BATOUM.
IS not this fuss about Batonm a little foolish ? The Russian Government, in announcing that the place must cease to be a free port, has possibly shown a bad spirit, and has cer- tainly displayed its usual self-will ; but it has not been guilty, as is asserted, of a direct breach of Treaty. The true history of the clause in the Treaty of Berlin referring to the place is, we believe, that Lord Beaconsfield, after the revelation of the Secret Agreement, wished to win as many apparent advantages from Russia as he could, and in particular desired to rescue Batonm from annexation. He failed, partly because Prince Bismarck, as M. de Blowitz told us on Friday, declined to sup- port him, partly because the Emperor of Russia had publicly expressed his determination to keep Batonm, but principally
because he was not heartily in earnest. He knew well enough that Batoum was a detail. Failing in his main contention, he still wished not to appear to fail, and succeeded in inducing the Russian representative to insert a clause in which the Emperor expresses his " intention " to make of Batoum a free port. No pledge is given, and the words were obviously chosen in order to recognise both Russian sovereignty in Batoum, and the Czar's freedom to act hereafter as he might deem expedient. The port has accordingly been left free for some years ; but its trade has increased so greatly, that its immunity from duties has begun to annoy the Russian Treasury, as well as, according to Russians, to cause some positive embarrassment. The Emperor has there- fore resolved to subject the trade of Batoum to the duties current in the rest of Russia, and has signified that decision to the Powers which assisted in framing the Treaty of Berlin. The method of conveying his intention is not, perhaps, the most courteous; but then, the Czar is not courteous, and, moreover, could not have asked permission to put on the duties without implicitly waiving that perfect sovereignty which he claims in Batoum, and which is allowed him by the Treaty. Beyond the discourtesy, however, we do not see that there is any grievance. Batoum will not be the richer for paying import duties, or the more important should it be gradually fortified. Earthworks do not take long to construct, and in the event of war, Batoum would have been protected by earthworks rapidly thrown up, just as it will now be protected by works of masonry, constructed at leisure, and with cost.
It is necessary to keep a watch on Russia, and it may one day be necessary to fight her—though that duty falls rather to the Empire of Austria—but this eternal jealousy about trifles is unworthy of a Power like England, with a steady policy in the East. It is always useless to be querulous with Russia, and just now there is no fresh reason for querulous- ness. Russia has gained nothing of late that England should be so readily alarmed. She was defeated in Afghanistan, where her intrigues only induced the British to fortify the North-West frontier of India more scientifically, and to complete a railway system which now places London in direct communi- cation by steam with the Bolan and the Khyber. She has suffered a most serious reverse in the rise of Princa Alexander, who already bars the land road to Constantinople, and may within ten years be the head of a military federation of the Balkan States, and of an army which it will take a long campaign to overcome. She has lost much of her influence in Constanti- nople, which was formerly so absolute, and she has relaxed the alliance of the Imperial Powers," as Lord Beaconsfield called them, which alone enabled Alexander II. to advance his armies within sixty miles of Constantinople. M. de Giers may be as great a diplomatist as Nesselrode, but he is certainly not a success- ful one. He has not conciliated either Roumania, or Bulgaria, or Turkey ; he has not soothed away the jealousy with which Germans and Englishmen alike watch Russia ; and he has not negotiated a single useful or working alliance. He has treated the French Republic as if a Republic were only a makeshift form of government, and has consequently not benefited in any way by the desire of French Republicans for Russian aid, even allowing his master to raise questions about the personality of the French Ambassador. And finally, he has distinctly weakened the confidence of South Slays in Russia as their natural protector so much that the Russian party in Bulgaria is temporarily dead. He has, in fact, gained nothing ; and if the announcement about Batoum has any political meaning at all, instead of a purely financial one, it is intended to cover by a seeming act of audacity a long series of grave failures. Those failures, it is true, may goad the Court of St. Petersburg into action of serious im- portance, action directed against the freedom of Bulgaria ; but at present they have only excited it to exhibitions of temper which warn the world without creating either deference or alarm. The Russian Court just now, in fact, is not strong. The Emperor Nicholas, who, with all his faults, understood the proportions of things, would not have struck Prince Alexander off the Russian Army List, or have threatened Bulgaria with a descent, or have worded the announce- ment about Batoum so as to create a hubbub. He would have been perfectly tranquil until his armies moved, and would have promoted Prince Alexander ten days before he declared war upon Bulgaria, just to show that he was acting from policy, and not from individual pique. His successor adopts a different policy ; but it is not one which suggests the immutable resolve that, far more than its success, used to make Russian diplomacy so formidable. We certainly shall not fight to prevent the Czar from taxing imports into Batoum ; and as we shall not, we do not see why
Lord Rosebery should not receive the announcement of his gracious intention to do so with a chilly remark that Lord Beaconsfield fancied be had received a promise, but had evidently been deceived.
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