope that this time something would come of so much ostentatious preparation. Had there been no change of Government, these anticipations would equally have been disappointed. The failure—and un- doubtedly there has been failure—would have been no less complete than it is to-day. For that failure is inherent in the character of the Concert and in the character of the Sultan. A different Sultan might have been so impressed by the apparent resolution of the Powers, by their absolute unanimity, and by the comprehensiveness of their demands that he might at once have conceded all that they asked. A different Concert, again, might have imposed its will even upon Abd-ul-Hamid. He might instinctively have recognised that this time the Powers were animated by a common purpose and a common determination to give effect to it, and under the influence of this belief he might have been as pliable as he has in fact been obstinate. But things being what they were, neither side was long deceived. Certain members of the Concert knew perfectly well that they meant to do as little as they decently could, and the Sultan was not long in finding this out for himself, even if it were not confidentially com- municated to him. When a new and imposing machine is first set to work, it is difficult for the spectators to persuade themselves that it is going to do nothing ; and familiar as the Concert of Europe has become, and little as we have been taught to expect from it, it is still imposing in presence and stately in movement. Happy is the Foreign Secretary to whom it falls to play his part in the initial stages of each fresh manifestation of its strength. This was Lord Lansdowne's good fortune ; to Sir Edward Grey has fallen the humbler function of being associated with its later and less creditable developments. But this is no fault of Sir Edward Grey's. He is in the position of the one partner in the Concert who really means business, and he has bad, as any other Foreign Secretary would have had, to discover how little he can do in that character when at every step lie has to carry with him four indifferent or unwilling colleagues.
Even if the mandate of the Conference had been given to Great Britain, it is doubtful whether he would have been able to do much more, supposing the Powers to have been of their present minds. His every act would have been hindered by endless constrictions and limitations. But when the mandatories were Austria and Russia there was no room for even a momentary self-deception. The execution of the Concert's decision was entrusted to these two Powers on the plausible ground that, as the nearest neighbours of Macedonia, they were most interested in its well-being. And so in a sense they were ; the misfortune was that their interests were not identical. Indeed, this is a very mild way of stating the case. Both of them hope to have a large share in the residuary estate of the Sultan, and any settlement which took Macedonia out of that estate would proportionately lessen the value of the divisible remainder. There is no need to suppose that they are specially indifferent to the bad government of Macedonia. It is only that their sympathy with its present condition is tempered by their desire to postpone any im- provements which would put difficulties in the way of the final settlement which each desires. It may be thought unjust to attribute to either of them any unwillingness to extract from the Sultan the power of suppressing the Greek and Bulgarian bands which have of late been the principal agents in the harrowing of the Macedonian population. But the residuary legatees of the Sultan are in a different case from those who stand in that relation towards a private owner. In the latter case the inheritance depends upon a single life. In the case of the Sultan it depends upon the life of an Empire. If Macedonia were as well governed as the Lebanon—and. it would not be beyond the power of a united Europe to secure this—it might give the rule of the Turk in Europe something like a ninety-nine years' lease. Little as his rulers have recognised the fact, it is Turkish misgovernment that, in recent times, has been the main cause of Turkish weakness. The establishment of order and tranquillity in Macedonia would deprive Europe of the main plea on which she now rests her claim to interfere from time to time in the affairs of the Porte. A contented population might have no active desire to escape from the easy rule of a Governor appointed with the concurrence of the Powers, and irremovable except with their consent. It might even compare its condition with that of the neighbouring kingdoms, and find no reason for making any change in its political position. Englishmen, who see no territorial expansion lying before them—in Europe—are not perhaps fair judges of the aspect which such a prospect wears to an inhabitant of Russia or Austria-Hungary.
It is not wonderful, therefore, that in Sir Edward Grey's speech the note of hopefulness was not strongly marked. No doubt if it were open to Great Britain to act alone, her course would be very much plainer. The difficulty that stands in the way is not how Macedonia can obtain decent government, but how Europe can be brought to will the measures—not at all revolutionary in themselves— which would bring decent government within sight. Sir Edward Grey sketched out towards the close of his speech what the measures in question should be. He sees no reason why a Mussulman should not govern Macedonia, " provided that his character, position, and powers were satisfactory." In this way the religious feelings of the Turks would be respected, while the relation of the Governor to the Powers would ensure his acceptance of their policy. Under such a system the foreign officers in Macedonia might all be placed upon the Macedonian Budget, instead of being paid by the Powers, and the financial strain be relieved by large reductions in the Turkish forces. The introduction of this last-mentioned economy would necessitate the provision of a substitute for an armed force in the shape of a collective guarantee by the Powers of the security and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Sir Edward Grey enforces his recom- mendation of this way out of the Macedonian difficulty by the significant reminder that if the Macedonian situation continues as it is, neither political security nor terri- torial integrity can be regarded as beyond the reach of danger. This part of the warning is evidently intended for the Sultan. The Foreign Secretary's object in uttering it is to make him see that he will run greater risks by holding out against the demands of Europe than he cau possibly incur by conceding them. It is not, however, to the Sultan only that Sir Edward Grey addressed his sermon. The interests of the Powers themselves were not left out of sight. Not even to deliver Macedonia from the rival inroads from which she now suffers can Great Britain put the peace of Europe in jeopardy. But she can impress upon the Powers that in keeping clear of one danger they may easily run upon another. With Macedonia in her present state, "anything which is less than a remedy can be little better than a farce." To play with the European situation in this fashion may be to provoke a catastrophe ; and is this a contingency which the Powers can safely ignore ? The Concert cannot break up with its work unaccomplished and count upon things falling back into their former state. Europe will have been tried and have been found wanting. She will have evaded a duty laid upon her, and the irritation consequent on such a policy may bear fruit in unforeseen ways. About this part of Sir Edward Grey's speech there was an undiplomatic ring which may perhaps indicate even graver uneasiness than he chose to give expression to. If the Concert comes to an end with nothing to show in the way of results, it will be a virtual promise of impunity to the Sultan and of permanence to his methods of government. Is Abd-ul-Hamid quite the man to whom such a promise can be prudently given ?
Before we leave the subject of Macedonia we should like to draw attention to aspoint too often neglected. People sometimes talk as if it were only the Christian subjects of the Sultan who suffer from Turkish misgovernment. That is an entire mistake. The Christians are by no means monopolists in misery. The condition of their Moslem fellow-subjects is quite as tragic. In dealing with the Sultan and his Government this aspect of the case should never be forgotten, and care should be taken by those who desire reform to keep it well to the front. Especially does it behove British opponents of the Sultan to make the Mohammedan sufferers understand that reform is intended quite as much to help them as to help the Christians. The Sultan is only a name to conjure with in Turkey when his friends are able to raise the cry of "the Christian against the Turk."
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