4 SEPTEMBER 1897, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE EUROPEAN CHESS-BOARD.

AiFAURE has returned to Paris with a treaty of • alliance, or at any rate something very like it, in his pocket. Let us see how the pieces stand on the European chess-board after this event. That the Russian Emperor is now master of the European situation is the vague instinctive feeling of the world at large, and in this case the vague instinctive feeling will, we believe, prove correct. The closer we look into the details of the new arrangements binding Europe, the clearer it becomes that no one of the various Powers can move without Russia, and that her will, for the time at any rate, predominates absolutely. Germany is virtually isolated, and if she took any important independent action, might find herself between the hammer and the anvil of France and Russia. Austria is to a great extent bound by her new agreement with Russia, which lays down that the status quo in the Balkans shall not be gratuitously disturbed ; but that if it is, Russia and Austria will divide the spoil on certain definite lines. France, on the other hand, has, by entering into alliance with Russia, pledged herself not to alter the general European status quo by any movement not approved of by her ally. Thus, in some way or other, every Power except Russia is bound, either by express agreement or by her interests, not to alter the status quo. Germany does not want to alter it. Her only dread is that it should be altered, and therefore she has encumbered Russia with protestations and assurances that she will stand at Russia's side and strike down any one who dares to interfere with the status quo. Austria, as we have just pointed out, has also agreed with Russia to maintain the status quo, though she has wisely tried to anticipate the results of its break-up. France, as we have also said, is bound hand and foot to Russia not to interfere with the status quo. Thus, if the agreements and protestations are maintained, Russia has got all the Powers into a charmed circle, from which they cannot move unless and until she says the magic word. While she wants peace, which she does at present, partly in order that she may finish her armaments, and partly, also, because she wants to develop Siberia and exploit Northern China, she will not speak the word, and there- fore, till she changes her mind or till the charm wears out, as all charms do in time, the status quo will be main- tained. It is an astonishing position for any country to have attained, and the winning of such a place reflects great credit on the Russian statesmen. The only doubt is whether internal difficulties, which may arise in Russia at any moment, will allow Russia to keep the peace. But for that we should feel more than ordinarily secure as to the peace of Europe, for that the Russian statesmen think just now that peace is to the interest of their country we do not doubt. If, however, they should become pressed by internal troubles, it is impossible to feel certain that such a mood would last.

A curious proof of how tightly France is held in the bonds of the Russian Alliance is afforded by a statement made by a correspondent of the St. James's Gazette, which, if true, is most important. The writer in question, who professes to be specially well informed, and who certainly writes as if he knew the general lie of European politics, declares that before the final conclusion of the arrange- ment between France and Russia, Russia required France to give her the following solemn and specific assurance in regard to the future. The caution of the Czar could not, says the writer in the St. James's Gazette, be satisfied until the following declaration —" of which I guarantee the sense, if not the exact text" —was made :—" The French Government gives the assurance that should Germany offer to give back Alsace-Lorraine purely and simply, or against a territorial colonial compensation, to secure France's neutrality in case of war with Russia, France would not accept the proposition. Honour compels France to reconquer by arms what she has lost by the chance of war ; besides, conquest alone can attach again the annexed Provinces and also weaken Germany, which would be the principal object for France as well as for Russia in ease of a war pro- voked by the Triple Alliance." Of course the exacting of this :pledge means that in the negotiations the Russian Foreign Office had said You are asking us to break with Germany for good. How do we know that Germany will not suddenly turn the tables on us by voluntarily handing you back the Provinces, and by saying to you that "you can have the Provinces without the risks and expense of a war if you will only stand aside while we deal with Russia " ? How do we know that you would not accept an arrangement so obviously to your interest?' No doubt, from Russia's point of view, the possibility of such action on the part of Germany was the crux of the problem. According to the St. James's Gazette, France met it by the declaration we have given, and Russia was satisfied. At first sight it may seem as if this fierce declaration on the part of France were an answer to those who say that France is giving up all hope of getting back the Provinces. As a matter of fact, the declaration in question is amost a final abandonment of the Provinces. A moment's thought will explain this. France pledges her word that she will not receive the Provinces back except through conquest. But France also, in effect, pledges her word to Russia that she will not go to war with Germany except Russia agrees to the war being waged. But Russia meantime positively and formally assures Germany that as long as the status quo is maintained, and France is not attacked by her or by the Triple Alliance, Russia will not interfere with the peace of the world, or attack or help in an attack on Germany. This means that France cannot get the Provinces back by war,—unless, of course, Germany were so mad as wantonly to bring on the war with two fronts. But she also pledges herself not to get them back by peaceful means. Can we be wrong in saying, then, that the Russian Alliance means the abandonment of the Provinces ? Assuredly it does mean the abandonment of the Provinces unless that Alliance means immediate war with Germany, which no one dreams of professing to believe it means. France, then, has resigned the Provinces by assuming the position of Russia's faithful ally. Cest magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre,—nor Alsace nor Lorraine.

