SIR EDWARD GREY'S WARNING TO BULGARIA. D ANGEROUS situations are often
allowed to drive on to disaster for want of the plain or firm word that would have saved them. It is astonishing how often, both in foreign and domestic polities, one sees a tangle becoming worse entangled, while all the time the peril is the result of an obvious misunderstanding, or of the failure of some directing authority to take a larger audience into his con- fidence and say exactly what is proposed and on what urgent reasons his policy rests. For some time the situation in the Balkans has been dangerous, but we are very sure that, if anything could save it from becoming worse, it was the wise and clear words spoken by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on Tuesday. These words came at the right moment, and though they were a plain warning, they were conceived in all friendliness. They represented exactly the feelings of Englishmen, who have always respected and liked Bulgaria, but who now recognize that, however great their sympathy with her may be, she cannot be allowed to impede the work of the Allies in liberating Europe without suffering the consequences of her acts. We are persuaded that Bulgaria will now think twice, and even thrice, before acting on the strengthnf glittering promises from Germany.
The mobilization of the Bulgarian Army followed almost immediately upon the receipt of the Allies' Note proposing a settlement of Bulgaria's demands. The meaning of this sequence was, of course, that Bulgaria was not satisfied, and wanted more. For our part, we heartily sympathize with Bulgaria's wish to possess all that she gallantly won in arms from Turkey in the first Balkan War, and that was recognized as her property by the Treaty of London. Unhappily Bulgaria penalized herself by her abortive attack upon her own allies after that war. To some extent it is natural and just that she should suffer for her fault, although we have always maintained that her aberration (prompted, as we have since learned, by Germany) was punished far too heavily. The governing fact of the situation, however, is that there are other claimants besides Bulgaria, What the Allies proposed. as a settlement beyond a doubt represented the highest common measure of agreement among the various Balkan States which could be reached by consulting them all. It would be absolutely impossible to arrive at an ideal settlement of all the Balkan problems. The ethnological difficulties are much too involved for every one to be satisfied by any • conceivable scheme. All that pan be hoped for is a just and practical accommodation. When the best that could be proposed in the circumstances was offered, Bulgaria said No.' At ,least we take that to have been certainly the first meaning of her mobilization, though we are glad to eay that second and better thoughts have apparently pre- vailed. The present attitude of Bulgaria is that of the auctioneer who cries Going ! Going !—." In other words, Bulgaria is using her mobilization as a means of impressing on the bidders for her favour the urgent need for them to increase their bids. We need not complain of that, but, as sincere friends of Bulgaria, we must point out that in this badly arranged world the man who will not accept an offer because he holds out continually for more often gets nothing in the end. The offer is withdrawn ; or all the circumstances change and the offer cannot be repeated, however much the desire to repeat it may exist. , No doubt Germany has exerted every kind of wile and persuasion at Sofia, and she came within an ace of setting the Balkans against one another in the bad old fashion. Nothing would suit her better than bitter and permanent discord among the Balkan States, because then she could deal with them individually at her leisure, and open her way to her Turkish ally, and thus on to the Middle East and the Far East. German policy, in truth, absolutely requires the Balkan States to be at loggerheads. If they all settled down to cultivate their gardens in contentment, the way of Germany's expansion, as indicated by herself, would be blocked. From the German point of view, it was Serbia's offence that she stood in the way more than the others because she was in the direct line. But if German policy succeeded, all would eventually be treated as impediments. It is of course possible that any one of them which assisted Germany against the others would receive her price, but the chief condition would be a practical loos of independence, A German dependant has never been allowed to be anything but a servile creature. A Balkan State in the pocket of Germany would be the natural object of the hatred of all her neighbours. She could never afford to shake herself free from her miserable bondage. Fortunately for Bulgaria, the people had enough penetration to see through the plans of the German intriguers who were trying to coax her on to her doom. The evidence of the sympathy with the Allies which exists all over Bulgaria and among many of her statesmen is various and strong. Last week, even at the moment when it seemed that the Bulgarian cavalry were off to perform some such errand as cutting the railway from Serbia to Salonika, and even when German guns were signalizing their anxiety to co-operate with Bulgaria by shelling the Serbian frontier, the Bulgarian Consul-General at Manchester said : " As a Bulgarian, knowing the sentiment and feeling of the people, I say you will never find one single Bulgarian who will take:up arms against Britain or Russia." That was only one of several similar oxpressiona of opinion. We believe that even if Bulgaria did take up arms against Russia and ourselves, her people would do it with a heavy heart. They very well remember that it was Russia who rescued their country from Turkey, and that it was Britain whose cham- pionship brought them Eastern Roumelia in 1886. • The most interesting evidence of the depths of feeling which have been moved in Bulgaria is contained in an account in the Temps of an interview between King Ferdinand and the leaders of the Opposition parties. M. Malinoff, the Democratic leader, said that the Govern- ment had embarked on an adventure which could only lead to disaster. The Government wanted either neutrality or an alliance with Germany, but neutrality would mean that Bulgaria would become a battlefield like Belgium, and an alliance with Germany would mean that Bulgaria would instantly have as her enemies the three Balkan nations as well as four Great Powers, That," he said, " is the end of Bulgaria." M. Stamboliski, the Agrarian leader, declared that if a pro-German policy were persisted in the people would hold the King and the Government responsible for a fresh disaster. They had not forgotten the disastrous adventure of June, 1913, when Bulgaria attacked her allies, Serbia and Greece. The Corriere della Sera gives a much more dramatic account of M. Stemboliski's plain talking to King Ferdinand. "The policy I have decided to follow," said the King coldly, "is the one I believe best and most advantageous for the country." "It is a policy which can only lead to disaster," replied the Agrarian leader, "which must bring calamity, and which will compromise not only the future of the country but your dynasty, and may cost you your head." M. Tsanoff, the Radical leader, who had for this occasion broken his rule not to visit the Palace, said that, in his opinion, Bulgaria was staking her existence. The act of June, 1913, he went on, was indeed a "criminal folly," but to lead Bulgaria against Russia now would be worse; it would be a "premeditated crime."
The danger that Bulgaria will plunge to her doom seems to be passing. We rejoice at this prospect, even though Bulgaria should feel in no way able actively to help the Allies. As Sir Edward Grey said, so long as she does not side with our enemies there can never be any question of our attacking Bulgaria. The alternative is equally obvious and certain. If Bulgaria should aid Germany, "we are prepared to give to our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our allies, without reserve and without qualification." In that intention the whole country is behind Sir Edward Grey. We desire for every Balkan State "not only independence, but a brilliant future." We offer a policy which would probably secure that, and which has no other object. But any Balkan State which sides with Germany will be involved, however much we may regret it, in the final downfall ind ruin of the Central Powers, for on that downfall the Allies are more than ever determined.
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