"ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY ! "
FPO the question, " How are we to know who is the victor!" -.I our forefathers gave the answer, "He who holds the Death-stead.".. _We held the Death-stead on June 1st, and we hold it still. Ever since the German Fleet went about and ran full steam ahead for Wilhelmshaven, scourged on, till darkness covered them, by our destroyers, cruisers, and battleships; British warships have patrolled the battlefield. Our flag has flown, and still flies, without challenge over the green-grey sheets of .. humming water beneath which lie so • many_ brave then and the good ships that once so proudly played their part in guarding all we hold dear. If to hold the Death-stead is the test of victory, as without question is, who can deny our claim? But this is not the only- test of victory. There are others, and judged by them also our victory is beyond question. The first of these athriliary tests is allied to that which we have inst given. He isIhe vanquished who breaks off the encounter; who dares not fly the signal "Engage the enemy more elo:sely 1 "—who from necessity—for here of course there is no question of cowardice or courage—seeks the shelter of his ports. Even if we had not been able to hold the Death-stead, and if the 'enemy still roamed over it in our place, we might nevertheless count ourselves the victors. The Germans acknowledged defeat when their ships, some to the south, some to the north; some to the eastward, made their dash for safety. It is not the victors who fly to shelter. Next eonaes the moral test of victory—did the enemy accomplish the object to gain which he invited battle I It is conceivable that the side which is physically beaten, which loses the battlefield, which has to break Off the encounter, may yet win a moral victory by accomplishing its aim. The German High , Sea: Fleet,-,when in all its beauty and strength it steamed into the North Sea, was not merely challenging us to a fight, or, like Van Tromp, showing its power to sweep the German , Ocean with a broom. It had a great and clearly defined aim. What that aim was we do not yet know, but we do know that the German Fleet was intent on some purpose beyond bringing our Fleet to action. It may be that Admiral von Scheer thought our battle-cruisers were too adventurous, and judged that by a sudden swoop of his whole force he could surround and destroy them, and yet get back to shelter before Admiral Jellicoe could rescue his daring skirmishers. It may . be that the German Admiral wished to prove to the neutrals that our blockade was broken, and that he could if he liked at any moment assume the command of the North Sea.
• Again, it may be that the Germans wished under cover of a general action to facilitate the escape of a small squadron of *wilt commerce-destroyers into the Atlantic. Further, the ingenious suggestion of a French Admiral may be true— namely, that the supreme object was to cover the despatch of a squadron with -orders to steam full speed to Archangel and there destroy the ships going in with munitions and the ships coining out with grain, and also to burn the Russian base and ruin the open (summer) door into Russia. Yet again, it has been suggested, that the aim of the German Fleet was, after brushing our, battle-cruisers aside, to enter the f!kagerrak, pass either through the Sound or the Little Belt into the Baltic, and so demonstrate German strength and • British weakn-ess. . The notion sounds rash to the point of madness when we remember that the German Fleet could get into the Baltic at any moment in the sober security afforded to it by its great ditch, the Kiel Canal. But mad as it sounds, we must also remember that there is no limit to the eccentrici- ties Of the German High Command, especially on the element still strange to them. They are brave sailors and ingenious constructors, but for sea strategy they have no instinct. Finally, the dominant idea may have been a combination of two or more of these schemes. All we can be sure of is that the Germans had a clear and definite object, and that we prevented them accomplishing it. They did not fail by accident, or because they changed their plan, or because they found that they were mistaken in sonic tactical calculation. They failed because we attacked them, obtained the initiative in the battle, and drove them from the field of action. Judged by this test of the unaccomplished object, our victory was again complete. .There is one more test. We won" on points" as well as by the failure of the Germans to " come up to time." Though the arithmetic of the battle of Jutland is still nebulous, we now know that,- great as were our losses, those of the ermans were still greater. We have published ours truth- fully. They dare not publish theirs. They have closed Wilhelmshaven lest the dreadful secrets it holds should bring despair to the heart .of , the Fatherland. In all probability they lost nineteen or twenty ships-to our fourteen. If we take the percentage of loss to the total force, this means a terrifie blow to German naval power.
