10 JUNE 1882, Page 6

THE SULTAN IN EGYPT.

ACCIDENT is always possible in a situation such as exists in Egypt. A hot-tempered Colonel may excite the mob, a fanatic may murder a European Consul-General, an gmeute in Alexandria may call down the fire of the Fleet. Apart from accident, however, there seems to us little reason to doubt that the immediate control of affairs is in the hands of the Sultan. Even if the Colonels have not resolved, as reported in a late telegram, to submit to his authority, the means of resisting it are very small. Arabi Pasha cannot arouse any fanaticism among the people against the Khalif, and the " Army " on which he relies does not number 15,000 efficients, is not provided with very good artillery, and will be sorely shaken in morale by a decree authorising the men to return to their homes. A fortnight would bring a Turkish corps d'armee to Alexandria, and the Egyptian military leaders, if defeated in open rebellion, would have no mercy to expect. Even if the Turks were defeated, behind them stands the irresistible force of Europe ; and Arabi Pasha, after a momentary victory, would be no nearer to success, either for the Nationalists or himself. It is not probable that the Military party fail to perceive these things, and if no accident intervenes, we believe they will submit to orders from Con- stantinople, whatever they may be. They may utter furious threats, and even debate the contingencies of resistance ; but they will yield, and make the best terms they can for- their own heads and fortunes.

The urgent question, therefore, is the line which the Sultan's policy will take, and this may give rise to a diplomatic conflict of a very serious character. The ob- ject of the sultan is believed to be twofold. He would, in the first place, greatly like to increase his ascendancy in Egypt, so far as to make it worth the while of the Khedive and of all Egyptian parties to remit money to Constantinople in the steady stream which Ismail kept up. The deposed Khedive alleges that he sent out of his various loans and his general revenue a total sum of sixteen millions to Constanti- nople, and even if that figure is exaggerated, it is certain that the amount was the heaviest of all Ismail's secret expenses.

This money went directly to the Palace, and was the source of infinite comfort and peace to the enormous crowd of persons, male and female, who live by worshipping each successive Sul- tan. Abdul Hamid would also greatly like to pose before the Mussulmans of the world as arbiter of Egypt, and able to secure results which neither the European Powers nor the Mussulmans when in revolt succeeded in obtaining. That impression would reinvigorate his authority over all Arabs, and especially at Mecca, which is for him and his House a question of life and death. These two objects can be secured only in one way,—by abolishing Arabi Pasha and the Colonels, and at the same time dismissing Tewfik, as in- competent or untrustworthy, in favour of some other candi- date, possibly Prince Halim, but much more probably Abbas Pasha, a child eight years old, in whose name some great Turkish official would exercise the Regency, and use his powers to fill the Treasury of Yildiz Kiosk. This policy has been discussed already at Constantinople, and that it will be essayed there is little doubt, and as little that it will be .powerfully supported. To begin with, the Colonels can be easily persuaded to make Tewfik's resignation the one condition upon which they will consent to submit. They have already demanded his removal, and should he be retained, they will dread his future vengeance. Then the proposal, though most offensive to England, is one which Lord Granville, hampered by the partnership with France, e,an hardly resist without French help, and the Government of K de Freycinet is not on this point sincere. It may adhere to England out of policy, but it has always encouraged Halirn's pretensions, and always regarded Tewfik as too English in his sympathies. The secret " discord " between the two Powers, so constantly hinted at in Egyptian correspondence, refers mainly to this, and it was to this that Mr. Gladstone directed the clearest sentences of his recent speech. He pledged the West to maintain Tewfik, and no other Khedive. And then, the ultimate arbiter, already accepted, "the European Tribunal," may on this point refuse to exert pressure on the Sultan. One Khedive is to the Imperial Powers as good as another, and each of them has his own reasons for conciliating the Sultan on any point not involving war, or the direct interests of his own State. Germany, Austria, Russia, will all be in favour of an exercise of • authority sanctioned by England and France when Ismail was dismissed, France will be half-hearted in defence of Tewfik, and England will be left alone to protect her protege, and defend almost by force a Khedive in whom this country takes no very acute interest. That will be a very awkward situation, with the Sultan called in as agent, and Europe accepted by Great Britain as arbiter.

We expect, therefore, barring, accident, to .see Arabi Pubs and the Colonels submit, on condition of Tewfik's removal ; to see that condition referred by the Turkish Commissioner to the Khalif, as ultimate Sovereign of Egypt ; and to see a furious diplomatic struggle at Constantinople raging round that single point. On which side victory will incline, it is impossible to predict. Lord Granville will probably over- come the disinclination of France, because the Egyptian Ring in Paris, on the whole, sides with Tewfik, as the least expensive Khedive ; but he has to deal with a more dangerous opponent. Nobody quite like Abdul Hamid has appeared on the Ottoman Throne for ages. He is as much dreaded by his Ministers as the most warlike of the Sultans, while he exhibits in diplomacy an obstinate flexibility with which it is most difficult to deal. He may persevere until perseverance becomes dangerous, and in that case the Western Powers will have to adopt resolutions stronger and more decided than allies can usually bring them- selves to sanction. M. de Freycinet, with the Chamber before him and M. Gambetta behind, is not the precise supporter a determined English Foreign Secretary would choose.