A BOOK OF THE MOMENT

COLONEL HOUSE

The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour, Professor of History at Yale University. (Ernest Benn, Ltd. £2 2s. the set of two volumes.) PROBABLY the best way to treat this book, though I am afraid it would not be a way which would satisfy the general reader who wants what he calls facts, would be to analyse it through- out in order to show the difference in character and mental configuration between the two friends, Wilson and House. As it is, all I can do at the moment is to point out one essential

difference between them—a difference which may seem small but which kept the two men sundered by a vast and un- bridgeable stream. House always did more than he said, was always far braver and more penetrating in act than in word. Wilson was just the opposite. He said a great deal more than he did. He could lay down abstract principles in eloquent language as well as any man in the world ; but, alas ! he had " the back trick " as well as any man, not merely in Illyria but in the whole world. When he had got his verbal formulae in shape he seemed quite satisfied ; the appeal that he should act upon them not only made him feel that he was suffering a kind of affront, but too often increased his natural irreso- lution.

Having once come to an abstract decision, Wilson used his ingenious and secretive mind to find a way for backing out. He did not run in the direction in which he had sped the ball of thought, and so make sure that it was going to the right place. Rather, he tried to set off in the opposite direction, thinking, apparently, that in that way he could escape the consequences of his thought and have it both ways. The last few pages of the book give a wonderful picture of this characteristic man. When Wilson decided, or rather concluded, in view of certain pro- mises that the neutrality period must came to an end—he had used language to Germany which to the minds of normal men could mean nothing but war or the acceptance by Berlin of his view—when, in fact, there was a condition out of which it was evident that actual hostilities must arise, instead of acquiescing, he began to hesitate and to try to take back in practice what he had given in theory. House went to him

at the end of March, 1917, when he, the President, had con- fronted himself with the home-made dilemma of asking

Congress to declare war or of pointing out to them that a state of war existed already and demanding the necessary means to carry it on. When the President's difficulty was put to House at once advised that the state of war should be assumed and that Congress should be asked for the supplies required. Having given that advice, he felt, as Colonel House's editor puts it, that the President must meet the crisis in a frame of mind at once humble and determined. " He set himself the delicate task, first, to make the President feel the necessity of special effort on his part, and then that by such effort the task might be accomplished successfully." But, alas ! the Presi- dent's inclination was not towards humility and determination, as for example, Lincoln's had always been, but towards arrogance and stagnation.

House, faced with this psychological situation, seems to have managed the President with extraordinary skill. He very wisely insisted that the difficulties before the President were not as great as he imagined :—

" I said it was not as difficult a situation as many he had already successfully met, but that it was one for which he was not well fitted. He admitted this, and said he did not believe he was fitted for the Presidency under such conditions. I thought he was too refined, too civilized, too intellectual, too cultivated not to see the incongruity and absurdity of war. It needs a man of coarser fibre and one less a philosopher than the President to conduct a brutal; vigorous, and successful war."

That was probably the very best thing that House could have said, and he went on to support his reanimation of the Presi- dent by pointing out the advantages of his position and the previous domestic successes of his Administration :-

" I made him feel, as Mrs. Wilson told me later, that he was not up against so difficult a proposition as he had imagined. In my argument I said that everything that he had to meet in this emer- gency had been thought out time and time again in other countries, and all wo had to do was to take experience as our guide and not worry over the manner of doing it. . . . I felt that he had taken a gamble that there would be no war, and had lost ; and the country would hold it to his discredit unless he prosecuted the war success- fully. . . He listened with a kindly and sympathetic attention, and, while he argued with me upon many of the points, he did it dispassionately.'

The full meaning of this passage can only be appreciated by someone who has carefully read Colonel House's book and seen there—for he makes no concealment—exactly what was his view of his Chief. So much for abstract advice. CoUld anything have been better as practical advice at the moment than the following ?

" Since last night he had made a memorandum of the subjects he thought proper to incorporate and which I approved. . . . He will differentiate between the German people and those who have led them into this disaster. . . . I advised the British Government to do this, but they never acted upon it, and I hope it is to be done now. My purpose was, and is, to break down the German Govern- ment by buildmg a fire back of it within Germany. . . . This is the main note I have urged him to strike ; that is, this is a war for democracy and it is a war for the German people as well as for other nations."