We have dealt elsewhere with the details of the battle, and need not tell again of its deeds of heroism beyond the dreams of romance ; of how the battle-cruisers and battleships came ploughing through the green water like knights charging with pennons flying and lances in rest. Into the press they dashed, every thought obliterated from the mind but one--to destroy their enemies and rescue their comrades. Valour, chivalry, and nobility were in the ascendant and ruled the hour. Every one of the great traditions of our Navy was maintained, and had Blake or Hawke, Rodney or Camperdown, Nelson or Collingwood, been present, he would not have felt one instant's misgiving that any of his lessons of self-sacrifice and courage had been forgotten. As we write there come to mind the words of the great Elizabethan lawyer, Lord Coke. Even the arch. pedant of the Courts burst into fiery eloquence at the thought of the Navy. It turned parchment and wax and white wafer into flesh and blood :— " The king's navy exceeds all others in the world for three things, viz. : beauty, strength, and safety. For beauty, they are so many royall palaces : for strength (no part of the world having such iron and timber as England hath) so many moving castles and barbicans : and for safety, they are the most defensive walls of the realm. Amongst the ships of other nations, they are like lions amongst silly beasts, or falcons amongst fearfull fowle."
Taken as a whole, the instinct ot the British people towards the battle has been sound throughout. They have realized that there was nothing to regret, nothing but what might "quiet us" in deaths so noble. A few shrill voices have, however, been raised in criticism. Our commanders, they think, were too daring and ran too great risks. "They need not have attacked the Germans so precipitately and while we were so weak. When the enemy so greatly outnumbered and outclassed them they should have waited for sup- ports." They should have done nothing of the kind. Admiral Beatty, bravest of the brave as he is, is no Berserker blind with the rage of battle. He is the coolest and most calculating of strategists. He knew that his duty was to engage the enemy more closely, not merely because it is the glorious tradition of the Fleet, but because it was the right thing to do at the particular juncture. He knew, too, that his ships were built to fight and destroy the enemy whenever the chance arose, and not to be preserved in a glass case. He knew that a com- mander's duty is not to save his ship but to risk it. His squadron was no talent to be laid up in a napkin, but some- thing to be put into the Bank of Battle to earn its profit. When he found the enemy he did not merely bark at their heels and ask for help. He did not add up the number of units or the number of guns, or work out formal calculations as to the proportions of armour. He and the band of brothers under his command flew in their hearts, if not at their masts' heads, the old signal. As loner as he had a deck under him and a gun to fire he knew that it was his duty to hold the enemy.
It has been said of the men commanding the ships which came up under Admiral Arbuthnot to support the leading squadron that they were even more blind with the lust of battle than Beatty's captains, that they " flushed " too eagerly "to antici- pate the scene," and rushed on with too little thought "o'er the deadly space between." We are not going to argue this point now. It is of course possible that in the heat of battle a mistake was made—there never was a battle on land or sea in which mistakes did not occur. All that we are concerned with now is that Arbuthnot, like Beatty, was true to the great tradition, true to the spirit of the Navy, and when the foe were in sight made it his prime care to grapple with them and not to save his ships or his own and his men's skins.
We are not suggesting that there is to be no sea strategy, no sea tactics, no husbanding of strength, nothing but "in- fighting." Every artifice is to be used and encouraged on the sea as on land, but it must always be remembered that when the enemy comes out and offers battle he must be fought, and fought not half-heartedly but whole-heartedly and with the utmost inspiration of the offensive. And here perhaps we should guard ourselves from being thought to be making some subtle or covert insinuation against our land forces. Nothing is farther from our mind. We have no part or lot with those foolish people who want to hurl our men prematurely or unadvisedly against the German lines in Flanders. We cannot put it more strongly than by saying that we no more want that than we wanted Admiral Jellicoe to hurl his ships on the German minefields, or, weary of waiting, to make a dash on Willielmshaven or Cuxhaven, or, again, to court destruction by badly thought out attempts to seize Heligoland or to force a passage into the Baltic. There is no analogy between engaging the enemy as Beatty engaged them and attacking the German trenches pre- maturely. The analogy would only apply if to-morrow the Germans came over the parapet by the hundred thousand to swamp our lines. In that case there could and would be no standing on the defensive, no thoughts as to whether we were strong enough at the moment. Our Army, we know, would clothe itself once more in the inspiration of the offensive and attack the attackers, just as Beatty and Arbuthnot attacked them. There would be no shirking of sacrifice, only the inexorable determination to hold the enemy till Haig, like Jellicoe, could bring his sledge-hammer reserve on to the field. Splendid as is the Navy, our Army has no need to learn this supreme lesson from it. Whenever the inspiration of the offensive has been required of it, our glorious Army has answered the call. Who knows but that it may be answering it as we write?
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