BOOKS.
SIR CHARLES DILKE'S SURVEY OF EUROPE.* fx is now authentically known that the lively and suggestive series of articles published in the Fortnightly Review were written by Sir Charles Dile, or, as he prefers to be called, the author of "Greater Britain." Such a survey of the European position as that included in this volume is not only useful, because a competent writer is sure to supply information in a connected form, but because it provokes examination and keeps the large problems before the public. But we do not see why it should have been thought proper to lay down at the outset the sweeping proposition that at this moment" sheer force holds a larger place than it has held in modern times since the fall of Napoleon." Is it larger than it was in 1822 or 1850 P Sheer force has always held, and must always hold, a great place in human affairs ; but we fail to see how it is greater now than it was when the French Restoration invaded Spain, as the sword of the Holy Alliance, and when Nicholas was the arbiter of the German States, Austria master of Italy, and Louis Napoleon preparing to "wade through slaughter to a throne." If it is meant that force is represented by huge armies, actual and potential, the meaning of the word is restricted to bulk, because the underlying facts are made up of far more than arms and numbers. Besides, if it were admitted that the place of sheer force, in the wider or narrower sense, is larger, are not the shaping and controlling forces of another kind also larger P—so that in the end there is not much difference, and thus nothing is gained towards the comprehension of existing dangers not only to England, which concerns or should concern us the most, but to everybody, by labelling a remarkable change of conditions, the reign of sheer force, as if it were something new. The truth is that the armies of the Great Powers were re/atively small, and now every one, except our own, is large ; the arms and explosives are more deadly ; the resources of science are more abundant ; the means -of locomotion have increased a hundredfold. But mere bulk, even when accompanied by improved organisation, does not constitute change in the fundamentalfact of the European situation. Light and shadow in the lot of man still keep their relative proportions. The criticism is not idle, because what the author implies is that we have lost something, won in some better time, when" might" had less credit in relation to " right " than it has now. Bat if we have last that something, it was an advantage to lose it, for it was a delusion,—the things represented by these vague terms standing towards each other pretty much in the same relation now as they have stood for at least a hundred years. Sir Charles Dilke may mean that force has been more frequently applied to the temporary, or it may be permanent settlement of international quarrels, the accomplishment of national wishes, and the satisfaction of a real hanger for external dominion, than it was between 1815 and 1850, when naked force reigned on the Continent, if it ever did ; and he may mean that force has been relatively developed everywhere. But that is very different f corn the notion implied by the misleading statement that, in those latter days, we live under the sway of an exceptional reign of sheer force. It diverts the mind from the realities which are all-important in such a weighty inquiry.
Nor was it necessary to his purpose that Sir Charles should put forward, even "incidentally," the strong indictaient against Austria that she had "lured" Louis Napoleon to his destruction in 1870. Besides, it was not introduced "incidentally," nor pet forth ones or twice, bat three or four times. It is a staple thread in an argument designed to show the weak points of alliaaces,
• The Prosont Position of Eureplean Polities; or. Europe in I887. By the Author of "Greater Britain." London ; Chapman and H
especially alliances with Austria; and it is vindicated at some length in the " conclusion " to this volume. Now, we agree that "history is history," and that, if true, the accusation is one of weight. The "documents," which no one produces, may throw a different light on the matter; but it is most unlikely that any one will "leap to light" which makes good the charge of "luring" the Emperor to destruction. The two Governments had been engaged in making arrangements to wage war upon Prussia at some time, and on pretexts suitable to them. The arrangements had gone far in general terms ; but neither the pretext nor the moment had been fixed upon, when the Imperial Council at St. Cloud suddenly, and without concerting with Austria, declared war. There lies the vital point in the busi- ness. Austria would have plunged in had she been ready, and had South Germany held back ; but the Austrians had months before demanded "time," the Archduke Albert, it is said, on fair authority, remarking emphatically to Louis Napoleon, in January, 1870, that his Court wanted a year for preparation. It surely cannot be contended that one party to an alliance, if an understanding can be called by that name, has the right to dash into a war abruptly, and on a foolish plea, and then accuse the other of breaking pledges because that other does not also rush into the fray. There was not only almost unparalleled rashness at Paris, but delusions on both sides respecting the temper of Bavaria ; and the combination of headlong passion in Paris, with the absence of political judg- ment alike in Paris and Vienna, brought about the marvellous catastrophe. The Austrian Chancellor, Von Benet, held on to his dream as long as he could, although the Empress and De Gramont had been so unwisely impetuous, but not longer than the moment when the full consequences of their folly were obvious in the outburst of German resolution, and the disorganised condition of the French Army was visible to the naked eye. The reckless decision at St. Cloud, on the night of July 14th-15th, spoilt the grand game which the two Courts had been planning, with the professed object, of course, of securing peace, bat with the deliberate intention of waging war when it suited both, in order to reverse the verdict of Sadowa. Alliances with Austria may be as brittle as Sir Charles in- sinuates, but we cannot accept the example of 1870—when there was no alliance, no signed treaty, no fixed or even conditional time for the outbreak of war—as evidence that Austria is a treacherous Power. She may be, but her conduct in 1870 does not prove the charge, which was not incidentally but substan- tially preferred. It would not have been necessary to deal with it again had not the original indictment been maintained in the closing pages of this book.
