5 JANUARY 1951, Page 5

Retreat in Korea

Very large forces of Chinese infantry, with a little support from artillery but none from armour or the air, have attacked the 8th Army, which has been allowed several weeks in which to pre- pare defensive positions covering the Seoul area. So far, this attack has not • been held at any point, and the 8th Army is once more committed to the difficult and disheartening process of withdrawal. Further east, North Korean forces have disrupted what seems to have been an attempt to establish an enclave manned by South Koreans with its flank or rear resting on the sea ; news from this sector is scarce, but the intention of the North Koreans is pre- sumably to get round behind the 8th Army positions, and there seems to be little to prevent them doing this. Most of X Corps is still refitting in the south of the peninsula, and those elements which are or soon will be on their way to join 8th Army may well be pinned down before they reach it by the need to protect the main north-south communications from encircling movements combined with guerrilla activities. The readiness with which the 8th Army has given ground, and the complete abandonment of Seoul now announced, suggests that General MacArthur's plan contemplates a full-scale withdrawal during which no determined resistance will be offered until his main forces are back within the Pusan peri- meter. If this is the strategy dictated by the sheer necessities of a winter campaign against numerical odds, it is to be hoped that the idea of leaving behind a smaller bridgehead or fortress area at Inchon has not been lightly discarded ; if time allows (which is unfortunately improbable) its defence might with advantage be entrusted to an independent force of British and Commonwealth infantry, together with the Turkish, French, Dutch, Greek and other United Nations detachments, artillery and engineer resources being supplied by the Americans. The situation is likely to appear pro- gressively gloomier during the next few weeks. The Chinese advance may and certainly ought to be slowed down ; but the fighting quality of the 8th Army, which is not at present—thanks partly to the appalling weather conditions—high, will not be im- proved by a long withdrawal, and it is to be hoped that General Ridgway will oblige his enemy to act some part more exacting and less gratifying than that of a sheep-dog while the 8th Army retreats to a battlefield of its own choosing.