THE LORDS AND THE NEW HEBRIDES.
THE conversation, for it was scarcely more, which Lord Harrowby started in the House of Lords on Monday, derives additional importance from its coinciding with the sittings of the Colonial Conference. Too often on former occasions, questions that nearly touch our Australian fellow- subjects have been discussed with but slight regard to their interests, and in total ignorance of their feelings. This spring, at all events, it is not in our power to make this mistake. It will be the fault of the Australians themselves if we do not know exactly what they think upon any question that concerns them. Their representatives are not only on the spot, but they are in constant communication with the Secretary of State, and through him with the Prime Minister. It is a further advantage for them that the Prime Minister happens also to be the Foreign Secretary ; and as the questions at issue between us and them relate, with scarcely an exception, to foreign policy, this is a very real advantage. Ordinarily, the Colonial Secretary would have to gain the ear not only of the Prime Minister, but of the Foreign Secretary. As it is, he has only the Prime Minister to secure, and he is able to approach him on a side which his depart- mental position naturally makes specially interesting to him.
The history of the difficulty about the New Hebrides may be gathered from the speeches of Lord Harrowby and Lord Carnarvon. The position of the English Government is, fortunately, unusually strong. In some of the disputes which have grown out of European annexations in the Pacific, the English case was not one that a foreign Power could be expected to see in the English light. The Australians, naturally enough, would like to set up a Monroe doctrine of their own. They would like to extend the right of first possession to all the unoccupied territory in their own quarter of the globe. Whether it would not have been wiser to give effect to this ambition earlier, and to what extent it should be given effect to now, are questions of much historical and political interest; but so long as great tracts of territory in the Pacific remain unoccupied by Europeans, it is idle to expect foreign Powers to show any particular deference for the ultimate ambitions of the Australians. They claim the right to do from time to time in the present what England has done almost continuously in the past ; and however warmly we may sym- pathise with the indignation this imitation of English policy by foreigners excites in the Australians, it is very difficult to convey any clear sense of it to the Powers concerned. Annexa- tion they understand ; but they deny any right short of annexation. Consequently, a Foreign Minister who wishes to retain the good-will of the Australians, and at the same time is conscious that the pretensions put forward by the Australians are in excess of anything that France or Germany can be expected to acquiesce in, is often placed in a position of great difficulty.
In the case of the New Hebrides, however, this considera- tion does not present itself. We have neither to justify Australian ambitions to a European Power, nor to excuse a European ambition to the Australians. The English conten- tion rests on a treaty basis. The French and English Govern- ments have agreed to respect the independence of this particular group of islands. It might have been wiser, perhaps, had we annexed them in the first instance ; but we preferred to leave them independent, and to arrange with France that she should leave them independent also. The French Government main- tain that this agreement is as firm as ever. It must be admitted, however, that if it is firm in intention, it has been somewhat infringed in act. The French have bound themselves neither to annex nor to occupy the New Hebrides ; but for nearly a year the French flag has been flying, and French troops have been stationed there. There is no sign, moreover, of their departure. On the contrary, it is said that additional huts are being put up, as if for the use of troops or—what the Australians dread even more than troops— convicts. Apart from treaty obligations, this last theory would be an extremely probable one. The neighbouring island of New Caledonia can take, it is said, no more convicts than it has already ; and as the policy of transporting recidi. Metes is still in favour with Frenchmen, the New Hebrides would make a most convenient addition to French convict territory. Thus the alarm of the Australians is perfectly natural. They know that the French would like to make the New Hebrides a second convict settlement, and they see that, in apparent defiance of the arrangement between France and Great Britain, the islands are held by French troops. Why should not this be the first stage in a permanent occupation? The answer to this question is that the French Government have steadily protested that their occupation of the New Hebrides is purely temporary, that it was begun for a special purpose, and that it will come to an end so soon as that pur- pose is fulfilled. They will remain there until satisfactory arrangements can be made to keep the peace, and to prevent the slaughter of Europeans. The experience of 1885 showed that in the absence of such arrangements, Europeans are slaughtered ; and the French Government will take any steps that they think necessary to prevent this. The moment that this object is attained, they will leave the island, and with this assurance they expect the English Government to be content. Unfortunately, it is not so easy for the English Government to be content with it. They have to reckon not only with their countrymen at home, but with their countrymen in another hemisphere, and without in the least questioning the sincerity of the French assurances, it is impossible to deny that there is some ground for the distrust with which they are regarded in Australia. Englishmen, most of all men, have reason to know how easily occupations begun in perfect good faith and with every intention of bringing them to a speedy end, have been prolonged on one ground or another, until at last they have been converted into possession by mere lapse of time. It is not the fault of the occupying Power. There is always a real reason for staying a little longer, some arrangement to be completed, some experiment to be watched, some seed that has not yet sprung up, some fruit that has not yet ripened. Then, as time goes on, fresh responsibilities are incurred, each of which furnishes a ground for remaining to watch over its fulfilment. There is not a single stage in the process at which there is any cause to suspect bad faith. There is simply a lengthening chain of circumstance, which makes the original undertaking less and less applicable to the actual situation. This is what has happened again and again with ourselves, and the know- ledge that it has so happened is of itself enough to justify the excitement of the Australians. It is to them a matter of the highest and most instant moment that the New Hebrides should not become French, and what they are now witnessing is just that first and innocent stage which in our own case has led to so much of the world's surface becoming English. It is only reasonable, therefore, that they should call upon the English Government not to give time for this unintentional occupation to grow up. The one thing it needs in order to come to perfection is to remain unnoticed. The English Government have only to hold their tongue, to rely upon the fact of the arrangement without troubling themselves as to how and when it is to be carried out, and the result the Australians dread will be in a fair way to be accomplished.
All, then, that is at present incumbent upon the English Government is to take care that the subject is never allowed to drop. It is annoying, no doubt, to be constantly saying to the French Ambassador here, and constantly instructing the English Ambassador to say to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris,—" When are you going to withdraw your troops from the New Hebrides?" But there is really no other course open to us, if we would avoid a still more annoying alterna- tive. For it must never be forgotten that if it should ulti- mately prove that the French do not mean to go, the English Government would be bound to incur all the risk and cost involved in making them go. There are some things that the Australians might ask of us that we should not be bound to do. We should not, for example, be bound to resist or undo an annexation of territory in the Pacific which violated no treaty obligation. Even the violation of a treaty obliga- tion we might overlook if it involved no one but ourselves. But the particular combination of a treaty obligation the enforcement of which is demanded by a Colony that regards it as a matter of life and death, is one which would leave us no choice but to act with vigour. At present we may be quite sure that the French Government does not wish to drive us to any such extremity. But what we have to think of, is how to prevent it from driving us there without wishing it ; and the only way in which this can be guarded against is by constantly pressing the French to do what they have promised to do.
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