THE AMEER'S FLIGHT.
THE flight of the Ameor of Cabul to the British camp is a most disastrous event. It ends all possibility of form- ing an alliance with " a strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan." It appears from the statements of the Stan- dard's correspondent, who must be a Staff officer, for no others are allowed to telegraph, and must be experienced, or he could not have chatted with the. Ameer's followers, that Yakoob Khan left his capital " surreptitiously," having, in fact, lost all authority, and being in danger of his life. In other words, his alliance with the hated Infidel has destroyed the Ameer, has broken his control over his troops, and has uined his character in the eyes of his countrymen, who egard him as we should regard a Premier who introduced a Catholic Nuncio, supported by French troops, to rule over Great Lritain. Yakoob Khan could not even come out openly to meet hi allies, and with his flight every vestige of central government die appears from Afghanistan. Herat, Candahar, Badakshan, Kohistan, the Ghilzai country around Ghuzni, are virtually independent of Oahu' and each other ; while the capital is in anarchy, given up to a lawless mob, and probably, if we may .judge from the usual symptom, the Closing of the gates, with massacre going on inside. The British Government is there- fore compelled either to march on Cabul as a mere invader, intent on chastising an outrage, or to restore Yakoob Khan to the throne, as the most convenient Puppet through whom to rule. They have chosen the second alternative, and as Yakoob Khan can give little or no help, even if he is not assassi- nated by some indignant fanatic as an apostate traitor, they have first to occupy Cabul, Ghuzni, Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and Sellalabad,—two or three of which may be defended, dis- organised though the Afghans are ;and then to commence the conquest of the distant provinces, Herat included, which unquestionably will revolt against a British nominee. These
Empires, Russia, Persia, and provinces march with three China, are as large as kingdoms, and are occupied by clans of furious semi-barbarians, who will submit at one moment, and organise a Sicilian Vespers the next. And the Government have to commence this immense task, which will occupy. 30,000 men for a twelvemonth, with troops who hate the work, feeling always cowed by the climate, and with the huge Suleiman range behind them, covered for three months in the year with snow, and swarming with martial banditti, who, though they take our bribes, cannot be kept from slaughtering our officers and plundering our convoys, and who, even when quiet, will take in that long line of nearly 800 miles 10,000 men to 'watch and control them. The enterprise is enormous, and it has to be accomplished either at the expense of India, already overburdened, or at that of the British taxpayer, who has, as three-fourths of all experts affirm, no interest whatever in Central Asia, and who for five millions spent in fortresses, could make the Indian frontier absolutely impregnable,—to find, when he had done it, that his danger was in India itself. This is wholly independent of the risk that Russia may resist our conquest, and of the certainty that whenever Russia desires to embarrass us, she will pretend to collect a few thole–ed men and to be looking towards Herat, and so compel us our garrison. There never was a task so costly or so useless commenced by man with so little consideration, or so little consultation of the people who are 'o suffer for it all.
But may not the British Government stop short ? Certainly it can, if it pleases, declare that Cabul has forfeited its rank by its crimes, punish that city by degrading it, and carrying off Yakoob Khan to Candahar, set him up there as Ameer of Afghanistan. That is a policy quite likely to be adopted, for it 43 very showy, and very feeble ; but then it involves the very consequence against which Lord Salisbury and his followers have always protested,—the dissolution of Afghanistan, and the gradual reduction of its component kingdoms either to hopeless anarchy, like that which raged in the Khanates, or to dependance, more or less complete, upon Teheran and To,shkend. Oabul will be irritated to mad- ness by its degradation. Herat, unless occupied, will not obey Yakoob, a mere puppet in English hands. The distant pro- vinces will almost necessarily set up for themselves, and we shall in no long time either be compelled to garrison and defend Candahar against marauding clans, or to hold it as a Metz, leaving Russia to roll slowly up towards us, as we might leave her now. We do not say that task is beyond our strength. We have always acknowledged that if we confine ourselves to Candahar, we can, at a severe and perfectly use- less cost, govern the old kingdom, connect it with Scinde by a fortified railway, and build an impregnable outpost at Canda- har, a Metz in the midst of Central Asia. That is possible, and as we should be forced in a few years to reduce Beloochistan to order, and run a direct railway through it to the sea, that, we frankly concede, might be bene- ficial to the world, but then that would not be ruling, con- ciliating, or even coercing Afghanistan. Afghanistan would have disappeared, to be replaced either by anarchical Mussulman States, quarrelling with each other and the world, or dependent Russian provinces. That is not a pleasing prospect for any party or for any Power, yet that is the best prospect left us, unless the Government has the nerve, after chastising Cabul and seating Yakoob Khan in Candahar, to retire, and defend our natural frontier against all comers. There is no need to abandon the Passes, if we wish to keep them. We have only to retire, cancel the Treaty of Gundamuck by an arrangement with Yakoob Khan, and remain armed and ready in our own borders for any enemy whom Providence may send. If we have not that nerve—and this Government unquestionably has not—there are but two alternatives, both wearisome, exhaust- ing, and unnecessary,—to conquer the whole of Afghanistan, or to remain content with holding down Oandahar. Next week, we suppose, the English populace, after its new and most sickening fashion, will be shouting. over our " victory at Oabul ;" but Cabul is only the road to trouble, of which the most imaginative and hopeful can see no probable end.
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