As to the essays themselves, we dealt with two of the more important—those on Austria and Russia—when they appeared, and also touched on the author's very interesting view of the present state of Italy. To our minds, be has a tendency to lay too much stress on numbers in dealing with military questions, which occupy so much space in these papers, and does not ade- quately;take into account the value of any given military machine as an organic whole when considering its relative power. Another vital matter in military dynamics is what we may call the force of continuity, not for the preservation of routine, but the acquisi- tion and assimilation of improvement, and also the spirit in which the manufacture of armies is undertaken. In both these last respects the German Army still stands alone, not one of the imitators of that marvellous entity having yet been able to catch and embody the governing principles which lie at the root and permeate every part of the structure. If this view be correct, it will beseen that the estimates of relative power made by the clever essayist will, or may have to be, largely modified. It is not merely the numbers, or even the quality of the troops, which have to be weighed, nor even organic completeness ; the main thing is the dominant directing spirit which rules throughout on sound principles, which, once set in motion, provide for their own continuous existence. The German Army, for example, is a School from top to bottom, in which the science and practice of soldiership is effectively and systematically taught. - From every one, beginning with the Emperor- King, the strict fulfilment of duty is exacted. The main- tenance and constant improvement of the Army is a great business, carried on by great men of business, and nothing is allowed to interfere with the process. Neither we nor any other country have anything like it ; and it may be doubted whether nations under Parliamentary rule, where Ministers are set up and pulled down by majorities, can produce anything to rival in steadfastness and thoroughness the German Army. The French are grimly in earnest, so are the Italians ; Austria-Hungary is bound to have the best attainable public force ; Russia longs and strives for one; bat none have the spirit or enjoy the conditions which render possible the construction of a really good army in the degree attainable in Germany. Then there is the question of command. Which country will produce the next great Captain ? None can answer ; but history shows that from all calculations, like those in the volume before us, calculations mainly based on numbers, a large deduction must be made for the possible General. Providence may be on the side of big battalions, to use the language of an irreverent Ring; but no one knew better than his Majesty bow not only to win victories, but to wage war for year after year with inferior numbers. It is the small consideration given to such important matters, as well as a tendency to deal out concrete strategical dicta—a very delusive amusement, even on the part of professional critics— which detracts from the value of Sir Charles Mike's information.
A large part of the essay upon "The United Kingdom" is devoted to the Army, and contains suggestions which it would be well to consider. Many, if not all, have been mooted before, and will be again. What we find defective in the essay is the fact that the writer does not go down to the bottom of the reasons which make, and have for centuries made it im- possible for Great Britain to have an Army ; and when he writes his promised book or essay on "the system which might give us a better return for our expenditure than does that which we pursue at present," perhaps he will take the pains and show sufficient disinterested frankness to render it clear. If it should prove that really good military institutions are incompatible with Government by party, then, we suppose, the nation will prefer makeshifts, and retain party as the principal agent in government. We should look with more confidence on some of Sir Charles Dike's sug- gestions, had be not been so curiously influenced by the "reduction of the Horse Artillery" as to draw from it an irrelevant political conclusion. The chief reason against the dimi- nution of the Horse Artillery was that they might at any moment be wanted in India or elsewhere. But if we are ever to have any- thing complete in itself—such as even one Army Corps—we must begin somewhere ; and if the House of Commons will not provide additional field batteries, ammunition columns, and transport, the War Office must get them where they can, or go without. On the whole, the concluding essay is the least thoroughgoing and instructive; but, like the others, it will provoke thought, and deserves attention, although on some serious questions— Ireland, for example—it leaves behind unpleasant doubts ; and on others, notably this very question of the Army, it does not cut deep enough to lay bare the source of the evil.
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