We have dealt with all the European Powers but England. She alone stands outside the charmed circle which the Circe of the North has drawn round her. How is England affected by the completion of the spell ? In our opinion, favourably. The spell has been cast to support the status quo, and the status quo means peace, and England benefits by peace. There only remains one point of doubt. The German Emperor, if he has not already done so, will very soon realise that he is, in truth, in a position of almost complete isolation. Menelek uncon- sciously gave a severe blow to the Triple Alliance when he defeated the Italians, and so overthrew the Crispi Ministry, and put the Rudini Administration in its place. A more severe blow was, however, the agreement made between Russia and Austria as to the future of the Turkish Empire. This agreement was not in any way a nominal or technical breach of the Triple Alliance, but it took the heart out of it, for all that. But at the moment that the Triple Alliance has "gone soft" the Kaiser finds himself confronted with the fact that Russia and France are henceforth to count as one, and that Russia is to direct the forces of the Alliance. At the same time the anti-English policy of Germany, pursued so patiently and so persistently for so many years by the German Foreign Office, has at last come to be understood by England. Germany, therefore, is really quite isolated, and because of her isolation has come within the Russian spell, and been forced to sit in the charmed circle whose members cannot move till Russia wills. It is not a pleasant position for Germany, and by all accounts the German Emperor has devised a plan—he is always good at plans—for breaking up and escaping from the Russian spell. His notion is that all the Powers should join together, give up their old antagonisms, and set upon England. If only he could get up a coalition against England, his isolation would have vanished, and he, and not the Emperor of Russia, would control the fate of Europe. It is a brilliant dream, but not one which is very likely to be accomplished. The German Emperor may point out what" a dreeping roast" the British Empire is, and how there will be a prime cut for every one,—South Africa and Uganda and half Australia for himself ; Egypt, Malta, and Gibraltar, and our West Coast possessions, and the rest of Australia for France ; India for Russia; and trifles such as New Zealand and the West Indies for Austria and Italy. Canada, too, might be a nice morsel for any one who did not mind the neighbourhood of the United States. But though the German Emperor would have so many attrac- tive pieces of "loot" to offer, we very much doubt his being able to get the Powers to agree to his scheme. Partitions are always ticklish things to manage. People are so apt to think that they have come worst off in the division, and so to fall to quarrelling. Besides, it is no good dividing the lion's skin till you have killed him, and the lion may take a good deal of killing. Again, it is very doubtful whether any of the Powers would care to raise Germany to the height to which she would be raised were she to be allowed to plan and accomplish the destruc- tion of the British Empire. As Charles IL said to his brother, "Nobody is going to kill me in order to make you King." The Kaiser's plan, then, would be almost certain to fail, even if he were to get so far as tentatively proposing it, or some portion of it, which, however, is very doubtful. It is far more likely to remain one of his wild dreams of "world-policy." Meantime the isolation of Germany is a fact, and a very curious one. It has taken the German Emperor about six years to reduce his country to the diplomatic position in which she is now placed. We do not, of course, mean to argue that it is a position of any peril, but it is certainly one devoid of the prestige with which Prince Bismarck contrived to endow his country. One must be fair, however, to William II. It is conceivable that even Prince Bismarck would not have been able to manage better. He would, of course, have done everything he could to keep Russia and France apart, but when France was so very eager he might have failed. At any rate the German Emperor, though he has talked so much about being the "War-Lord," and has pranced so much, has always been careful to be a peace "War- Lord," and only to prance at reviews. As he is unquestion- ably a man of personal courage, the strong desire to keep the peace in Europe which he has always shown is a sign of grace. He clearly does not want to go to war merely to try what war is like, or to test his powers of strategy, as he tests his powers of painting and composing on the bodies of his subjects. We should be thankful for that fact, for it makes it probable that, though ill at ease, he will endure to sit in the magic circle which Russia has woven round the status quo.