WRONG WAYS WITH RUSSIA
NOT for the first time in recent history, the soundest comment on an event of importance in the international field has come from Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs. Referring to the letter of Mr. Shvernik, President of the Praesidium of the Soviet Union, with its proposal for a new Five POwer Pact, Mr. Pearson expressed doubt whether anything had happened to change the situation since such a pact was last discussed, but held that the Russian proposal should be examined, even though emphasis on a desire for peace was a regular feature of Russian tactics. That is in full consonance with Mr. Eden's counsel at Denver on Monday (before the Shvernik letter was published) that when friendly words and gestures were forthcoming from Moscow we should not rebuff them but test them out. Contrast with that the summary and contemptuous dismissal of the Russian letter by the State Department at Washington as " a propaganda trap," and the less discourteous but not substantially different comments emanating from Whitehall. It is not a question primarily .of whether the Russian letter is in fact propaganda—it would be hard to point to any document emanating from Moscow since 1917 that is not—but whether it is necessary, or rational, to play straight into Russia's hands and give her propaganda, such as it is, double force. Consider the effect on the so-called Peace Rally in East Berlin of the capital Communist speakers can make of the indisposition of the United States, and to a lesser extent Britain, to so much as consider the " peace proposals " put forward officially by the Soviet Union. In their fundamental estimate of the value of the proposals the Anglo-Saxon Powers may well be right. But the ineptitude of their declarations is one more demonstration of their disturbing incapacity to meet Russia on anything approaching equal terms in a field she has cultivated assiduously for thirty years.
Let, as Mr. Pearson suggests, a moment be devoted to examina- tion of the Shvernik letter. Its genesis is not irrelevant. On July 7th President Truman sent, to Mr. Shvernik, together with a cordial covering letter of his own, the resolution of Congress in which the friendship of the American people for the people, of the Soviet Union was affirmed and the desire of the American Government to do everything calculated to bring about a just and lasting peace expressed. The preparation of the Russian reply has taken exactly a month. In the interval no effect appears to have been given to Mr. Truman's request that the Congress resolution- might be brought to the knoirledge of the Russian people, though it appears that that step has now been taken simultaneously with the publication of the Shvernik letter. There is some small gain in that, for it achieves through official Soviet agency what the Voice of America has been trying to achieve for the past month by broadcasting the Congress resolu- tion in Russian to Russia. As for Mr. Shvernik's letter, it reciprocates, for what that may be worth, the sentiments expressed in Mr. Truman's, and proceeds to propose the con- clusion of a pact of peace between the Five Great Powers. That is dismissed in Washington and Whitehall as both superfluous and undesirable, as duplicating the purpose of the machinery of the United Nations. Such a rejoinder is logical enough, but it is a little too facile. After all, pacts outside the framework of the United Nations Charter but duplicating its objects are not unknown. There is one styled the North Atlantic Treaty, as Moscow controversialists are not likely to fail to observe. The Soviet proposal is not to be disposed of on that ground.
It is useful in such cases to start from whatever agreement is known to exist, and then consider the divergencies and what can be done about them. What was, and presumably still is, common ground is. the desire for a meeting of the Foreigtt Ministers of the four (not five) Great Powers, with a view to resolving the differences between them. That was proposed by, the Soviet Government as long ago as last November and accepted by the Western Governments provided an agenda could be agreed on, as it plainly could have been if the junior Ministers to whom the task was entrusted had not been so fettered by,' personal limitations or by their official instructions as to make their conference a humiliating fiasco. Yet after it all the British, Government declared itself still ready for a Four Power Con-1 ference, apparently with a minimum of agenda, and that presum- ably remains the position today. But between a Four Powell conference and a Five Power Pact, in which Communist China would be a participant, there is a wide gulf, too wide manifestly to be bridged at this moment. But whether it is wise to dismiss the idea out of hand may well be questioned. Clumsy or shortT sighted diplomacy could easily drive China finally into Russia's arms, the one result which statesmanship should be strenuous to avoid. The permanent ostracism of China by the Western Powers is not to be contemplated. There can be no hope old peace in Asia till, under a Government of whatever colour,, China holds the place to which so great and numerous a nation! is entitled in the United Nations organisation. She plainly cannot be admitted—her admission cannot be so much as considered —while her troops, under the guise of volunteers, are actually, in arms against the United Nations. But Western statesmen, if they deserve that name, will not limit their vision to events, so immediate as to be discernible even to the myopic.
What, then, should be the answer to the proposal for a 'Five Power Pact ? The proposal, of course, is in itself a transparen enough attempt—so transparent that its authors can never hay supposed it would impose on anyone—to secure general recognil tion of Communist China. That is out of the question at present. So, a fortiori, is the Five Power Pact suggested. But discussions, with China are not. Discussions have in fact been taking placel for a month now at Kaesong, and, preliminary and technical, though they are, they have always been regarded as the first! step towards not only a permanent settlement in Korea but a, general understanding with China. That is a development which Russia has it very much in her power to help or hinder. Her intentions in that respect have not been fully revealed, but ono fact is incontestable, that it is to Russian initiative, voiced by Malik, that the opening of cease-fire talks in Korea is due. On Russia's motives there is room for infinite speculation, but her action, however prompted, combined with Mr. Shvernik's letters does seem to open the way for some slight progress in the right direction. Mr. Shvernik and the Praesidium of the Soviet Uniod want a Five Power Pact to include China. The Western Powers want an understanding with China. That must be preceded; by discussions with China, and they in turn by the conclusion oil a durable peace in 'Korea. It is along these lines that Mr.f, Truman, it may be hoped, will pursue his correspondence with; Mr. Shvernik—for it would be a great pity to leave the inter-I change where it is. • If it be asked what prospect there is of any substantial relaxa-' Lions of international tension, the answer can provide small, ground for optimism. There are, it is true, various signs that the Kremlin prefers the idea of a propaganda war, in which she is considerably more adept than her opponents, to a military war in which her ultimate defeat would be more than prObable. And there have been one or two minor indications—the Truman-, Shvernik interchange was one, the publication of Mr. Morrison's article in Pravda another—that the barred and bolted door is being opened half an inch. But little enough can be built on that. The replies given by Mr. Malik to the English Friends who visited Moscow last month were not as a whole encourag- ing. The Deputy Foreign Minister, in the face of official speeches and Notes vilifying every non-Communist nation perpetually, assured his questioners that the Soviet Union did not conduct hostile propaganda against other countries. Asked about inter- course between Russia and foreign countries, he stated that 2,134 'persons (out of, say, 2,000 million) from foreign countries had 'visited Russia last year, 'and 1,893 Russians (out of, say, 200 million) had gone on delegations to other countries. As to dis- armament, he could do no more than repeat the proposal of a reduction of a third in the forces of all countries—a third of the forces of an over-armed Russia and a third of the forces of almost totally disarmed Western countries. All this is depressing, and much more could be added to it. But it provides no reason for characterising Russian communications as " a propaganda trap," or for abandoning a persistent and tireless search for bases of understanding. " Examine," says Mr. Lester Pearson. " Test," says' Mr. Eden. Both of them speak like statesmen.
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