Britain and Egypt—The Next Step
OME weeks have passed since the,.reiection of the Anglo-Egyptian draft Treaty, and it is possible to reconsider the position with the further data available. We find no occasion . for• undue , pessimism, or for . modifying the position we took up three weeks ago when•.we, expressed the hope that a fresh effort will be made to reach agreement on the difficult problem of the British troops in Egypt, , for undoubtedly the main stumbling-block was the ,retention of the British forces. The continued presence in Egypt of British occupying forces—apart from the Canal _Zone—seems incompatible with the independence of Egypt.
As we wrote at the time, Sir Austen Chamberlain made a • genuine effort, to meet the Egyptian point of view, and never before has agreement between Great Britain and Egypt been nearer. The British Foreign Office showed a welcome spirit of generosity in its . handling of what remains one of the most difficult external. problems with which this country has to deal. Although the understanding which Sir Austen had arrived at with Sarwat Pasha was not endorsed by the .Egyptian Government, the fact . remains that the • principal spokesmen of. Great Britain and Egypt reached agreement. The most hopeful factor in the situation is the knowledge that Great Britain has admitted before the world that Egypt is not solely a British interest, but ,a subject of international concern ; how else can our willingness to submit the vexed question of the British Occupation to the League of Nations in ten years' time -be interpreted ?
A section of opinion at Cairo thinks that if Zaghlul Pasha had lived agreement would have been more easy, because of the unique position he occupied in the esteem of his fellow-countrymen. A correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in Egypt wrote recently : " Zaghlul, however erratic a course he may have steered, knew very well that Egypt needed Great Britain and would have to sacrifice some of her theories to fulfil British needs. There is little doubt that during the last two years he had begun to feel strongly that the task appropriate to his old age was the establishment of a lasting foundation of friendship between the two countries." One of the difficulties of the situation is that Zaghlul has left no successor with the same influence that he possessed. There are grounds for encouragement, • however, in the comparative good temper shown at the time of the rejection of the proposed Treaty, very different from the bitterness and disorder displayed at the time of the appointment and visit of the Milner Mission nine years ago. On the British side, the , chief essential at the present time is patience and a readiness to reopen negotiations on the vexed question of the British Occupation, always with the reservation that the safety of the Suez Canal must be safeguarded.
. An encouraging factor has been the important speech made by Mustapha Pasha Nahas, the new Prime Minister. Nationalist leaders do not as a rule speak in such warm . terms of the possibility of co-operation with the British Empire. In advocating an entente between the two countries, the new Premier said : " I have always been of the opinion, even in the darkest moments, when I was at Aden and in the Seychelles, that the day would come. when Great Britain and Egypt would reach an • agreement. That day will come, sooner or later, according to circumstances and according to the dispositions of the two countries. Butin my opinion an eventual accord i• s inevitable. In my capacity as . head of the Govern- ment and leader of the majority, I can affirm that the Egyptian people's disposition towards Great Britain and the idea of agreement are still good, but that everything .depends on the disposition of Great Britain herself." We can assure the Egyptian Prime Minister that there are many in Great Britain who are anxious to see, a strong and independent Egypt in permanent alliance with the British Empire, and who think that a strong and friendly Egypt is one of Britain's major interests. But when we treat with Egypt, we must be careful not to adopt the position of a schoolmaster lecturing his charge ; discussions must proceed on a footing of equality, as Nahas Pasha has said.
There is no reason why Great Britain should give up any vital interest, but, as we said on a previous occasion, in our view the security of the Suez Canal will in the last resort depend on the British Navy. If we were prepared to refer this vexed question of the British occupying forces to the. League of Nations ten years from the signing of the Treaty, why cannot we go a step further and see if we can meet the Egyptian point of view by offering to submit the question to the League of Nations at an earlier date ? We have everything to gain by putting our position in Egypt on a legitimate footing. The moral gain would be enormous, for we cannot forget, even if we would do so, the very specific pledges of previous British Prime Ministers, that our occupation was a temporary one. From the standpoint of the British taxpayer a friendly Egypt would be a great gain, and we think that there are many more persons in authority in Egypt, despite some of their public utterances, who realize that the best interests of their country demand an Anglo-Egyptian understanding and an end to the present unsatisfactory situation. They have no desire to see the complete withdrawal of British forces from the Canal banks, leaving the country open to some other European invader, although they do not say so.
We regard the question of the guaranteeing of vital international highways as of international concern and we would welcome the co-operation of the League of Nations in this matter. But we would even go further. The two greatest Naval Powers in the world at the present time are the British Empire and the United States. Just because they failed to reach agreement on the question of cruiser parity at Geneva, is there any reason why we should not enter into an agreement about guaran- teeing the freedom of some of the vital ocean highways ? If the United States were ready to enter upon a mutual guarantee to keep the Suez Canal open in time of war, could not we on our side, as a quid pro quo, undertake to give a similar guarantee as regards the Panama Canal ? If the two great English-speaking Powers undertook to keep these international highways open, can it be seriously contended that they would not succeed in doing so ? This would be an effective piece of English-speaking co- operation for the good of mankind.
The excellent spirit which has been shown both in Great Britain and Egypt when the announcement of the temporary failure of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations was announced prompts us to believe that a resumption of negotiations would be by no means hopeless, and we hope that Sir Austen Chamberlain will take up the threads where he dropped them. There would be no more useful piece of constructive statesmanship in the whole field of British external relations than the signing of an Anglo- Egyptian Treaty which would ensure an Egypt friendly to the British Commonwealth and in perpetual alliance with it.
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