TOPICS OF THE DAM
TrIE WESTERN VICTORIES.
THE splendid successes on the Western front have "overthrown more than our enemies," because they have overthrown misgivings and doubts, which are always a drag upon the mental and moral temper that makes for progress. The victories are very important not so much for what they have accomplished as for what they have proved. They have proved that the strongest trench fortifications which German science can devise and German methods can perfect are by no means impregnable. What was done at the end of last week and during this week can be done again, given the same methods. Let us not overstate our achievement—we are only at the beginning of what has to be performed—but none the less let us not fail to recognize that the pessimism which talked of a hopeless equipoise of force on the Western front was as unjustifiable as it was discouraging. Every balance of strength into which human factors have entered is much more apparent than real. The balance may be sustained for a very long time, but it frequently happens that when it does go it goes with a run. Any one who has watched a. tug-of-war between, say, a team of burly policemen and a team of no less brawny bluejackets must have wondered at the astonishing change from the equipoise to the collapse. The policemen seem man for man of equal strength, weight, and size with the bluejackets. When both sides lean back with all their weight on the rope you could swear that the tug might go on for ever. Not an inch is gained for a long time. The foot-work of one side seems to be as clever as that of the other. But unseen processes are at work ; the yielding of ground at last becomes noticeable, and the final stages are very rapid. The unity of a team has dis- appeared, strength is being applied haphazard, and the losing team are finally hauled across the line as though they were a party of infants. No such collapse in the war is, of course, within sight. It may be that another apparent equipoise will be established, and very likely several. But we know now that none of them will be a bar to our success. If the Hohenzollern and Kaiser Wilhelm Redoubts can be captured in spite of all the lavish care on their construction which is implied in their proud names, there is no redoubt yet invented that will ultimately survive the combined assault of hurricane artillery and well-trained infantry—provided only that we go on feeding our Army with the necessary drafts. If these fail, every- thing may fail. There will be a fresh shortage at some future date, but a. shortage of men, not of munitions. The nature of the attacks delivered by both British and French may be described briefly. They differed from the former attacks of the British at Neuve Chapelle, and of the French, for instance, west of Vimy in May and June, because they were Made on a much longer front. The Neuve Chapelle affair was a local victory, and it was there proved, as the present victories have proved on a much larger scale, that we could advance if only the artillery preparation were adequate. Unfor- tunately a local victory was of little use. There was not the necessary support from the neighbouring parts of a line which did not conform to the new line gained by us. Very different was, and is, the manner of the new attack. An intense bombardment took place of the whole German line during some five weeks, and finally there was the hurricane bombardment during the hours immediately preceding the assault ; but nowhere was any indication given of the British or French intention to attack par- ticular points. It seems that the Germans were in a sense surprised. This is strange when we reflect upon the warning which the bombardment must have given them. But no doubt in many cases they expected the attacks to be delivered just where they were not delivered. If it is true that the German Emperor has removed some of his generals as a punishment for their miscalculation, so much the better. We are sure that the Carthaginian method, or the method of "encouraging the others" by terrorism—provided, of course, that there was no culpable act of negligence on the part of the German generals—is more likely to sow seeds of mistrust than of confidence.
Sir John French names four distinct areas in which the British troops attacked. Two attacks were launched near Ypres, one of which made more progress than the other, but in neither case was the progress marked. Very likely it was not intended to be. The two other attacks were north and south of the La Bassee Canal. The attack north of the canal was apparently a demonstration in force. The attack to the south was the real business. It was here that we advanced on a front of five miles and pene- trated the German lines at some points to a distance of three and a half miles. The capture of Loos and Hulluch is profoundly encouraging. The long rows of miners' cottages in these places had been turned by German ingenuity into extraordinarily strong fortifications. Yet they both fell into our hands on the same day. More important still, perhaps, is the capture of a hill (Hill 70) overlooking Lens. As the French have taken a still higher hill south of Lens, there is hope that when large guns have been brought up the very important railway junction of Lens may soon become too hot for the Germans to remain there. Still, it is useless to try to think far ahead. The chief virtue of the present attacks is that, being universal, they give the enemy no advance advertisements of our intentions, and the strongest blows may fall in quite unexpected places. The main French advance was not in Artois but in Champagne. It is being conducted towards the railway which runs through the valley of the Suippe. This line, which runs roughly parallel to the German trenches, has of course fulfilled the enormously important office of con- veying German troops quickly from point to point. If the Germans should lose this railway, they could not stay anywhere near their present positions in Champagne. Moreover, if a German retreat were necessary here, the Crown Prince could not maintain his ground in the Argonne. To sum up the whole situation, it Lens could be taken, Lille, which is the most important point in Flanders, would be soon threatened ; and if the Suippe Valley railway could be taken, the Germans could neither stand in the Argonne nor in the district of Soissens.
At the time when we write the British troops are hammering at what was the third German line, but it must not be expected that there can be a consider- able advance till the French are masters of the whole Vimy plateau. That plateau commands the ground beyond, and when it is in French possession, and has been, in the fashionable military phrase, " cousolidated," we may expect progress out of all proportion to the gradual and deliberate conquest of ground which is necessarily characteristic of the fighting that succeeded the first victorious rush. As this is a war of heavy artillery, masses of slow-moving guns and ammunition have to be brought to fresh positions, and there installed with all the exacting formalities which are foreign to the handling of field-guns and horse artillery. Patience is as valuable as determination. There are times to go fast and times to go slow. Our generals will not waste the precious material of the magnificent New Armies without that sort of unprecedented preparation of the positions to be attacked which Mr. von Wiegand, in a message to the New York World, likened to heavy surf bursting on a shore. But we must remember that the Germans still have enormous supplies of ammunition, and that they will retaliate in kind. It has happened before in this war that our casualties have been heavier during the first few days in a freshly conquered position than during the assault itself. On the other hand, we may fairly draw very great encouragement from the numbers of unwounded Germans who have surrendered themselves. If these numbers de not indicate a war-weariness scarcely distinguishable from an incipient loss of moral—as they very well may—they at least show that the overwhelming nature of our bom- bardment deprived many Germans in the trenches of their military faculties, and left them in a dazed and helpless condition. Whatever the explanation be, the fact serves our purpose just the same. In spite, however, of the greatness of our initial success, and in spite of the splendid qualities of our new troops, which have been demonstrated to admiration, there will still be checks and disappoint- ments. Of that we may be sure. But the way of triumph has been shown, and the means of following it are in our hands. Pray Heaven we at home who have to supply the men and the munitions may not fail in such tremendously encouraging circumstances!
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