The Last Phase
From a Special
THE surest sign that 'the negotiations on Algeria's independence are about to begin in earnest at Evian next week is the spate of warnings by the rebel FLN leaders that they and the French agree on nothing but a willingness to talk. Their wariness betrays, the French some- times seem to hint, a certain anxiety in the face of de Gaulle, the traditional sense of inferiority of rebels. They are somewhat defensively deter- mined not to lower their guard, not, in the words of one of their spokesmen to a French corre- spondent, `to lose in seven days what we have won in seven years of war.'
Yet, as the talks open, it is clear that the French are the more likely to suffer blows to their pride. Somewhat like the Japanese colonel in the River Kwai film, they have acknowledged they cannot crush the rebels and yet hope not to suffer the humiliation of the consequences. The French Government's communiqué propos- ing the opening of negotiations managed not to mention the FLN at all. Similarly de Gaulle, whom it pleases to grant independence but not to concede it, is trying to keep the negotiation within the formal limits he has set in the past. His thesis has always been that talks with the FLN could only be about the cease-fire, after which political discussion with all Algerian representative groups could follow. On this theory, the cease-fire must come quickly, or dignity be lost. But the FLN answer they will only agree if their guerrillas are recognised as their country's army and act as a counterpoise to the French Army in the period leading up to the referendum which is part of de Gaulle's Procedure for 'autodetermination.' They also astutely refuse to commit themselves on the future unless they are recognised as a government able to commit their country.
The French will have to go through the hoop on this, and it will be particularly painful for the settlers and the French Army in Algeria. Yet it is impossible to infer that the chances of peace are bad. General de Gaulle is now com- mitted, in the eyes of French opinion and in the eyes of history, which no doubt matters a great deal more to him. The French appointed him to make peace, and leave them in peace, and it is significant that his position deteriorated, as at no other time, after last year's abortive talks at Melun. The Algerians, on their side, seem sur- prisingly temperate in their proposals on the basic problems.
It is true that they appear to think that once their sovereignty is acknowledged they alone should decide how moderate they will be on these issues. But it is encouraging that they should have been as forthcoming at the begin- ning of a long and tough negotiation. Behind their attitude probably lies the prudence of the potential man of means; Though by Western standards a desperately poor country, by African ones Algeria will be a powerful one, a kind of Nigeria for the north-west. In population its ten millions do not compare with Nigeria's thirty- five, nor even outnumber the Moroccans. But war will have given it Africa's strongest army, and a whole corps of young men trained to lead. It possesses something of a middle class and if even a fraction of the Europeans stay, a civil service, and the beginnings of an economic plan obligingly worked out by the French. Above all, Algeria will have the Sahara. Its oil alone should provide a profit of perhaps $100 million by the late 1960s, not to speak of the natural gas found in vast quantities at Hassi R'mel. Ever since the fall of Mussadeq, oil-producing countries have made prudent revolutionaries.
The fact that to make something of this poten- tial strength the Algerians need outside help en- hances this tendency. France takes most of Algeria's exports, which include 400,000 workers employed in France whose pay keeps another two million going at home; the Sahara's oil has little hope of major markets outside France in a' world with too much oil; and the royalties at best pro- vide only a fraction of the sums France has been pouring into Algerian development. More aid will be needed in future; and there is no reservoir of technical skill to replace in comparable numbers the several tens of thousands of settlers who are engineers, teachers or skilled workers. It is not generally realised how far lavish French econo- mic aid, French mental alertness, the French language and cultural influence go to offset the ineptitude of French colonial policy-makers.
In the circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that a radical Algeria would be vigilant to defend its integrity, and will no doubt stress 'positive neutralist' postures to satisfy everyone that this is real. But if the French show the kind of en- lightened self-interest that appears in the argu- ment that all they need from the Sahara is oil in francs, not the profits, they have good chances of settling down to a new relationship with Algeria. The residual problem is the awesome one of the European minority. No legal guarantees can long prevent hardship for the settlers. An under- developed Algeria will inevitably sacrifice the interests of Europeans who are of no active use to the Moslems. The agrarian revolution, though the most widely publicised prospective change, would at most affect a tenth of the Europeans.
The majority of sufferers will be the government and other office employees, the artisans and work- ing men, who are 70 per cent. of the European population and risk being displaced by Moslems.
How can such people leave the homes where their families have been for several generations? Can the French Government be expected to provide adequate compensation? A large number will no doubt leave. Nearly half the settlers left Morocco and Tunisia when the protectorates ended. The Algerians have been there longer, but a similar proportion—if that occurred—would bring half a million refugees to France. Because of the huge • size of this problem one must expect the French to attach great importance to the nature and length of the transition period to independence if a detailed agreement is not reached on future Franco-Algerian links.
Yet it is hard to think of even this issue break- ing up the negotiation. For if the Europeans in Algeria have not evolved beyond colonialism, the metropolitan French want to have done with it and see an end to over twenty years of war.
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