THE VALLEY OF DECISION
ATIME may come when a nation can only do what it has to do; when treaties and technicalities are swept away on the surge of events. That time, the Government decided on Monday, had arrived. For too long there had been indecision. In trying to conciliate opinion at home and abroad the Government had vacillated, losing respect on all sides. One way presented itself to regain its prestige : swift and decisive action whenever the next crisis should arise. The Israeli raid into the Sinai peninsula provided the occasion. Clearly, the United Nations had failed to settle the Middle east problem; and the problem could not be left to settle itself. Britain, the argument ran, should act—regardless of divided public opinion at home and in the teeth of the criticisms of the rest of the world.
This, in brief, is the Government's case. That action needed to be taken is indisputable. The Israelis, admittedly, argue that their attack was no more than a raid : it was not intended to be the preliminary to a full-scale invasion. But it was on so large a scale that it must inevitably have been interpreted as a warlike act. Either full-scale hostilities would, have fol- lowed (assuming there was no intervention from outside), or Nasser's position would have become untenable. The humilia- tion would have been too great to shrug off otherwise.
In these circumstances it was reasonable that the Govern- ment should wish to throw a protective screen between the e. PPosing forces. And it was also reasonable that the move, if 't Was to be made, should be made quickly, before the opposing forces had time to come inextricably to grips. But if the Government's case is thus far conceded, two questions still arise. Was the action taken appropriate? And, if so, was it timely? The answer to both questions, it is now clear, is—no.
The Government's action took the form of an ultimatum, demanding that British and French forces should be allowed to take up strategic positions to defend the Suez Canal. What- ever its justification in theory, this in fact amounted to a sus- pended declaration of war on Nasser. The Israelis probably 'lever had any intention of driving forward to the Canal; there Is no reason to disbelieve their story that they were concerned Only to wipe out Egyptian commando nests in the Sinai penin- sula. If anything, British intervention actually suited their book, by lessening the chance of Egyptian counter-attacks and by embarrassing Nasser. , To Nasser, on the other hand, the ultimatum amounted to a direct threat. He owes his power and prestige in Egypt to the fact that he got rid of the British from the Canal Zone. Except in some extreme emergency, it is inconceivable that he should allow the British to return. To have done so in present circumstances would have been tantamount to an admission that the Israelis could not be checked without British support. As the Egyptian people have been told for Years that it is only a matter of time before the Israelis will be annihilated by Egyptian might, this would have been political suicide.
The suicide, political or otherwise, of Nasser would cause few tears to be shed here. And it is arguable that his destruc- tion must be accomplished sooner or later. Consequently Ministers are now making much more of his danger to Middle East and world peace, in the form of the constant Arab threat to Israel. But Arab designs on Israel have long been known. If the Government accepts this argument now, why, a couple of weeks ago, did it roundly condemn Israel for making smaller and more easily justifiable reprisal raids on Arab territory? The Spectator has reiterated, to the point of tedium, that an explosion was inevitable if the Government allowed the Arab States to build up their arms to a point when they would feel safe in attacking Israel. However, this new realism on the part of the Government towards Israel is greatly to be welcomed.
The timing of the Franco-British ultimatum was also at fault. The Israelis may have been justified in their belief that they were only knocking the dagger out of an aggressor's hand; but this cannot alter the fact that in the eyes of the world Israel was the attacker. Yet here were Britain and France apparently poised to go in and occupy the territory of the country attacked. No matter what the justifications were, it is generally believed, outside Britain and France, that Britain and France were bent on aggression. Worse than that, the rumour has widely spread that this was a put-up job, designed to circumvent the United Nations and to secure Britain again in full possession of the Canal.
It can be argued that what the world thinks does not matter: that this is an affair in which Britain's interests gave her no option but to act; that the world's criticism, though it may cause sorrow, need not 'cause alarm. History has upset majority verdicts many times before. But can Britain's interests thus be dissociated from the general interests of the West? May not the ultimatum have caused irreparable damage to Britain's international position, and thereby undo any good that this action might have been expected to do?
In the first place it has weakened the status of Britain and France in the United Nations, and that at a time when their prestige is most required, in the coming trials with Russia over the satellite States. The British had to use the veto, for the first time; a bitter draught to swallow in view of what has been said here of Russia's use of the veto in the past. And it was used, furthermore, against a motion calling for a peaceable settlement of the dispute. Britain will almost certainly be branded as an aggressor by a majority in the United Nations.
This would have mattered less if the Commonwealth had been solidly behind Britain. But the Commonwealth was not. Canada has all along been worried about the British Govern- ment's line on Suez; and Australia actually voted against us in the Security Council. It was the saddest moment for Commonwealth solidarity for many a year.
The United States, too, strongly disapproved of the Franco- British action. There is a tendency here to discount American opinion, partly on the grounds that it is in any case distorted by presidential election policy, but mainly because of the way that Mr. Dulles has handled the whole Suez affair. And it is true that American policy has been irritatingly inconsistent. But even if it were inconsistent to the point when a breach was becoming inevitable, was this the time to make it? The only decisive and legal argument in favour of intervention was the tripartite pact, whereby Britain, France and the United States undertook to take action if Middle East frontiers were violated. But the US was in a strong position when it insisted that Israel must be given a chance to obey the Security Council, and with- draw behind her frontier, before justice was meted out to her. (The Anglo-Egyptian agreement did not here apply, since Israel's aggression was excluded from its provisions.) If a rift had to come it is unfortunate that it should have come when the Americans could claim that they were acting in the spirit of the United Nations,Charter while the British were not.
Nor can the hostile attitude of almost all the small countries of the world be discounted. It is a particularly malign chance that it should be so at this time, when events in Poland and Hungary have at last brought a very real hope of easing inter- national tension, by breaking down the barrier between East and West. What should have been the most heartening few days since victory in Europe eleven years ago were changed to un- certainty and despondency, from which the British people, divided yet anxious not to appear so, were the worst sufferers.
All this will have to be remembered, painful though it may be, no matter what may happen in the Middle, East in the next few days. On what happens there, now that the decisive step has been taken, the ultimate verdict must depend. The Prime Minister has asserted that the intervention is to keep the Canal open, and is only temporary : 'based on the present situation.' He is unlikely to be too harshly judged if the Franco-British forces carry out the operation quickly and successfully (although that will not in the last resort justify this act of aggression), and if the Canal Zone has, in fact, only to be reoccupied for a brief period. But if the operation meets with effective resistance; if the Canal is not kept open; if Britain, instead of acting the policeman, finds herself compelled to occupy Egypt; and if the war spreads over the Middle East in general; then, Sir Anthony will face a terrible indictment.
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