THE FRENCH REVERSES. T HE week has been, on the whole,
one of reverse for France. But there is this feature about the reverses,—which in the neighbourhood of Paris must unquestionably be described as intermediate between reverse and success, and quite enough of the latter to have permanently improved the French posi- tion and bulged out the German lines of investment,—that they are only reverses, not crushing and demoralizing disasters such as for the most part preceded Sedan. The French armies are now real armies, commanded by real soldiers, who know how to act when they are worsted,—are armies which fight at least as well as Bazaine's at Gravelotte, and sometimes even better. The most encouraging feature in the week for France is the resistance of GeneralChanzy at Beaugency on Wed- day and Thursday to the German attack within three days of the great discouragement of the battle of Orleans. This shows finally that the new levies are not like MacMahon's levies of August. Under the discouragement of recent defeat and the most depressing weather, they held their own in the face of a quite equal enemy, Their morale is no longer dependent on mere good spirits. They fight like men who trust their Generals, and who mean to fight in bad fortune as well as in good. We will summarize briefly the fortunes of the week.
In the neighbourhood of Paris the 30th of November was the great day of sortie. Concerted attacks, many of them feints, were made on all sides of Paris. In the north-west a feint from Courbevoie was made towards Argenteuil. In the north a sally from one of the outworks of Fort St. Denis (Fort de la Briche) carried the heights of Epinal, which, however, the Prussians retook about two hours later at very heavy loss, and with a greatly superior force. On the eastern side of St. Denis, towards Stains, and again more to the east towards Bourget, feints were made to prevent the Germans from sending reinforcements elsewhere. But the main attack was made towards the south-east and south. One French force went out on the Fontainebleau road, and occupied successively Mealy and Montmesly, where the French still hold a position in advance of Creteil,—a position much in advance of any hitherto held by the French, as the Versailles correspondents of various papers, drawing their intelligence from German sources, expressly admit. General Ducrot with 50,000 men crossed the Marne more to the East on pontoon bridges towards the Wiirtemberg positions of Champigny and Brie, also attacking, on the 1st Decem- ber, the Saxon troops which garrisoned Villers. These villages were repeatedly taken and retaken by the contending armies, the French always keeping a partial hold on Champigny, and the Germans always keeping the same sort of hold on Villers. In the final action, on the 2nd of December, the French retook completely the positions of Brie and Champigny in a very bloody battle in which General Trochu was himself present, and were not afterwards disturbed. On Saturday, the 3rd December, the General having received notice perhaps of the failure on the Loire, they evacuated their positions without being attacked, recrossing the Marne, but not re-entering Paris, Ducrot's army remaining beyond Creteil. The net result of the fighting was,—that the French could not break through the German lines ; that in all the positions where the distant fire of the forts of Nogent, Rosny, and Mont Avron, gave them any assistance, however slight, they remained victorious ; but that in all the actions where they derived no assistance from this fire, they gained nothing, just holding their own. However, their position remains better than it has yet been since the investment began, and they are strengthening their new works beyond Creteil. Their fighting has been extremely gallant, as gallant as that of the Germans, and their discipline perfect. The losses of the Germans round Paris in the three days were at least 6,000 to 7,000 in all, most of which fell on the Wiirtembergers and Saxons. The French have gained confidence and space. The Germans have gained,—and no doubt it is a real gain,—respect for their enemies, whom before they were disposed to despise.
On the Loire the reverses have been more signal. When we last wrote, the Loire Army was advancing; Beaune-la-Rolande, though not carried by the action of the 28th November, had been abandoned by Prince Frederick Charles. Montargis had been occupied by the French army summoned from the neigh- bourhood of Dijon, under General Crouzot; the Germans, under the Bavarian leader Von der Tann, had been repulsed on the 1st December by the 16th Army Corps, under General Chanzy ; and we were led to believe that Prince Frederick Charles' army was outnumbered, and was in retreat. The conclusion was hasty and mistaken. He was but drawing in his lines for t the most irritating manner. One good result, for instance, of a more concentrated attack on the too scattered army of General D'Aurelles. Whether General Bourbaki's corps (the 18th) hastily summoned from Nevers, on the extreme right of the French position, really joined effectively in the series of actions we do not know, but the French armies, which had never really effected a junction, were defeated in detail. The 1Gth Corps, General Chanzy's, and the 17th were driven back on the 2nd December near Patay by the Bavarians and Mecklenburgers towards Orleans. On the 3rd December, Prince Frederick Charles attacked General Pallieres' Corps (the 15th), and that of General Crouzot, which had advanced beyond Beaune-la-Rolande towards Pithiviers, and drove them back into the forest of Orleans. On the 4th December (Sunday) these French forces were again defeated, and part of Orleans captured, the French, now separated, retreating across the Loire, the 18th Corps crossing far to the south at Sully, on the road to Nevers, the Corps of General Crouzot crossing a little further to the north, at Jargeau, and that of General Pallieres crossing at Orleans. The Corps of General Chanzy and the 17th Corps do not seem to have crossed the Loire at all,—at least, the former certainly did not,—but remained on the north bank for the defence of Blois ; for General Chanzy fought a good defensive engagement at Beaugency on Wednesday.
But what was the net result of all these defeats ? Thus much,—that General D'Aurelles, in his anxiety to advance to the relief of Paris, was incautious, and risked the separation of his corps, of which, of course, Prince Frederick Charles took instant advantage, and defeated him, but not disastrously. The German accounts of all the engagements admit very great losses and very gallant fighting. At Beaune-la-Rolande, on the 28th November, the behaviour of the French troops, as described by Mr. Russell from Versailles, on purely German authority was, strictly speaking, heroic, for they stormed again and again in the face of the most withering fire, and strewed the plain with their dead. The engagements of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th December also cost the Germans dear, and they cer- tainly lost, at a very low estimate, not less than from 6,000 to 7,000 men more in the three days' fighting on the Loire. The better part of a German army corps has been used up be- tween Paris and Orleans in the five days between the 30th November and the 4th December. On the other hand, the French, no doubt, had heavy losses. The Germans assert that they took 10,000 prisoners in the battle of Orleans, but many of them were probably wounded men and camp followers. What is more serious, the French lost the entrenched camps before Orleans, with all the heavy guns, and probably some fifteen or twenty field-pieces as well. And, of course, they lost something of heart and hope. But they did not lose their discipline. The retreat, instead of being a rout, as the German telegrams said, was evidently conducted in the best order, and left at least three corps (and probably all) in sufficient heart to fight bravely within the next three days. The Ger- man pursuit' had yielded no great fruits up to the time we write, and there is the best reason to suppose that the Army of the Loire is still at least 180,000 strong, in good order, and well supplied with guns and ammunition at the present moment.
We take the great lesson of the recent engagements on the Loire and the Marne to be, that the French have two excellent armies in the field, well supplied with all the munitions of war,—no doubt inferior to German armies of the same strength, because composed of less disciplined troops,—but good, stout, well-officered, fighting armies, not easily discouraged, capable of considerable things, and, most significant of all, capable of bearing reverses without losing heart, or any substantial diminution of fighting power.
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