Personally, I never failed to feel throughout the War that the essential crime was with the .Kaiser, and that the fault of the German people was submitting to so mean a master. Instead of letting themselves be politically emasculated by militarism, they should have made themselves a democratic State king before. That, instead of making them a prey to their enemies, as the Junkers insisted would be the case, would have given them a real security. In my opinion, therefore, House could not have given Wilson better advice.

I do not doubt that certain passages in Colonel House's book will be used to show that he was at heart anti-British, or, at any rate, callous to the sufferings of the Allies and so forth. I believe, in spite of these passages, that nothing is less true. Though Colonel House was, as he ought to have been, a good American and concerned to look at the world crisis with American eyes, and though, also, the man's whole nature was stirred by an intense desire to strike a blow against mili- tarism and to make arbitrament, not bloodshed, the final factor in human affairs, he had always a very real feeling of sympathy with the English-speaking people—the race who were his blood brothers. He was a cool man, but not one who was unfeeling, and whenever this country was in difficulty or in real peril it had a true sympathizer in him. I had per- sonal proof of this in many ways, but the time has not come to set them forth.

Indirectly, House's attitude is well shown in the passages in his diary which deal with his visit to Berlin at the end of January, 1916. He found the rulers of Germany, and among them the Chancellor, in no mood to consider any Peace terms' that would satisfy the Allies. They felt sure that they could win the War.

" I told him (the Chancellor) the British were a stubborn race and felt no concern as to the ultimate result. I called his attention_ to the South African War, when everyone thought the British would'{ be driven out. I knew at the time, I said, that they would wage; war until they had either won or had expended their last guinea and last man. I also went over this same ground later in the evening, with von Jagow, and it did not seem to sit easily upon the chest of either. They admitted that the British were a Stubborn race, but added the word unreasonable ' as being more descriptive of them. . . . We talked of undersea warfare, of the blockade, and he' said it was futile for Great Britain to try to starve Germany. I told him Western civilization had broken down, and there was not a market-place or a mosque in the East where the West of to-day was not derided. He admitted this, but said the fault was not Germany's. I was growing weary by now of the conversation indicating it by silence ; and in a few minutes we arose and joined the other guests. The Chancellor drank copiously of beer which was served to us from time to time. I contented myself with mineral water, matching him glass for glass. The beer did not apparently affect him, for his brain was as befuddled at the beginning, as it was at the end. Into such hands are the destinies of the people*. placed. Von Jagow and I then went into the Blue Room and went. over much of the ground I had covered with the Chancellor. He was somewhat more reasonable than the Chancellor, and argued Germany's position with more subtlety. We talked of the undersea warfare as it relates to the United States. I spoke of the folly of torpedoing the Lusitania ' and the Arabic,' particularly the latter which was westward bound without cargo, and could by no possibility have carried munitions of war. He admitted this, but said he had talked to the submarine commander who had sunk her, and he was convinced the captain believed the Arabic ' was trying to ram him. Had he been in the captain's place, he thought he I would have done likewise. Von Jagow spoke with much feeling., of the criticism made of Germany for her undersea warfare, and' tried to explain how difficult it was for commanders to properly; discriminate. I insisted that it was as brutal and useless as their Zeppelin raids. The sum-total of deaths from Zeppelin attacks was less than two hundred at present--mostly women and children. The net result, I thought, was of enormous value to the Allies. This opinion was concurred in by a British Cabinet official, who regretted that the Zeppelins did not go to the West of England, where recruiting was slack. I said I suggested to Lloyd George that a line of electric lights should be strung across England, showing the way."

Taken as a whole, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, arranged as a narrative by Mr. Charles Seymour, the Pro- fessor of History at Yale, give strong proof that the almost unlimited credit in the way of confidence which was given by our statesmen to House during the War was never misused.

" House might well feel complimented by the invariable symptoms of confidence that were manifested to him. It was a rare tribute paid to his discretion and integrity that the ministers of govern- ments should discuss the problems of the war with him, a foreign citizen, almost as though he were one of themselves, and that, too, at the moment when he was on the point of leaving for an enemy country. When, long after the war, they wore asked to explain so extraordinary a situation, they replied simply : Well, you see, it was Colonel House.' "

The author backs up that comment with the following foot- note :-

"Conversations with Lord Grey and Lord Balfour, June, 1924. According to the best information available, Colonel House was the only foreigner who had ever been given the use of a British Foreign Office cipher code."

This might well be House's epitaph.

J. Si'. LOE STRACHEY.