THE CABINET AND THE WAR.
WE have discussed above the passages in Mr. Asquith's speech dealing with the question of enlistment. Not less important are those parts which set forth the Cabinet situation. It is the fashion of the moment to say that here at any rate Mr. Asquith said nothing. That is not how we read it. On the contrary, we believe that it will be found that Mr. Asquith by his statement has consolidated the position of the Ministry. In the first place, be has con- solidated it by his declaration that the responsibility for the unhappy Dardanelles expedition rests upon the Cabinet in general and upon the Prime Minister in particular, and that no Minister can be singled out and made to bear the burden of the failure. Here Mr. Asquith was, we are sure, perfectly right, not merely obeying the chivalrous instinct to shelter a colleague, but carrying out a principle which is absolutely essential to the system of Cabinet government. It is of course quite open to people to argue that the system is a bad one, but as long as we have it the acceptance of responsibility by the whole Cabinet for the acts of every Minister in it is a sine Qua non. A. certain Minister may, in fact, have played a special part in regard to the Dardanelles, and did, in effect, induce his colleagues to enter upon that great adventure, but from the Cabinet point of view that does not matter. The moment the Cabinet sanctioned the proposals of the Minister in question it became their plan, and therefore their responsibility, quite as much as his, and any attempt to shirk that responsibility would not only be disloyal, but destructive of the whole spirit of our system of government. The only way by which a Cabinet can repudiate the acts of a.Minister is by getting rid of him —by ceasing to allow him to be a member of the artificial personality which is held to think and act with one will, though with many bodies and many minds. The sense of complete common responsibility for all official acts of individual Ministers is the great antiseptic of Cabinet government. It secures, or ought to secure, the greatest possible amount of vigilance. A, B, C, and D cannot shrug their shoulders about the malfeasance of E and F when they know that they will be held responsible for that malfeesance. They cannot say that E and F are the wild men of the Cabinet, and that they refuse to be bound by their monkey tricks. The wild men are themselves as long as E and 1' are contained in the Cabinet. And here comes in the prime reason why big Cabinets are bad and dangerous. The sense of responsibility as to other men's actions becomes dissipated when it is spread over too wide a field. Seven or eight, or possibly even a dozen, men may watch each other and have a real sense of responsibility for each other's actions. It is very difficult to apply this Principle to a body of twenty-two men. It is apt to become, from a practical working principle, a mere theory or fiction. If, then, we are to come back in effect to a. smaller Cabinet, for the Inner Council or Cabinet will be the real Cabinet, it was well to start with a sharp remiuder of the golden rule of the Cabinet—i.e., that each Cabinet Minister is directly responsible for the acts of all his colleagues, and can never escape therefrom by the plea : " Please, Sir, it wasn't me ! " Another point in Mr. Asquith's speech which will, we believe, iniprovo the position of the Cabinet and make for solidarity is his firm declaration that he has no intention of resigning; bUt will bear his burden to the end and see the war through at all costs. All sides must be agreed that it is an advantage to have this matter settled, and to have it made quite clear that Mr. Asquith is not going to be driven from office by newspaper clamour or by House of Commons criticism, and that he will not leave the service of the nation unless he is definitely asked or commanded to resign by some clear expression of the will of the country. Some people may of course think this a misfortune, but if they are wise they must agree that at any rate it is an advantage to know how we stand. For ourselves, we will only say that, though we have found certain things to criticize in Mr. Asquith's conduct, we have always held the view that there was no remedy in resignation. It is not necessary to give more than one reason for our belief. We can see no one who could fill Mr. Asquith's place. Talk about Dictators is mischievous rubbish. Dictators cannot be manufactured or called up with a whistle as you call up a taxi-cab. They have to grow and impose them- selves upon the nation, and we see no trace of any such person. During the American Civil War whenever things went wrong there were perpetual demands for a Dictator who was to supersede Mr. Lincoln, turn out " the poli- ticians," and so forth. But these demands invariably came to nothing, very largely because even the most determine 1 opponents of the President were unable to bring forward anybody whom the nation would agree to be the " Necessary Man." We must make up our minds to the fact that in the Coalition, and in the Coalition more or less as at present constituted, we have got an executive organ to which, in effect, there is no alternative. We can change the name or re-set the pieces on the board, but practically it will be the same Government. This does not mean, of course, that we should be undone if a Zeppelin bomb were to fall on the Cabinet and kill the Prime Minister and a dozen of his colleagues. In those circumstances we should have little difficulty in finding good men and younger men to take their places. But that is a very different proposition from a forced retirement. When Cabinet Ministers are driven from office at a time of crisis they are, to put the matter candidly from the point of view of their successors, sure to cumber the ground and make difficulties.
