6 AUGUST 1898, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

LORD SALISBURY AND THE CHINESE QUESTION.

INTEWSPAPERS and Members of Parliament are still in full cry against the Government because they will not try to play the game of dog in the manger in China, and regard every forward move by Russia, France, or Germany as necessarily a humiliation and a defeat for England. One screams that the open door has become a brick wall ; another that railway poaching is going on in our sphere of influence,—a region which apparently is to be far more strictly preserved than India, or even these islands ; a third is in hysterics because somebody has telegraphed from Pekin or Shanghai that unless we do something vigorous at once our " rivals " will get a concession which ought to have gone to an English firm. Amid this hubbub one man alone seems able to keep his head and to realise the true proportion of the events that are taking place. Most fortunately that man is Lord Salisbury,—the man of all others who, at this moment, it is necessary should have a clear understanding of the problems in front of him. The tone and temper of Lord Salisbury's speech in the House of Lords on Monday last was one worthy of a great and wise states- man and patriot. The people of this country are, however, for the moment so crazed with a sort of railway panic that even able and moderate men like Sir Edward Grey are infected, and temporarily rendered impervious to com- mon-sense. If not they would realise that in spite of a host of difficulties and perplexities the Prime Minister is so managing the situation that in the end it will be found that a vast and far-reaching revolution has taken place in the international situation in China without the interests of Great Britain being injured. We do not say that, as at present advised, we agree with every step taken by the present Government in regard to Russia and China. We hold, indeed, that in many particulars a simpler and franker policy would probably have been preferable, but, considering the immense difficulties of the case, we are not, therefore, going to condemn Lord Salisbury. In regard to the main issue, and to the general principles involved, he appears to us to have a masterly grasp of the situation, and we would implore the country to think long and deeply before they act on the assumption —for such is the view that they are asked to accept— that he has failed to realise the true nature of the problem, and has no proper understanding of the real interests of the United Kingdom. Let those who are inclined to lose faith in Lord Salisbury, and want proof of his depth and width of view, consider for a moment a single example of his statesmanship. We are all at this moment congratulating ourselves upon our good under- standing with America, and are delighted with the strength and support which we get from friendship with those of our own flesh and blood. To whom is this happy and good-omened state of things due ? Without question to Lord Salisbury. It was his handling of the Venezuelan question which made the Anglo-American understanding possible. Not only this country, but the whole Anglo-Saxon race owes him a boundless debt of gratitude for his prescience and his wisdom in dealing with that perplexed and heated controversy. Undoubtedly President Cleveland's extraordinary Message would have given Lord Salisbury the right to stand on his dignity and to take firm and vigorous action. America was at that moment by no means strong at sea and anything but strong on land, and no man knew this better than Lord Salisbury. Again, Lord Salisbury had the whole country behind him, and could do exactly what he pleased. Except Sir William Harcourt, the mass of the Opposition was all for resenting President Cleveland's Message. If Lord Salisbury had been the weak man he is represented he would have yielded to public opinion, and would have "stood up" to President Cleveland and "made this country respected." He was urged to do so from all sides. He was told that Amenca would be far more friendly in future if only he withetood her arrogance and bad manners. He was assured that the path to a lasting friendship lay through giving America a lesson. Lord Salisbury knew better. He refused to consider the question from the standpoint of the moment, but preferred to look ahead and shape a very different course from that suggested to him. He has been abundantly justified. His so-called graceful concessions and turning of the other cheek to Mr. Cleveland, instead of proving a failure, have proved a success beyond all expectation. The "comprehensive head," which Pope so rightly praised in Godolphin, helped him to see into the heart of the question, and to turn it to the advantage of his country. No doubt the present situation has in it nothing in the slightest degree analogous to the former crisis, but the skilful and sensitive hand is still on the helm, and will, we believe, prove not less successful in its steering. If, then, our readers are wise, they will not, as we have said, lose faith in Lord Salisbury, but will rest content in the belief that he knows his Asia as he knew his America, and as he knows his Europe, and that in the end he will bring the ship into quiet waters.

