SINGAPORE AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
WHAT is the position now with regard to Singapore ? The Government has decided not to proceed with the construction of a battle-fleet base, but to complete the fuelling arrangements made by the late Government, a sum of £200,000 having been set aside in the Naval Estimates for this purpose. To us this appears to be a sound decision.
No one, of course, denies the strategical importance of Singapore. It is the gateway to the Indian Ocean, and upon that ocean there floats at any moment of the day or night something like £160,000,000 worth of British ships and cargo. Moreover, Singapore is a good covering base for the Pacific Ocean, and therefore for the defence of Australasia. We have now adequate facilities at Singapore for docking and repairing our light forces of the China Station. These forces consist at present of five light cruisers, a flotilla of submarines, and a number of gunboats. A further strengthening of our naval strength in the Far East will probably become necessary in the near future, but the ships at the disposal of the Com- mander-in-Chief are now substantially adequate for the ordinary routine duties of commerce protection, and also for the protection of the lives and property of British- subjects.
The completion of the fuelling arrangements at Singa- pore by the establishment of tanks for oil storage will give to our naval forces in the Far East that mobility which is essential if they are to perform their duties of protecting our commerce efficiently. For if we go to war with any Power in the future, raiders will undoubtedly escape into the oceans. Curiously enough, Germany is the only Power against which, by reason of her geo- graphical position, we can maintain a close naval blockade. These raiders will have to be tracked- down and destroyed by fast light craft, and Singapore is the ideal base from which these craft should operate if protection is to be afforded to our vast Pacific and Indian Ocean trade. Here indeed is the crux of the whole question. It is absolutely vital that we should be able to operate with our light forces from Singapore.
But the establishment of a base for our battle-fleet at a cost of something like twelve millions is a very different affair. First of all it is a direct challenge to Japan. No other Power possesses, or is likely to possess, a battle-fleet in that part of the world. The fact that war was regarded as possible between ourselves and Japan might well lead to a regrettable coolness in the relationship of the two countries, followed by a tremendous increase in Japanese naval construction, and a consequent derangement of the whole consortium of British-American-Japanese naval strength in the Pacific. We might find ourselves once more involved in a crippling race of naval armaments, which could only have one end.
From a purely naval point of view also it would be suicidal for us to attempt to maintain a battle-fleet at Singapore. The Japanese Fleet must be reckoned as the second most powerful fleet in the world to-day ; what it lacks in material, as compared with the fleet of the United States, it more than makes up for in personnel and in general .efficiency. At present we have ten battleships mounting 15-inch guns, and two under construction mounting J6-inch guns. On the assumption that the construction of two more battleships is sanctioned in the near future for replacement purposes, it will still be necessary for us to concentrate the whole of this battle-fleet in Far Eastern waters if we are to challenge Japanese naval power on a capital ship basis ; for at such distances questions of docking and repairs will at once- become for us acute ; whereas Japan, like Germany in the recent War, can choose her time. Here it may be mentioned that Lord Jellicoe gave it as his considered opinion that we should require not less than eight battleships and eight battle-cruisers for this purpose.
As soon as we begin to construct docks for capital ships. at Singapore, the Japanese Naval Staff must inevitably devote its whole time to the evolution of plans having for their sole object the destruction of this base. In a few years aerial warfare may develop to such an extent as to render the oil-tanks at Singapore extremely vulnerable, and in this connexion it should be borne in mind that the reason why our battle-fleet was left unmolested in the early stages of the recent War was because the Germans were not aware of the fact that Scapa Flow 'had been selected by us to be the Fleet base. On the other hand, the existing arrangements at Singapore for the mainten- ance of our light forces cannot exercise the minds of the Japanese Naval Authorities, for they cannot possibly be construed as a move in any sense hostile to Japan.
It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of the Mediterranean to us. It is, as Mr. Amery has pointed out, the geographical centre of the main highway of the British Empire. The importance of Malta as our great naval centre is not challenged. And in concentrating_the main portion of our battle-fleet in the Mediterranean the present Government is pursuing a wise course. Strained relations between two great Powers such as Japan and ourselves would inevitably cause a situation of high tension all over the world. In these circumstances would any British Board of Admiralty accept the responsi- bility of denuding not only the Mediterranean, but home waters as well, of all our capital ships ? During the comparatively minor Turkish crisis of 1922, it was found that the six battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet were insufficient for the work, and reinforcements of capital ships had to be drafted into the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Fleet.
There are many technical objections to the basing of our battle-fleet at Singapore, which need only be touched on here. How, for instance, is it proposed to concentrate the Fleet in the Far East in time to prevent a surprise attack by Japan ? If you send it round the Cape, a cruise of several weeks, with consequent wear and tear, is involved ; but the transport of a Fleet through the Suez Canal is a highly dangerous and difficult operation, which has never yet been attempted. Haw is it proposed to supply and man the Fleet when it is at Singapore ? The Fourth Sea Lord would have an almost impossible task, owing to the length of his lines of communication, and the consequent vulnerability of his supply ships to attacks by enemy raiders, submarines and aircraft.
Finally, the construction of such a base as was contem- plated by the last Government would take about eleven years ; and even if the contention of the British Naval Staff that the capital ship is to-day the basis of naval strength be accepted, it would be rash to assume that this will necessarily be the case in 1935. There is every reason to suppose that aerial development will continue to make rapid progress, and that we shall shortly have planes capable of working at long distances, and also of developing highly effective torpedo attacks on a fleet at sea. Commander Burney is constantly emphasizing the great efficiency and economy of airships for reconnaissance work at sea. A time may come when the arguments in favour of the establishment of an air base at Singapore will prove overwhelming. A composite air force working from Singapore would be able to protect itself against hostile air attack ; and it is reasonable to suppose that during the next ten years it could be developed into a highly efficient weapon of, offence.
The majority of the present House of Commons is agreed that the adequate defence of the Empire must be secured ; and it is perfectly competent to debate the larger questions of naval strategy. The Prime Minister made out a good case from the naval point of view for laying down five cruisers, and consequently secured a large majority. It is a pity that he did not base his argument for not proceeding with the Singapore scheme on realistic naval considerations. Instead he adopted a sort of apologetic air, and a debate which should have been of a technical nature developed into a fruitless discussion on pacifism. There is a tendency in certain quarters to regard the present Naval Staff at the Admir- alty as infallible ; which is unfortunate, because it is with the Government and the House of Commons that the ultimate decision lies. The House having agreed upon the broad lines of defence policy, the question of Singapore should be considered solely on its merits or demerits from a naval and economic point of view. Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Amery seem determined to make it into a party question. This is to be regretted.
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