THE EGYPTIANS IN ABYSSINIA.—THE FELLAH AS A FIGHTER.*
ABOUT the time of the opening of the Suez Canal, when Khedive Ismail was at the height of his prosperity, rich with borrowed money and ambitious of military renown, he engaged a number of American gentlemen, nearly all of whom were educated and experienced soldiers, for the reorganisation of his army. Two or three were ex-officers of the Federal Army, but the greater number had won their laurels while fighting for the "Lost Cause." Among the former was Colonel Dye, a West-Point graduate, who had seen much service both on the Indian border and in the Civil War, and before the termination of that con- test he had attained the rank of Brevet Brigadier-General. since his retirement from the Khedive's service (which he found a sort of Egyptian bondage, very hard work and very little pay), he has occupied a portion of his leisure in writing a book, to which he has given the somewhat misleading title of Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia. "History of the Egyptian Invasion of Abyssinia" would have been better. Colonel Dye has much to say concerning the fighting capacity of the Fellahin, and seeing that he speaks from experience, gained both in the barrack and the field, his strictures possess at the present moment a more than ordinary value. His esti- mate of the Egyptian peaeent's soldierly aptitude is very low. Though gifted with a wonderful power of physical endurance, and a docile and a good campaigner, the fellah is neither com- bative nor intelligent, has not a spark of patriotism, dislikes and distrusts his officers, and hates soldiering with so intense a -hatred that, in order to avoid it, he will often cut off one of his fingers, or put out one of his eyes. When Colonel Dye was in Egypt, the artillery, as well as the cavalry, consisted exclusively of fellahin. The gunners were taken from a class superior to that which supplied recruits to the other arms of the Service. The officers, moreover, were better instructed than their breth- ren of the Line, an advantage which they owed to the exertions of the commandant of the artillery school, a highly educated
• Preach officer. To the teaching of this Frenchman probably, the stout defence made the other day by the forts at Alexandria is in some measure due. A great drawback to the efficiency of the fellah as a fighting-man is the shortness of his sight, resulting from ophthalmia. So defective is the vision of Egyptian soldiers, says Colonel Dye, that hardly any of them can see further through a rifle-sight than a few rods. The eyes of the black soldier are better. Under the same conditions, he can mark thirty to forty per cent. more hits than his Egyptian • comrade. This superior shooting may, however, be in part due to the negro's greater nerve, confidence, and eagerness to excel. The black regiments, being officered exclusively by Egyptians, arc in no way better organised than the other regi- ments; albeit, the negroee being inured from childhood to war and the chase, they make far better fighting material than the fellahin. With the exception of a few who have risen from the ranks, the higher officers are the descendants of Turkish fathers and Circassian mothers. They are generally sufficiently "brave, but cruel, avaricious, corrupt and fearfully immoral, mentally inert, and physically lazy. The younger regimental and staff officers are, for the most part, the sons of pashas and beys in Government service, trained in the military schools established by Ismail. They are inferior, morally and physically, to the men they command. In this, observes Colonel Dye, there
* mosiem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia: or, Military Service under the Khedive, in his Provinces and beyond their Borders, RA Experienced by the f American Staff. By William MaE. Dye ormerly of the United State, Army, And lido Colonel of the Egyptian Staff). Now York : Atkul. and Pront.
is nothing surprising, for while the future officer is exposed at an early and susceptible age to the enervating influences of the harem, the fellah, from his earliest youth, lives a laborious life in the open air.
If the American officers might have had their way, the Egyp- tian Army would havebeen thoroughly reorganised, and rendered as efficient as, in the nature of things, it could be, Perhaps it is as well, in view of recent events, that they were not allowed to have their own way, for Colonel Dye's experience in the Abyssinian war goes far to show—though he does not say so —that the fellahin, if well led by officers in whom they had confidence, would fight as well as our Indian Sepoys.