We have said that we do not entirely agree with all the details of Lord Salisbury's policy. Our chief point of difference is the belief that Lord Salisbury should at the very beginning have abandoned publicly and plainly the notion of maintaining the integrity and independencs of the Chinese Empire. Instead, he stuck to that policy as long as he could, and even maintains it to some extent to-day. It was, no doubt, a choice between retiring slowly and secretly, or rapidly and openly, from an untenable position ; but in our opinion the better course would have been the latter. As we understand the position in China, it has been, and is, something of this kind. There used to exist in China a certain state of things which suited this country very well. Last year it showed signs of giving way under foreign pressure, and Lord Salisbury had to ask himself what course he ought to take. The answer was, apparently, easy. Preserve the status quo, which suits England capitally, But the status quo was, in fact, the open door. Lord Salisbury, then, had to decide whether he would or would not fight to maintain the status quo of, the open door. On closer inspection this turned out to be in reality another way of saying should we, or should we not, pledge ourselves to "the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire." Lord Salisbury rightly decided that he was not going to back up the Chinese Empire against all corners and to say to the world, 'We don't want, and won't take, any part of China for ourselves, and neither will we let you. But when Lord Salisbury, in effect, threw over the dog-in-the-manger policy, he had to find an alternative. He found it in the sphere-of-interests policy, our sphere being the best piece of China,—the Yangtse Valley. One would say that in diplomacy, as in life, it is better to be off with one policy before you are on with another. Lord Salisbury, however, has lately appeared to be acting contrary to this maxim. He has apparently not abandoned the open-door policy, and yet has in a great measure adopted that of spheres of interest. How comes it that so far-seeing a statesman as Lord Salisbury has committed such a blunder ? We believe the explanation is to be found in the fact that Lord Salisbury, rightly or wrongly, became convinced last spring that public opinion here would not endure a sudden abandonment of the open- door policy. He felt, that is, that the country must be gradually accustomed to the change. International rela- tions in China were in the throes of a. great revolution, and it was his duty to see the country through this revo- lution without war or loss. This duty could be best accomplished by slowly abandoning our old position,— by retiring in sections' as it were. Accordingly, he has only very slowly and inch by inch receded in practice from what he abandoned long ago in theory,—the position of main- taining the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire. At the same time, like a good diplomatist, he has refused to show his hand to his opponents. He has, that is, maintained for what it was worth, and still maintains, the remains of the open-door policy. Not having aban- doned it in name, he has claimed under it all the advan. tages he could. Most men would have found suct a position impossible ; but Lord Salisbury is such a master of the art of negotiation that he has actually managed to play the two games at once, and with advau tage to his country. But though there may have been a national gain, there has been a party loss. Lord Salis. bury, from the point of view of the Opposition, has no doubt given himself away by retiring so slowly from one position that for a time he has appeared to halt between two policies. They have not been slow to see that he was apparently open to the charge of vacillation and indecision.

We come last to our only serious practical difference with Lord Salisbury. In our opinion, having in fact fallen back, and rightly, and necessarily fallen back, on the sphere-of- interests policy, he should have taken some more clear and effective measures for "pegging out" our claims in the Yangtse, and making it clear to all the world that this vast valley is secured to us. We do not, of course, desire that he should forbid a single foreign railway. Rather we would have him welcome them; but we would let all the Powers clearly understand that the railways laid in our reserve would in the end be under our control. At the same time, Lord Salisbury should, in our opinion, take means, by surveying and exploring parties, by the appointment of extra Consuls, and by other such methods, to make our special and peculiar posi- tion quite clear to the natives. Again, he should make it plain that our connection with China vitt Burmah, and also via' Thibet, is to be maintained. Why should not an expedition starting from, say, Darjeeling go through Thibet to the upper waters of the Yangtse, and so down to the sea, inquiring en route whether a rail- way that way would be so impossible as Lord Salisbury says a railway is via', Burmali ? That is, in our opinion, one of the notice-boards which Lord Salisbury ought at once to affix to the walls of the Yangtse Valley. But very possibly Lord Salisbury has already prepared some- thing of the kind, only better, and he will be merely amused at our amateur suggestions. At any rate, on the main issue we have, as we have said above, perfect con- fidence in Lord Salisbury. We are convinced that he knows what is wanted, and how much we can get, and we are content to leave the getting of it in his hands,— certain that, even if he makes mistakes, they will be less than the mistakes of any other conceivable Foreign Minister. We have only one word more to say. We implore Lord Salisbury to abide by his own deliberate judgment, and not to pay too much attention to that transient and embarrassing phantom, public opinion. After all, what is public opinion ? As often as not, the will of the minority rather than of the majority,—a mere mass of "newspaper paragraphs and prejudice" rather than the authentic voice of a united nation.