A LANDMARK IN PHILOSOPHY.* Jar Psychological Principles Dr. James Ward,
Professor of. Philosophy in the University of Cambridge, has finally revised and considerably expanded his Encyclopaedia Britannioa article " Psychology." The Cambridge Press is to be congratulated on co-operating to release a famous article from comparative inaccessibility, and on presenting it in its new form within the limits of a single well- arranged volume.
Philosophy has been aptly described by Plato, in one place, as the attempt " to grasp the immutable and the eternal," and its character can perhaps best be appreciated by throwing it into contrast with Mysticism, the quiet contemplation of Being, the apotheosis of feeling, which is content, without intellectual striving, to wait—haply to enjoy. But, if Plato thus indicated the sphere of Philosophy, it was left to Aristotle to demarcate the specific studies in which Philosophy consists. He, with sound judgment, gave priority to what he named " First Philosophy," called by us Metaphysic, which, as the term suggests, is concerned with the ultimate problems of knowledge and existence. Closely he related thereto Logic and Psychology, Ethics and Aesthetics (of the re- spective subject matters of which, we may assume, working notions obtain), and, while he did not deny to Mathematics and the nascent sciences of his day the designation Philosophy, yet even at that
• Psychological Principks. By James Ward. Cambridge ; at the University Press. ins.
time homogeneous bodies of detailed knowledge tended to dis- entangle themselves from philosophic setting, leaving only their principles and methods to the purview of " First Philosophy." After the Renascence, this separatist tendency rapidly developed : to-day " exact sciences " multiply indefinitely. Will Psychology, Ethics, and Aesthetics become "exact," leaving likewise only their methods and principles to the regulative survey of Metaphysic ?
In part, the question is answered. The psychological bias of English metaphysicians from Locke onwards is traditional. Their constant approach to the problems of knowledge through appeal to the introspection of the individual upon his own unique experi- ence, made clear that the study of individual exporiences awe experience would, in due time, be recognized. Forty years ago, Dr. Ward; "understanding by experience not merely nor primarily cognition, but also, and above all, conative activity or behaviour " (p. 28), took up the task of constructing a science of Psychology so definable, leaving to Metaphysic the problem of the validity of the method of introspection with which, primarily, he worked, and that of observation and experiment, whose results, in the case of Psychology, depend, in turn, for interpretation upon introspection.
The classic philosophers to Kant, the Scottish school, emphasizing the faulty view of mind as aggregated faculties, could yield Beg- eestlons ; Herbartianism and the writings of the later Associa- tionists (both drawing away from that error), and still more the works of Lotze, could prove of greater worth ; the laboratory of Wundt at Leipzie could manifest the possibilities and limitations of ' (to speak popularly) physiological and mental correlates ; Spencer's volumes could stand as a reminder of evolutionary thought—all this may be allowed, but it will not derogate from the accomplish- ment of Dr. Ward, who, though he would probably be the last to urge independence of help, has, beyond expectation, succeeded in the task which he undertook, and which, with brief lapses, has been his main concern as a philosopher. Simultaneously others have laboured in the field ; on the Continent the development has been chiefly along the experimental lines of Wundt, in America the brilliant independent pen of the late William James wrote from a standpoint not unlike that of Dr. Ward yet in touch with Germania experiment, whilst the generation of those taught by Dr. Ward—Stout, Shand; and McDougall being names readily suggested—are carrying on his• work, vying with their comrades abroad. Cumulative research is progressing I rival schools grow excited ; Psychology is emancipated. Ye when the years pass, we venture to think it will be increasingly clear that Dr. Ward lathe true founder of the science, whateverrnodifi- cations may be necessaryin his doctrine, whatever lacunae gape to be supplied- Modification is possible. According to Dr. Ward, expressed in the simplest terms, the individual, at any one moment, is aware of sensory presentations and such ideas as hold the field, he is pleased or pained with the situation, and he acts to or from the exciting presentations till new presentations occur. He has a " single sub- jective'aetivity," " the one power of variously distributing . . . attention " (p. 57), and that activity, accounting ultimately for the discrimination he makes among presentations, determining how far (if at all ?) they are cognized, likewise conditions Feeling-tone, the elemental, pathie, unanalysable state of content or discontent with the situation ; and, finally, that same activity is the source of innervation to action. The last battles in Psychology will probably be fought over the question of the nature of mental Activity and Feeling-tone. But, if his view were proved false (and all now do not hold it), Dr. Ward's system would not totter ; at most it would suffer sympathetic modification in every part. Lacunae admittedly exist. Dr. Ward has hitherto been held to deal perfunotorilywith instincts, emotions, sentiments—Feeling in general, as his oritios say. The defect is partly one of intention ; he is dealing, as did his friend William James, with " principles," not details—that work he leaves to others. He is, moreover, undoubtedly right in pointing to the loose usage of the term Feeling that has permitted his oritios to confuse, in their classification of emotions, sensation-factors and Ireeling-tone. Still, much of the new matter of this book deals with these questions in their practical aspect. After due reflection, we affirm that nothing will permanently impair the central value of this life-work, or cause Psychological Principles to be other than a, title to high place upon the bead-roll of philosophic fame.
Let us turn from a consideration of the place of this work his- torically to deal with the book and the reader. Essentially it is a philosopher's Psychology. That student who, from whatever cause, held captive by Philosophy, has made sufficient acquaintance with the subject-matter of Ethics to be annoyed by the fact that such notions as " right," " pleasure," " conscience," " instinct," " will " are used (to-day inexcusably) with no attempt at exact expression of their connotation in psychological terms, and who has realized, at the stage where he passes the bounds of Formal Logic, that it is unwise to talk further of " percepts," " concepts'," " judgments "'until he has considered them as psychological data, should apply himself to something more than the elementary text-book, and make Dr. Ward's work the beginning of his wisdom. Orienta- tion at that critical stage is the chief need in an academic course in Philosophy. In the past, all serious students came eventually to read and value the famous Encyclopaedia article, and those who could bought the loose leaves of Messrs. Black's edition at " fancy prices." If University professors are wise, they will henceforth prescribe Psychological Principles, now accessible to all students, as a set book early in every Philosophy curriculum. Those of them whose special domain is Ethics will particularly be pleased that much of the additional matter has, as we have observed, practical bearing. We cannot advise that the ordinary layman should essay to make his first acquaintance with the science from this advanced exposition ; but workers in Science generally must face its findings upon particular issues--e.g., the section " Heredity," which would load us to renew our confidence in Ezekiel's proverb, " The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," thereby denying the main thesis of Weismann that acquired charac- teristics are not normally handed down, is not one that the biologist unacquainted with Dr Ward's Heredity and Memory (Comb., 1913) can ignore :-
" Weismann, whowas then supposed to have vanquished Lamarck and to have corrected Darwin,• has ended in discrediting himself on the main issue by his arbitrary, complicated and often in- consistent speculation despite his important work in detail"— (p. 426, note.) Apparently we may now seek for the origin of Instinct in the inheritance' of Habit.
Whoever the reader bet he will find this work written with direct- ness, with all the simplicity that seems possible, and to be happy in its use of literary similes and to reflect a catholic learning.
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