" GERRYMANDERING."
[To THE EDITOR OF THE " SPECTAT0R."]
Sia,—The simplicity of those Liberals who believe that Lord Salisbury would allow the Franchise Bill to pass the House of Lords on the mere sight of a moderate Redistribution Bill, is surprising. He is not likely to admit that any Redistribution Bill proposed by his opponents is fair or moderate. His tactics evidently are to prevent, if he can, the passage of any Franchise Bill, until actually coupled with a Redistribution Bill dictated by himself.
You give some countenance to Lord Randolph Churchill's doctrine that any considerable amount of what is called ' gerrymandering" is on either side impossible. On the Liberal side it would be so, because the House of Lords in rejecting any manifest unfairness of that nature would have the mass of impartial opinion with it. Resistance to mere party trickery in legislation, by either side, would, indeed, be one of the most important functions of any properly constituted Upper Chamber. But nobody would expect the present House of Lords to resist "gerrymandering" on the Conservative side. And I desire to suggest that if by entering into combination with Mr. Parnell, or by outbidding the Government, and, as you think probable, and as more than one of his own speeches point to, proposing equal electoral districts and single seats, Lord Salisbury should succeed in getting Redistribution into his own hands, he would be by no means precluded from "gerrymandering" by any system of equal electoral districts and single seats. If you will permit me, I will endeavour to illustrate this.
Suppose that under the new franchise there are 5,200,000 electors, and that they are divided into 650 constituencies of 8,000 electors, each returning a single Member (8,000 x 650-, 5,200,000); and, further, suppose that of the 5,200000 electors, 3,000,000 are of party A, and only 2,200,000 of party B. If representative Government means anything, it means that party A should have a majority in the House of Commons over party B.
But further, suppose party B, having control over Redistribu- tion, so to divide the constituencies that where party A is uppermost there shall be as nearly as may be 6,000 electors of party A against 2,000 of party B, while where party B is upper- most there shall be as nearly as may be 4,500 electors of party B against 3,500 electors of party A, the result would be that the 3,000,000 electors of party A would return 290 Members, while the 2,200,000 electors of party B would return 360 Members. (For 290x 6,000 + 360 x 3,500=-3,000,000, while 360 x 4,500 + 290 x 2,000 = 2,200,000.) The minority would have established its rule over the majority.
This is not a merely fanciful illustration. Its exactness of figures could not, of coarse, be attained in practice. But it would be perfectly easy, with the aid of information readily obtained from local election-managers, so to arrange equal electoral districts, that while in the larger number of districts the party intended to be favoured should have moderate majori- ties, in the smaller number the party intended to be kept down should waste its strength in overwhelming majorities.
If it is with any such scheme as this in view that the country is now convulsed, it seems worth while for moderate men who have reflected on the working of representative government, to ask themselves whether, if simultaneously with a great extension of the franchise, the ascendancy of the minority over the majority should be established by such contrivances, this result, whether good or bad, could have any durability ; or whether, as soon as the newly enfranchised classes had found out how they had been tricked, more Democratic changes than any now in contemplation would not be certain to follow.--4 am,
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