1-0L1TICAL COMMENTARY.
Big Jim and his Magic Cornucopia
By ALAN WATKINS
cy Er 1966 be the year of the voluntary efficiency idaudit for all of us,' remarked Mr. James Callaghan rather dauntingly in the House on Tuesday; whereupon several of those present shifted uneasily in their places; or if thy didn't, they perhaps should have done. This remark, how- iver, was untypical. Mr. Callaghan was not his usual stern neo-Gladstonian self, whom we have come to know and love so well. On the contrary, the predominant note sounded in his speech—his best so far as Chancellor—was one of carefully modulated optimism. When he came to his an- nouncement on decimal currency (hardly, one would have thought, a vote-winner or for that matter a vote-loser) one cynic in the press gallery was heard to observe that 'this is just to confuse everybody. No one will be able to work out how much the Government's really spending.'
In short, Tuesday was cornucopia day. It marked the culmination of an extraordinary fort- night of White Papers and published Bills and promises of infinite blessings to come. Mr. Callaghan's dilemma on Tuesday was plain enough. On the one hand, he bad to exploit to the' full the Government's mortgage proposals and also provide the country with some assurance that the budget would not be too bad after all. But, on the other hand, he had to make the by now obligatory references to hard work and efficiency and the virtues of thrift. As it turned out, the Chancellor succeeded remarkably 'Well in resolving this dilemma. It is the same dilemma that faces the rest of the Government in the forth- coming election campaign. Will they be as suc- cessful in explaining themselves as the Chancellor was on Tuesday?
But why, it may well be asked, are the Govern- ment in a pos'ion to have to do any explaining at all? Mr. Harold Wilson is forever telling us about his tough, unpopular decisions. Why, in that case, did he feel it necessary to turn ow the tap and see the Bills and White Papers flow in a seemingly unending stream?
There are two similar though separate reasons. First of all, when Mr. Wilson finally decided on the election date two weeks ago, he considered that the only charge on which Labour was really vulnerable was that of 'broken promises.' Sqme- thing had therefore to be done. And, secondly, it seems that Mr. Wilson had a genuine, puri- tanical sense of guilt and remorse about the pro- mises in the 1964 manifesto which were not subsequently fulfilled. This remorse demonstrated itself even before the final fixing of the election date. 'Let's see,' Mr. Wilson would ask his ministers after a piece of legislation had been announced, 'how many promises does that make it so far?' And then the Prime Minister wobld count off the fulfilled promises of that particular department on the fingers of one hand. 'Not bad going,' he would muse, 'not bad at all.'
The cheap mortgage scheme is a good example of a 1964 promise that caused particular 'diffi- culty. One idea was to set up a state mortgage corporation as a rival to the building societies. But this idea was quickly discarded because Mr. Richard Crossman believed that the soCiettes would take grave offence. Then there was the notion of linking relief on mortgage repayments to a general reform of the tax structure. But this, it was considered, would take too long. Finally the Ministry of Housing produced the proposal that people should have a choice: they could either accept the existing benefits offered by the tax system or, if they were less well off, take a straight subsidy. This scheme appealed to Mr. Wilson for the very good political reason that no one would be worse off as a result of it. Every- body would be happy. The rich would continue to receive the benefits of the tax concessions; whereas the less rich would be more advan- tageously placed than they would otherwise have been. Mr. Crossman, making no secret of the Prime Minister's support, then persuaded the Chancellor (who was at first dubious) into accept- ing the scheme.
Mr. Wilson, we may take it, is fully .aware of the dangers of the cheap mortgage and other recently announced plans. There is more than a streak of masochism in the British electorate: which is why Mr. Wilson keeps on as he does about tough and purposeful government and the taking of unpopular decisions. However, political parties cannot live by unpopular decisions alone. Most ministers recognise the need for the recent promises of legislation, though they recognise the difficulties also. These difficulties derive not only from the feeling that the voters are being bribed but from the contrast between the promises of the last few weeks and the elevated tone which, so one is informed, the Labour campaign will assume. As one minister put it, not without a tinge of irony, it would never do for an inter- national statesman like our Harold to be seen taking part in a political rough-house.
At this point we may conveniently consider the question of the proposed television 'confronta- tions.' Would having an argument with Mr. Heath on TV constitute a political rough-house? Would it at least derogate from the dignity of the Prime Minister? Perhaps it would. At any rate, one's impression so far is that Mr. Heath is noticeably more enthusiastic about confrontations than is Mr. Wilson. And this is understandable enough. Mr. Heath has a great deal to gain, and very little to lose. In the case of Mr. Wilson, however, this profit and loss account is reversed. Certainly it is widely believed that though Mr. Wilson now says he is ready to agree in principle _ to confrontations, he will in the end find some defect in the detailed arrangements which will unfortunately prevent him from appearing.
Assuming, however, that plans do in fact make some progress, what is likely to be the outcome? The most popular solution in television circles is for each of the two major parties to give up one of its fifteen-minute party political broadcasts. This mould mean that a half-hour-long confron- tation could be arranged. It would mean also that Mr. Jo Grimond could hardly make a valid claim .to be represented; whereas if an additional pro- gramme or programmes were mounted, Mr. Grimond could make a persuasive case for a seat at the top table.
But so far in this account we have been looking at the coming campaign chiefly through Labour eyes. Let us now try to put ourselves in the place of the Conservatives. How do they see things? Few really believe that their party will win (though last weekend Mr. Dudley Smith made a brave attempt to show that it would). Neverthe- less, it is at the same time wrong to think that the Tories are in a state of pessimism or disarray. Mr. lain Macleod has a phrase which he pro- duces from time to time—North of the Trent.' North of the Trent, says Mr. Macleod, there is not only a general propensity to vote Labour but in particular a tendency for former Liberals to vote Labour too. Hence the Hull result. South of the Trent, however, it is a different story. Here, so the theory goes, the disaffected Liberals, or those who live in constituencies which do not sport a Liberal candidate, will return to their true allegiance with possibly surprising results.
Be this as it may, it seems that whatever the outcome Mr. Heath will emerge from the election with added credit. In the past I have not always been kind to Mr. Heath: but it must be said that in, the last week or so his television appearances have improved enormously. He does not grin or giggle as he used to. He answers the question (though there are those who believe that answer- ing questions with a crisp monosyllable gives the viewers the impression of ignorance in the speaker). He has acquired a certain gravitas. Mr. Heath's chief defect as a television performer is still that he is not entirely happy when talking straight to camera. Significantly, all his impres- sive performances of the past few days have been in answer to interviewers' questions. But if he is happier with arrangements of this kind, why not stick to them?
Again, I once believed that if Mr. Heath 'lost' the election he would be quickly disposed of. Just as the country sqyire Sir Robert Walpole was hired by the Whig grandees to do a job, so also was the grammar school boy Ted Heath hired by the hard-faced Tories. Today, however, I am not nearly so sure about the vulnerability of Mr. Heath. There is a close parallel here with the career of Hugh Gaitskell. Gaitskell, it will be recalled, had little tactical sense. Neither has Mr. Heath. On Tuesday he elected to follow Mr. Callaghan even though it was obvious before the debate started that the day's news was going to be made by the Chancellor—an extraordinary misjudgment on Mr. Heath's part.
However, my principal point is that until the 1959 election Gaitskell was a politician who was generally unknown and in some quarters strongly disliked. And then, despite his election blunder over taxation, and despite his huge defeat, his conduct of the campaign won him many admirers in4ide the Labour party and in the country. It is possible that Mr. Heath will achieve much the same standing as did Gaitskell seven years ago.
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