THE ‘NISERO ' NEGOTIATIONS.
-FIORD GRANVILLE'S despatch to Count de Bylandt, dated May 31st, as regards the negotiations for the release of the crew of the Nisero,' is an admirable one ; but the reply given to Mr. Storey's question on Monday by Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, is to our ears alarming, indicating as it does joint action between England and Holland in a matter on which our objects and interests are very different. What we had hoped to see was the British Government taking prompt action in the sense of that despatch, and cutting itself free from the trammels of that joint action in Sumatra of which the Dutch were, not perhaps unnaturally, so desirous. The simple truth is, that our interests in this matter are quite distinct from the Dutch interests, and that nothing can be more dangerous than to mix them up together. What we want, and the only thing we want, is to get the crew of the Nisero ' out of their captivity—an end for which the use of force is not only useless, but fatal. We cannot make a military expedition into the interior of Sumatra without great expense, great loss of "life, and great delay,—none of them of the smallest use for our purpose, and the last fatal to it ; for great delay means, of course, more deaths among the captive crew. Moreover, the first prospect of success would involve the murder of the cap- tives,—the very thing we wish to avoid. On the other hand, the Dutch Government would like nothing better than to obtain such allies as the English in a war with the troublesome Achinese, who for twelve years have defied their power. The more our special purpose might be frustrated, the more probable it would be that we should be led on into the sort of general alliance against the Achinese which would suit the views of the Dutch Government, and would not suit us. Nothing could be more dangerous than to get ourselves embroiled in the difficult and useless struggle in which the Dutch have so long been engaged, and which hitherto has led to nothing except, as Lord Granville says, most unfortunate and mischievous restrictions on the trade of Sumatra with the rest of the world,—restrictions which constitute "a departure from the treaty of 1824 between Great Britain and the Nether- lands," "if not a violation of one of the most important stipu- lations of that treaty." If we get mixed up with the policy of the Netherlands in Sumatra, we shall run the risk of being involved in an expedition a great deal more difficult than the Ashanti Expedition, and one which can produce no sort of result favourable to our captive seamen. Holland might profit by enlisting British soldiers in the war against the Achinese, but we must suffer. Therefore it is that we protest against any common action with a Power which has different objects from our own, and which cannot but be biassed by her own objects in any policy which she may take in concert with us.
What we ought to aim at is separate negotiation with the Rajah of Tenom, for whom we believe that we might be able to find inducements to give up his prisoners,—inducements, too, which, far from operating against our general interests, would be entirely in favour of those interests. If we could send out an experienced negotiator with the full authority of the Queen, to do what Sir Andrew Clarke did in the Malay Peninsula in 1874, we believe that we might gain our end not only with- out the co-operation of the Dutch Government, but all the better for the absence of that co-operation. It is perfectly true that we have admitted the Dutch jurisdiction in Sumatra, and cannot now formally treat the various petty chiefs there as independent. But we can insist to the Dutch Govern- ment that as their intervention has failed, and as the use of force would be certain to defeat the very ends we have in view, we should be allowed to negotiate for ourselves with those who are de facto independent, whatever the Dutch may claim that they are de jure. And we may go further, and press the Dutch to give us, as our means of negotiation, that right of free-trade with the Achinese ports which our treaty with Holland really secured for us, and which has been a dead-letter only because we have been too long-suffering in allowing the Dutch to press their very useless and mischievous blockade of Achinese ports, without really using that blockade for any effective purpose at all. The
twelve years' struggle has had no serious effect, except to give the Dutch the few military posts they can actually occupy, without any trace of influence for even half a mile beyond these posts. That is not a condition of things to be tolerated for an unlimited time. We have a right to press the Dutch Government to withdraw its embargo on our trade with the port of the Rajah of Tenom, and to sanction our offering the opening of that port to the Rajah of Tenom, if he will do his duty by giving up our men to us. It is clear enough from the correspondence, too, that the Rajah is not acting quite without reference to some central power. There is some central power at Kemala, in conjunction with which the Rajah is playing his part. And a British negotiator, properly supported, would be able to bring pressure to bear at Kemala, which would greatly facilitate our dealings with the Rajah of Tenom. There are great natives resident at Kemala, whose influence could certainly be used in our favour with the Rajah of Tenom, if we availed ourselves of the services of some officer personally known to and trusted by them. What we need is separate action,—a negotiation begun by the British in the name of the Queen,—not hampered by any responsi- bility for the Dutch, whose cause in Sumatra is looked on everywhere as the cause of the invader,—and supported by an offer to restore that free-trade with Sumatra to which we have always had a treaty-right admitted by the Dutch. It is plain enough that the Rajah of Tenom would give a good deal for the opening of his port in the English sense of that
term. And it is plain enough, too, that we have borne too long the pretence of the Dutch to use a blockade which is no proper part of such a quarrel as theirs. We believe that with a little tact Lord Granville could secure for us that right of separate action which we need, and that formal concession of the opening of the Suma- tran ports which, by the treaty of the Netherlands with WI, they ought not so long to have kept closed. With this power in our hands, a successful negotiation would be highly probable. Without it, failure is certain. A joint expedition with the Dutch Government means a common failure, and, for us at least, a total failure.
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