TOPICS OF THE DAY.
OUR GERMAN OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES. AUSTRIA would seem to be now taking a more active part in the proceedings against Russia. When a new confederate enters into a course of action already commenced by others, it follows that such confederate exercises a practical influence on the combined course ; and the simple circumstance that Austria is now be- coming an active partner with France and England suggests a closer attention to the terms upon which the partnership stands. This attention is the more requisite, since it is already asserted, that the intervention is likely to be seized by Russia as the op- portunity to attempt a new position. It scarcely required the challenge of the Sheffield meeting, therefore, to attract a more suspicious scrutiny of the terms of settlement on this new partner- ship, this " marriage " as M. Kossuth calls it, between Austria and England.
The documents that bear upon the subject are of recent date : they appear to consist principally of the treaties of alliance be- tween France and England ; of the treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Austria and Prussia ; and of the protocol of the Conference at Vienna, which gives a certain degree of con- nexion to the two treaties. The treaty between Austria and Prussia opens with a declaration of regret at the war, of apprehen- sion for the future of .Germany, and of a resolution to unite offen- sively and defensively during the continuance of the war. The high contracting parties "hold themselves bound to safeguard the interests of Germany from all and every inroad, and to resist every attack upon any portion of their territory." They also bind them- selves not to conclude any treaty whatever with other states which does not fully harmonize with the principles of the present treaty. A separate article leaves the Emperor of Austria, or binds him as the treaty may be interpreted, to make a proposition to Russia in order to procure the suspension of the further advance of the Russian troops and the evacuation of the Principalities ; and declares that an offensive action would be first occasioned by the incorporation of the Principalities, or through an attack or passage of the Balkan on the part of Russia. This treaty, there- fore, threatens Russia with war in ease of further hostilities ; de- mands the evacuation of the Principalities ; seeks the restoration of peace as it was before the war, without any other stipulations; and binds Austria and Prussia to defend all the territories of either Power should they be attacked by any enemy. For it will be ob- served, that the main object of this treaty is to defend the two German Powers against the consequences of disturbances which they regret.
The convention between France and England binds the two Powers to concert together the most proper means for liberating the territory of the Sultan from foreign invasion, and also to "do all that shall depend upon them for the purpose of bringing about the reestablishment of peace between Russia and the Porte on solid and durable bases, and of preserving Europe from the recur- rence of the lamentable complications which have now so unhap- pily disturbed the general peace." This treaty, therefore, has perfectly distinct objects from the engagement between Austria and Prussia : whereas that binds the two Powers to forbid the further approach of Russia, to seek a peaceful conclusion, and to defend German territory against any attack whatsoever, this binds the two Powers forcibly to relieve Turkish territory from the in- vasion, and after the evacuation of the Principalities to seek solid and durable bases to prevent the recurrence of the lamentable complications.
England and France are mutually pledged to drive Russia out of Turkish territory, and to restrain Russia from similar out- rages in future. Austria and Prussia are mutually pledged to restrain Russia from further aggression, to ask for the withdrawal of the present aggression, and to defend Ger- man territory. The German treaty is entirely negative, the Western treaty is positive. The German treaty deals with the future only in the form of requests or defences; the Western treaty deals with the future for the purpose of demanding a re- straint of Russia or an abatement of her power. We med not look farther into the presumable motives on either side, when the recorded motives are so distinct. The German demand would be satisfied by mere quiescence now and henceforward, or by a simple retreat of Russia ; the Western demand would compel the retreat of Russia, and would extort securities for the future. The protocol of the Conference at Vienna on the 23d of May bears that the Plenipotentiaries have carefully examined those two conventions recited above; that the two conventions bind the con- tracting parties respectively in the relative situations to which they apply to secure the principle established by the series of pro-
tocols of the Conference of Vienna; that the object of the Confer- ence continues to be the integrity of the Ottoman empire and the evacuation of that portion of its territory which is occupied by the Russian army ; and it concludes in these terms— "That, consequently, the /tete communicated and annexed to the present protocol correspond to the engagement which the Plenipotentiaries had mu- tually contracted on the 9th April to deliberate and agree upon the means most fit to accomplish the object of their union, and thus give a fresh sanc- tion to the firm intentions of the four Powers represented at the Conference of Vienna, to combine all their efforts and their entire resolution to accom- plish the object which forms the basis of their union." The protocol, therefore, binds the four Powers to combine all their efforts and their entire resolution for a specific object. Al- though not specified in the treaty, it follows that a certain moral. obligation is entailed upon those who are parties to such a cora- -pact for sustaining each other during the progress of the compact. Now the object of the Conference of the four Powers is not that of the two Western Powers, but it is only that of the German Powers. By these Conferences, then, England and France bind themselves more than the other parties to the compact. Should it happen that Austria or Prussia were assailed by other enemies than Russia during the present stage of the hostilities, it might be a question which the two German Powers could raise on this con- tract, whether their allies would not be bound to sustain them, in order to sustain the efficiency of the German Powers, in fulfilment of the set stipulations? France and England might resist the claim, but there do appear to be grounds for it. In spirit, there- fore, France and England may be drawn into a hostile position towards other states in Europe, should those other states entertain any quarrel with Austria or Prussia,—a bond which might make England a party to disputes of which we have not yet the grounds before us and cannot predetermine our own judgment.
On the other hand, it is evident on the face of this protocol, that if the object aimed at by the two German Powers, and adopted as the object of the four Powers, were attained, the German Powers might turn round upon the Western Powers, declaring that the end of the Vienna Conference was acsomplished, and might not only refuse to go any further in the joint action, but might even put their veto upon any further prosecution of Russia, might side with that Power against the West, and might convert the sequel of the course to which France and England are mutually pledged into a war against Prussia and Austria as well as Russia. We are giving to the German Powers time, opportunities, and securities, which we do not obtain for ourselves. The statement this week that Russia is likely to accept the claim made upon her by Austria, under conditions favourable to a simple suspension of Russian hos- tilities, without any pledge against her renewing her machinations in future, shows that our construction is not abstract or imaginary.
It did not need the Sheffield meeting, therefore, to remind us, that any general engagement with Austria, any" marriage" with that Power, is very likely to be inconsistent with English objects and English interests. It follows, that to enter into any general pledge to take effect in a future stage which has not yet com- menced, is counter to sound diplomacy as well as to sound states- manship or to English common sense. Austria and Prussia appear to have played with England too much, perhaps because they sus- pect the determination of the English Government, as some per- sons in our own country do. We cannot unite with those who call upon English Ministers to take part with some unpronounced and almost anonymous " nationalities " on the Continent ; but we do say that the course of our Government would be relieved of much which is equivocal, and much which may become embarrass- ing, if it were more strictly limited to the immediate business in hand and to the present stage of action. Our own object is distinct enough ; we may cooperate with those who assist us in prosecuting that object ; but we have no necessity to enter into bonds with them, either to stop short, or to secure collateral and irrelevant objects, in which neither we nor the people of Europe have a common interest.
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