We now come to the final portion of Mr. Asquith's speech. Rightly or wrongly, he does not propose to reduce the size of the Cabinet. We did not think he would, so great is the difficulty of a Prime Minister in driving existing Ministers from office. Instead of that, he is going to adopt the easier and more practical plan, which we suggested in the beginning, of placing the war powers of the Cabinet in the hands of a Committee of not less than three or more than five. Here are Mr. Asquith's words on this point :— " I do not propose to change the size of the Cabinet, but of course there is a great deal to be said in time of war for having one, or it may be more—at any rate one comparatively small body of men who will deal with the daily exigencies of the State. . . . Wo have had since a very early period of the war a body fluctuating in number from time to time, and which has varied in name—sometimes it has been called a War Council, some- times a War Committee, sometimes it has gone by other designations—a body to which either general questions of State or questions of strategy in particular areas and arenas have been by the consent of the Cabinet referred. I have come to the conclusion, after now some fifteen months of experi- ence, that it is desirable to maintain that system, but to limit still further the number of the body to whom what I may call the strategic conduct of the war is from time to time referred. I think, and my colleagues agree with me, that the Committee, or by whatever name it may be called, should be a body of not less than three and perhaps not more than five in number, but with this important proviso, that whether it be three or five it should, of course, have power to summon to its deliberation and to its assistance the particular Ministers concerned with the particular Departments whose special knowledge is needed or is desirable for the determination of each issue as it arises. I think further that the relations between any such body and the Cabinet as a whole
i should be of an elastic kind ; and at the same time that it should be
understood that the Cabinet, which as a body has the ultimate responsibility for questions of policy, should be kept not only con- stantly informed of the decisions and actions of the Committee, but in all questions which involve a change or a now departure in policy, should be consulted before decisive action is taken. It is only on these lines that you can successfully conduct a war like this. I entirely agree with those who say—and. I have had plenty of experience—that it is very undesirable that decisions which have to be taken very often at very short notice should not become effective until they are referred to the Cabinet as a whole. That is perfectly true. I think a Committee such as I have indicated ought to be clothed with power to take such decisions and to act
upon them. On the other band, I am very jealous of the main- tenance of collective Cabinet responsibility for large changes and new departures in policy, and I believe that in practicelt will he found perfectly possible to work the two things together. That is what we propose to do."