The most stirring parts of the book are the narratives of Colonel Arrendrup's expedition to Abyssinia, and of the inva- sion that culminated in the terrible battle of Gura Plain, in • which Colonel Dye took a leading part. Colonel Arrendrup, a Dane by birth, had served in the Danish Army. Among his officers were Major Dennison (an American), Major Durholz (a Swiss), and Count Zichy (an Austrian). The force, consisting of about 4,000 men (although on this point the Colouel is not quite as clear as might be desired), disembarked at Massowah in October, 1875, and on November 14th joined battle with the Abyssinian Army, under King John, at a place called Mareb Fora, in the neighbourhood of the Asmara, Mountains. If the Egyptians had not been outnumbered by hundreds to one, they would probably have been beaten all the same, for the Abys- sinians fought with desperate ferocity ; and Arrendrup, who paid for his rashness with his life, attacked before all his men had come up. As it was, the Egyptians were simply massacred. "They [the Abyssinians] swarmed up the ridge and quickly over it, coming down on Rushtan's men in front, flank, and rear. They closed in upon the Egyptians, sur- rounded them, piled them in one bloody heap,—a great mass of human flesh, unrecognised and unrecognisable." A remnant only escaped, and after terrible sufferings succeeded in reaching Massowah.
It was to avenge this defeat and restore the damaged reputa- tion of the Egyptian Army, that the Khedive ordered a second invasion of Abyssinia. The force detailed for this service, con- sisted of 11,000 men of all arms, under the command of Rateb Pasha, with General Loring as Chief of the Staff, Colonel Dye as Adjutant-General, and Colonel Field, another American, as Inspector-General. If this army had been composed of the best troops in Europe, commanded by a Von Moltke or a Napier, it would have had an arduous task ; but ill-fed, badly organised, and worse led, it was foredoomed to destruction. Rateb would do anything rather than listen to the foreign officers of his staff, and the comfort and safety of Prince Hassan gave him far more concern than the movements of the Abyssinian forces or the condition of his own.
The decisive struggle took place on March 7th, 1876, on the plain of Gum, a stretch of comparatively level land at the foot of Kaya Khor mountain. The dispositions of the Pasha in command were exceedingly faulty, and his orders during and preceding the engagement marked by the very extremity of irresolution. The stores, reserve ammunition, and some guns were placed in an entrenched camp, to which the name of Fort Gera was given. When the battle began, the Abyssinians bore down on the Egyptian army as steadily and compactly as the
squadrons of a great military Power. Colonel Dye stationed• himself near a battery planted on a crest which formed the key
of the Egyptian position. This battery bore the brunt of the attack, and never did gunners fight more bravely than these poor fellahin. The supporting battalion showed equal courage.
Encouraged by the presence and exhortations of two or three American officers, they repulsed attack after attack, but only to be again and again assailed by overwhelming odds, and killed almost to a man. "I saw no man attempt to leave his post," says Colonel Dye ; "each and every one remained in his place till all was over."
The carnage was frightful. The Abyssinians not only killed, but mutilated, and the wounded were remorselessly butchered.
Colonel Dye, though shot through the foot, contrived to reach the fort, which was garrisoned by a large body of troops, who, owing to the cowardice or incompetence of Osman Pasha, their commander, had taken no part in the engagement. Among the first to escape were Prince Hassan and Rateb Pasha. Of the 5,200 men who went into battle, only 530 came out with a whole skin. A thousand were killed, 1,600 wounded, many of them mortally ; and of 2,168 Egyptians who were taken prisoners, all save 130 were massacred in cold blood.
Two days after the battle, Fort Gura was besieged by King John, who made several very determined attacks on the Egyptian position, which were repelled with considerable difficulty. On March 10th, after three days' further fighting, the Abyssinians raised the siege, broke up their camp, and dis- appeared. This apparently incomprehensible proceeding was ascribed to the unwillingness of the King's troops to remain longer in the field, for the Abyssinians, like the Vendeans, in the revolutionary war, assemble only to. fight. When a battle is won, they like to return to their homes, to work in their fields and recount their exploits. It is not the fact, as has been stated, that Prince Hassan was taken prisoner, and only libe- rated on the payment of an enormous ransom. He stayed quietly in the fort until the 3rd of April, when, by special permission of his father, be left for Cairo. On the 19th, the remainder of the army, now a mere mob, evacuated Gura, and reached Massowah as best they could. Many died by the way of sickness and privation, and only a small remnant lived to reach their native land.
If Colonel Dye could have given us a little less dissertation and a little more personal narrative, we should have been better pleased ; but his book is highly interesting, and written, if not with the pen of a ready writer, with modesty and good-sense. It is the only authentic history yet given to the world of the dealings of Khedive Ismail with Abyssinia, dealings which did much to provoke his downfall, and are, therefore, among the remoter causes of the present crisis in the affairs of Egypt.
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