3 MARCH 1923, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

WANTED, A CANNING.

WHAT the world wants to-day is a Canning—a statesman who will call in the New World to adjust the balance of the Old. Will not President Harding, acting as the representative, not of one Party in the Republic, but of America as a whole, play this great and beneficent part, and do in a much larger theatre, at a time of much greater need, and with a much greater purpose, what Canning professed to do?

There is no necessity for skilful presentation to prove the dangers of the situation. The barest catalogue of Europe's perils is enough to disquiet and depress the boldest observers. When we look back to March, 1919, it seems almost impossible to believe that we can have reached such a goal from such a starting-point. Then, all the peoples of the earth seemed, and indeed were, determined so to reorganize the Continent that the old hates, jealousies, fears and suspicions should no more be the cause of future wars. Above all things, men were resolved to have no more sowings of the dragon's teeth and no more crops of armed men—in a word, to have no more Alsace-Lorraines. Freedom of action for communi- ties, respect for national rights wherever they could be justly claimed, and as far as possible no exercise of coercion except to check aggression and wanton attacks —these were principles of universal acceptance. In the case of the Allies such considerations were strengthened by the feeling that the Allies themselves were Trustees for the restoration of Peace and Civilization. They must act on unselfish lines, and in doing so must keep together, subordinating individual interests to the common welfare.

Look at the state of Europe now ! We are seeing our hopes for a better and safer world dispelled one by one. The old recklessness and selfishness are reviving the old suspicions. Worst of all, there is the old desire to return to the use of force. Panic, masquerading under the name of Security, is breaking up the ties of the Alliance which saved us from a universal servitude under a German Autocracy. The air is full of talk about the regrouping of the Powers and of a Latin bloc which shall isolate " selfish and faithless " Britain ; which means, of course, that Britain must either be driven into the arms of Germany or must leave the Continent to its fate, thus confirming France in a policy which must end in failure, exhaustion and bankruptcy, or else in a domination by force extending over all Europe. But these are the very results to prevent which the War. was fought.

How are we to escape from this dreadful dilemma— one which, we believe, has its terrors for prudent and far- seeing Frenchmen just as much as for like-minded men in England ? Where are we to find shelter from the storm that is already darkening the sky ? The essential points in the problem are : (1) The determination of what Germany can pay without depriving her of hope and _strength ; (2) the discovery of the safest and best method of compelling her to pay what she justly ought to pay without the use of force, such as France is now applying, with the result that the old hatreds, instead of dying out, are being renewed with a tenfold intensity; (8) The need for setting Germany on a course which will make her change her defiant and suspicious policy, which will render her a true democracy, and induce her to turn her east skill- and energy into growing prosperous instead of cultivating the evil crops of national revenge and hatred.

Let an indemnity be named which Germany can pay, and pay quickly if her credit is restored, and let there be a policy as to evacuation which will give France her only true security—a neighbour not rendered half insane by the sense of revenge and by the continual sight of a huge block of territory, inhabited by some of the best elements of the German kin, cut off from the Fatherland. Such a perpetual appeal for German reunion, such a perpetual provocation to preparation for the redemption of the prisoner, could be nothing but a world-wide calamity.

No nation, as no man, can be judge in its own cause. Yet if the Allies are left to settle these problems by themselves, how can they avoid error ? Speaking broadly, either the French or the English view has got to be adopted. But though capable of . adjustment, these two opinions are at present absolutely opposed. There is only one way out—that proposed at the beginning of this article. We want a new and better George Canning. And in existing circumstances he can come only from America. Will America once more save Europe and the World, not this time in arms, not by a vast expenditure, but by good advice and the arts of conciliation ? Why should not America in effect offer to examine judicially the whole question of Reparations, estimate the greatest amount Germany can pay without being deprived of hope and the means of recovery, and then recommend a plan for securing the rapid restoration of the Rhineland to Germany, on the model of Bismarck's indemnity arrangement with France ? In order to facilitate this process let America propose a plan by which only a certain percentage of the debt owed to us and America by the Allies shall be paid in gold. Let the remainder be paid in German securities. We and America can then, under an agreement between ourselves if we so desire, remit these payments according as the progress of German payment to France is fast or slow. Next, let America suggest a plan under which the League of Nations can be bound absolutely to come to the aid of France if she is attacked by Germany. Finally, let America suggest modifications of the League of Nations under which she will be willing, and able, to join the League, or at- any rate join in the guarantee of security to France. • If America will do this, and do it without delay, she may yet save Europe alive. If not, the future of civiliza- tion must be dark and precarious. Surely the world is worth saving. Surely the jurists of America can devise means for saving it which will not commit their country to unrestricted responsibilities and yet will provide the former Allies with a compromise. After all, not much is needed. Though France seems " difficult," almost all her people would be thankful to find a good excuse for giving up the hopeless task of keeping 60,000,000 men in subjection and of maintaining huge armaments. France wants to be reassured, and America can reassure her. As for the other Continental Allies—Italy and Belgium—they will need very little persuasion to adopt the British standpoint. And then ourselves ? America knows that all we want is what she wants—Peace, and the assurance that we will not go back for ever to the system of obtaining security by armaments and the formation- of alliances and counter-alliances. For such entanglements we have no more desire than the inheritors of Washington's wise legacy of advice. • J. ST. LOE STRACHEY.