THE NEW LIBYAN CAMPAIGN

By STRATEGICUS

N0 battle in the war bears any sort of resemblance to that which opened last week in Libya, with the single exception of General Auchinleck's campaign of last November. In its con- fusion (which is wholly distinct from the ordered chaos of an ordinary battle), in the wideness of its range, its amazing vicissitudes

and the swiftness with which it changes, there is nothing com- parable to this tank-battle in the desert. It is for these reasons that it is so difficult to form any just appreciation of its position s any given moment. While one is writing the entire pattern may

eve changed, and vistas that seemed decisively closed may have ivened, and the range of possibility have passed beyond imagina-

non. It is only cumulative effects that can guide us ; and until they have reached a limit set by the balance of the forces engaged, t hidden from us, as indeed they may be concealed from the mand, we lack the means to estinlate the position.

This was our experience of the fourth Libyan campaign, which one period seemed to escape completely from control, and was gely decided by the brilliant impulse that took Rommel away

in the place where a decision may have been latent. But it pears to be even truer of the present campaign, of which only e opening moves have yet appeared. In the present season the tial phase has lasted incredibly long already. It is developing er almost unimaginable conditions, and tending more and more become a struggle of mere physical endurance. But it is well

remember that the first phase of the fourth campaign did not d for nearly three weeks ; and on this occasion the gage of tle is very much more important. It has been said that Rommel been emancipated from the control of the Great General Staff ; t it by no means follows that the .campaign is regarded as a minor ir. The Germans have carried out a long offensive against Malta, lost a very considerable number of aeroplanes when there is obviously an increasing call upon them. The loss was borne use it was deemed of greater importance that Rommel should in a position to attack with every prospect of success.

It can, in fine, be confidently assumed that the campaign forms integral part of the great offensive by means of which Hitler es to salvage his attempt to enslave Europe. Libya clearly has organic strategic connexion with the main battleground of isia, from which it is tactically separated. The campaign, there- e, is to be taken as the first act of the year's drama, which is to eal the final attempt of Hider to do what he has so often mised and hitherto failed to achieve.

The elaborate preparations in the Malta area, in Crete and them Europe, make it certain that so far hardly the outlines the act have been seen; but everything we know of Germany gests that the plans have been worked out to the last detail. is this that invests every German initiative with such threatening sibilities ; but even here some comfort can be found. The dity to organise plans of such elaboration and the success that erally attends them, leads the Germans to depend upon them. natural consequence is that the sudden crisis not infrequently them wanting. If, therefore, General Rommel has been given trot of the campaign this may be a decision from which we II ultimately profit. If this brilliant commander has on two asions succeeded by a bold opportunism, he certainly made a ound error of judgement when he left the main battlefield last :ember to raid the British communications. He lost the chance inflicting a decisive blow against our dispersed armoured force the sake of creating among our communications a confusion telt failed even to stop the normal supply to the forward Ps.

It was hardly to be expected that his careful plans would develop e perfectly than do those of an ordinary battle ; but very much re depended upon them being carried out punctually. General mel cannot so soon have forgotten that he was dealt a heavy eat last November by a numerically inferior force ; and he must e known that the Eighth Army has been strengthened since that • Yet everything that was essential to his success apparently

went astray. His plan was to place behind the British positions a very strong force consisting of the two Panzer divisions of the Afrika

Korps, the 9oth German light division, and the zoth Italian Mobile Corps, comprising the Ariete armoured division and the tont Trieste motorised division. As far as one can judge, he was never able to assemble that force east of the British lines at the critical time. The Italian Mobile Corps appears to have been delayed by the Free French before Bir Hacheim ; and the Afrika Korps met the full weight of the British armoured divisions, which at normal strength should have been numerically very much stronger. It may have been this compulsory dispersion that prevented him getting to Tobruk, which was his immediate objective.

His concentration, therefore, was not effected with the precision that characterised that of the Eighth Army last November. But this was a complete surprise, while Rommel's attack was expected ; and it is the most remarkable feature of the battle that in spite of this he was able to maintain his position for at least four days. He intended to take Bir Hacheim, and in this also he failed. He planned also to break through the British positions between Gazala and the Capuzzo road. He attacked, but made little headway and suffered heavy loss. He also attempted to land a force from the sea north of Acroma, where a detachment of his tanks had contrived to establish themselves. The landing proved abortive. Thus in everything he attempted to do he failed ; his concentration went wrong, he could not take Bir Hacheim, break through south of Gazala, nor land from the sea. Nevertheless, he fought a prolonged and heavy battle in the rear of our lines, and, when his supply coluMns threatened to fail him, he contrived to break through the minefields connecting our fortified positions. As I write he appears to be fortifying two of these and, under cover of a strong tank counter-attack, withdraw- ing his armoured divisions to them. His success in linking the two gaps to form one wide breach is an achievement that will ease his supply-problem considerably.

The vital fact which is unknown to us is the relative losses. The tank battle in the desert has some analogy to a naval engagement, and one wonders whether this is another Jutland. That might well be the conclusion of so confused a battle fought under such abnormal conditions. But after all, in spite of the dismal impression created by the famous Balfour communiqué, Jutland was the last we saw of the German challenge to British sea power by surface craft ; and the battle of " Knightsbridge " can hardly end in that way. In General Auchinleck we have a most determined fighter, and he will not be content with a mere immunity from challenge in the Mediterranean.

Although it seems dear that Tobruk was the immediate objective of the attack a week ago, and the means by which Rommel sought to capture Tobruk was the defeat of the British armour, it is obvious that the means would cover much more than the immediate end. Indeed, if Rommel could defeat the British armoured divisions without losing his own, what is there to prevent him from crossing the Egyptian frontier and trying to make for the vital Suez Canal, living on our supplies by the way? It is impossible that all the elaborate preparations have been made merely to enter Tobruk. The Rommel who advanced across Cyrenaica after Wavell's victorious offensive, would hardly be likely to miss the chance of again attempting to profit by our weakness in any case. The whole of the plan has not yet been seen ; but it must somehow promise to launch Rommel upon one flank of the operation which is designed to converge upon the Near East. It is for this reason that it is too soon to say that we have won a victory, much less defeated Rommel's campaign. All that can reasonably be said at this moment is that all that is certainly known of his plan is in ruins. ' It has collapsed under the fierce attack of the British armoured forces assisted by the Royal Air Force. But General Auchinleck himself warns us that the battle is not yet over, and the issue has yet to be decided.

Too little is known about the relative strength of the armoured forces, the Air Forces and the infantry to draw any further con- elusion ; but at least it may be pointed out that the dangers of the all-out clash between armoured forces do not affect us alone. If either side is disproportionately reduced in strength, the way must lie open to exploitation. • General Auchinleck is the last man to ignore any chance of turning the tables if it is offered him. Sooner or later we must hope and expect that he will have the power to restore the control of the Mediterranean to us. That time may be far distant. For the moment it is enough to recognise that the issues that still hang in the balance are very important. The battle is now setting into a new pattern. What we can assume is that General Auchinleck will not agree to the stabilisation of the position if he can possibly give Ritchie the force to defeat Rommel outright.