30 JUNE 1877, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE SITUATION ON THE DANUBE.

TWO very considerable events have occurred this week. The Russian Army has passed the Danube, and the Austro- Hungarian Government has explained its policy. The first event, although so long expected, has excited in the public a certain sense of surprise. The Russians have delayed so long, that it was thought they were detained either by diplo- matic reasons, or by fear of the losses they might encounter, and this latter impression was not diminished by the passage of one corps d'armie into the Dobrudscha. The Russians, it was believed, had been driven to adopt the old and bad route through the swamps north of Traja,n's Wall by the impossibility of crossing at a more convenient place, and would, if the Turks defended the Wall stoutly, lose thousands by disease. The exploit of June 26 has dissipated these ideas, and confirmed the old belief that a broad river, if treated like a narrow sea, and crossed in boats, can always be passed by an army not resisted by superior maritime, or, we suppose, we should say riverine, force. On that day the Grand Duke Nicholas threw 8,400 men across from Simnitza in 208 boats, seized the opposite bank under a fire unexpectedly weak, and then fixing a pontoon bridge, crossed over the whole of one corps d'arme'e, about thirty thousand men, carried the heights, and fairly established himself on the south bank of the Danube. It is believed that a third crossing will be effected at another point, probably near Widdin, but with the two already effected the Russian Army may be considered in Bulgaria. Days must elapse in preparations and in the march of the corps moving southwards from Matchin, but the active campaign has com- menced, and the plan of the Russian Generals must shortly be evident to military observers. We believe it will be in the main to invest the fortresses with the army now moving through the Dobrudscha, while another force, probably 120,000 strong, and preceded by a swarm of cavalry, advances Westward to Sophia to seize the terminus of the direct rail- way-line to Adrianople. Much must depend, however, upon the action of the Turks, who, vigorous in Asia, where they would appear to have decidedly checked the Russian advance, have displayed in Europe so little energy that they are accused of a design to lay waste Northern Bulgaria and retreat upon the Balkans, a dangerous policy for such a Government. All that can be said as yet, however, is that with months of pre- paration, and in their own country, they have not so organised themselves as to offer effective resistance to the passage of a river 1,000 yards broad. The cause of that failure we shall see presently, and on it will depend much of the future of the campaign.

The passage was probably expected at Vienna and Pesth, and produced the restlessness which induced the Premier of the Hungarian Monarchy (Herr Tisza) to make his now cele- brated declaration of June 26. This declaration has, we think, been a little misunderstood in this country. Herr Tisza is a Magyar speaking to Magyars, who believe their fortunes bound up with those of the Ottomans, and he had to explain why the Monarchy had remained tranquil, and why it did not even now order mobilisation. He was, in fact, as against Hungarians of the more fervent sort, just in the position of Lord Salisbury as against pro-Turkish Tories, and part at least of his object was to deprecate hotheadedness. " If," he said, " the Government had yielded to this advice and this urging, 600,000 of the toiling sons of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would have been taken away from their work and their families. Another consequence would have been that an increased bur- den of many hundred millions of florins would have been thrust upon the shoulders of the nation. Yes, if the Govern- ment had pursued to its full extent the warlike policy which at times challenged the whole of Europe, and which we have heard advocated here, the country would have echoed with the cries of pain of mothers who had lost their children, and wo- men who had been deprived of their husbands." The war had affected the interests of Austro-Hungary as of every other European State, but the policy of the Government, secure in a strong army, which would obey any order from the Emperor, had been to localise the war by remaining neutral. This neutrality, however, in no way embarrassed the freedom of the Monarchy to protect its own interests. Austro-Hungary was embarrassed by no engagement and no alliance, and he would add, that although in the interests of the freedom of

action of the Monarchy he would make no binding declaration as to the future, "I can assure the House that in the circles of the Monarchy which are authorised to decide there exists no one who would regard it as the duty of our foreign policy to alter the possession and relations of power on our frontier.' He repeated that the single object of Austro-Hungarian policy was the interests of the Monarchy, apart alike from prepossessions and antipathies, and warned his country- men in words which might well be studied in England, that fear of a nightmare is not courage. "I only ask the Members of the House to consider that the constant mention of a danger which does not exist is no sign of manly courage, and may temporarily so shake the nerves of the people that, if the proceeding be frequently repeated, their nerves, when the time of action arrives, will be found relaxed. I repeat that the continual mention of a danger is, moreover, not good ;- because if a people is constantly frightened out of its tran- quillity, and repeatedly discovers that it has been roused by the groundless chimera of imagination, it finally will not believe in danger when it really arises, and that would be a heavy blow for the Monarchy." It seems to us impossible to mistake the meaning of this speech. Austria desires neu- trality, if neutrality only is possible, and when it is not possible, will act, " without prepossessions or antipathies," with a single eye to her own interests. About those interests there can be no doubt. It cannot be the interest of the composite Monarchy to fight Slays in order to befriend Turks. It cannot be its interest to see a strong and independent South-Slavonic king- dom rise on its frontier, attracting all Slays and exciting incur- able jealousy and bitterness among Magyars. It must, therefore, occupy for itself the neighbouring Slavic province, Bosnia, and part of Herzegovina, thus bringing itself close to the ex- tended Roumanian State, which, we may rest assured, will be formed upon the East, a State which has no attraction for Slays. That, we believe to be the meaning of the Govern- ment, and that is also the meaning of the Hapsburgs, though the latter are not as afraid of Slavic preponderance as are the former. Both intend to assure themselves that when peace is concluded the interests of the united Monarchy—not of Hun- gary alone—shall be consulted, and the only perfect security is possession of a material guarantee. They might secure themselves by threatening Russia, but that alternative would irritate all the Slays, who furnish the bulk of the Army ; would_ plunge them into a great war in which they could gain nothing, for there is no territory not Slavic in Russian hands- to cede ; and would throw Russia absolutely upon a Court which the Hapsburgs dread much more than they dread the Magyars.

We recognise, of course, quite well that many of our readers will doubt this interpretation, and think that Austro-Hungary intends to defend the Turks, but we would ask them for the twentieth time to ponder two questions. Do they think it probable that the Hapsburgs, who were saved by their Slav subjects in 1849, will alienate them for ever for the sake of anybody except themselves—who have absolutely nothing to gain by the alienation—or do they think it possible that Russia has gone into this war without being certain of Austrian resolves ? The Emperor of Austria is at this moment in such a position that he could throw 400,000 men into Roumania right upon the Russian communications, could abso- lutely sever the Russian army from Russia. Every Russian officer knows that. General Fadaieff pointed out the con- tingency years ago in the most explicit and outspoken manner. It is as patent to the Russian Staff as to any human being with intelligence enough to understand a map. Do they really think it conceivable that the Court of St. Petersburg, the best - informed in Europe and the most cautious, guided as it is by an Emperor who is over-distrustful, and by a statesman who remembers how Austria acted in the Crimean war, has staked everything on a gigantic war, without being certain that this ruinous contingency would not be permitted to occur. If the Court of St. Peters- burg has moved without a certainty that Austria will not be actively hostile, it is a foolish Court, and we may leave the belief in its foolishness to those who believe and assert every day that it is the most crafty, most deceitful, and most Machiavellian Court in Europe. The Hapsburgs, as we believe, will think of their interests, as Herr Tisza says ; and their interests are to get all they can without fighting a Power which, if driven too far, could hand half their do- minions to the Hohenzollerns and the other half to a South- Slav Monarchy. A forced alliance between Berlin and St. Petersburg is not desired at Vienna.