That, it may interest readers of the Spectator to remember, is almost exactly what we proposed a fortnight ago. Here are our words :— "In our opinion, the first and the essential thing is to distin- guish between the operations of the war and the general conduct —i.e., the policy and political strategy-;--of the war. For the conduct of operations what is wanted is a very small Committee composed of the men directly concerned with the immediate work of the war—of men who are able to sit literally and not meta- phorically en permanence and devote their whole time to coping with the needs of the situation as they arise. The men who have to deal with the conduct of operations from day to day or hour to hour must be whole-timers, and not half-timers or quarter-timers —men who have nothing else to do, and not men who can only spare an hour or two every other day from the absorbing work of, let us say, the Treasury, the India Office, the Foreign Office, or some other great Department of State. The men who of necessity must give their whole time and thought and every ounce of physical and mental energy to the consideration of operations aro, in the first place, the Secretary for War, and, in the second, the First Lord of the Admiralty. But these men cannot form a Com- mittee by themielves. It would be impossible to give, as it were, a casting vote to either of them. Again, they must have some nexus between them and the man who, under our system, is the head of the Government and the channel of communication between the Ministry, the Sovereign, Parliament, and the people. The Prime Minister must therefore be a member of this Committee charged with the duty of conducting operations. During war, or at any rate during such a war as this, the Primo Minister is not obliged as in times of peace to think about the House of Commons and how to circumvent the tactics of the Oppo- sition. His Department, which is really that of Leader of the House, does not now occupy him. Therefore he can and must give his whole time and energies to the war. . . . The Committee of Operations, which would sit every day, would not merely from time to time, but constantly, call into counsel, as their help was needed, the heads of the great Departments of State, and also those Ministers who, though they do not at the moment hold groat administrative posts, have been singled out for their abilities and by their hold upon the confidence of their countrymen for the conduct of great affairs. Sometimes the conduct of operations would necessitate the presence of the Foreign Secretary ; sometimes that of the Colonial Secretary or of the Indian Secretary ; sometimes of the Home Secre- tary; sometimes of the Chancellor of the Exchequer ; some- times, again, of all of them. Further, some one or other of the great Ministers without portfolio, or with only nominal office, might be asked to undertake some vital piece of work. Presumably the way in which the thing would be run would be something of this kind. When some problem before the Committee of Operations touched a great Department, the Prime Minister, as holding the balance and as able to look at the matter from the widest horizon, would say We ought on this matter to associate with us this or that of our colleagues.' Again, it must be for him to say whether a particular matter is really too big to be considered as part of war operations, but must be regarded as a question of policy to be decided . . in the last resort by the Cabinet as a whole. To 'sum up, what would actually happen if the scheme for a Committee of Operations were adopted would be that the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty would manage the pure details, but that the Prime Minister would be there to co-ordinate their views, and, still more, to see to it that they did not go beyond their legitimate field of work, and, finally, to say when and how the inner Cabinet, or the whole Cabinet, must be consulted."
In a, word, Mr. Asquith adopts our proposal for an i Operations Committee, though not the name, and gives it exactly the elasticity which we suggested. Very naturally and very properly, he does not mention the anticipation of a humble newspaper. In the first place, such ideas cannot be patented ; and, secondly, on a field so narrow the possibilities which we were the first to formulate in words may have occurred, not to dozens, but literally to himdreds of minds.
Mr. Asquith ended this part of his speech by stating that he would give the names of the new Committee before long. It is obvious that if there are only to be three, they must be the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Secretary of State for War. We hope that if there are to be five rather than three, which it is still our opinion is the best number, Mr. Asquith will act upon our rule of not calling on the chiefs of the great executive Depart- ments except as and when their advice is specially required. In this case, besides 'the three Ministers just mentioned, we would, in the first place, add the linister of Munitions, because he is, in effect, a War Minister and his Department is affected by every con- ceivable movement of our arms every theatre of war. For the fifth occupant of the five chairs at the War Council we would select one. of the Ministers without portfolio. Once more, remember that this scheme does not mean the shelving of any holder of the great offices, because the Prime Minister will always be at the Council, and it will be his duty to see that if any decision of the Council affects one of these Departments—say the India Office, the Colonial Office, the Treasury, or the Foreign Office—the chief of that office must be brought into counsel. Remember, also, that the Prime Minister is very unlikely to forget such a duty, because if ho did it might lead to what a Prime Minister specially dislikes—the resignation of one of his most powerful colleagues. Of course, the plan of an Operations Committee thus adopted by Mr. Asquith is a compromise, but in view of all the circumstances it is, we think, the best that could have been arrived at.
And now let us Hope and .pray that Ministers will get on with the war and think no more about schemes of administrative reconstruction. Let them welcome all criticism that comes their way, but welcome it with the reserve : " We will only, be moved by .it or act upon it when it appears to us just and sound.. If it is unfair criticism, we will merely grin .and bear .it, con- scious that as long as we stick to our work and stick to each other thero.is no power on earth which can get rid of us." Their watchword should be : "This is our job, and we will not allow, anybody else to touch it till we drop dead in the shafts."
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