The Consumers' Council
THE intention of the Government in 'introducing the Consumers' Council Bill is so excellent that it is disagreeable to criticize the, scheme. -Up to a certain „point we can go unreservedly- with the, -Government. There is, to begin with, the proper touch in putting the emphasis on consumers. This ought to convince all _men and women who are responsible for providing the necessaries of an ordinary household that the Council would he working in their interest and should- have their support, -Next,- -we can wholeheartedly agree -with the Govern- ment that the necessity for giving such a Council powers • tn take evidence on oath and to require the production of, account books and relevant documents has been proved.. It had been hoped that the Food Council, without such compulsory -powers, would be able to collect enough information for its purpose and, by making the facts known, to cause the sheer weight of - public opinion to depress prices. The theory was not at all unreasonable,- but the results have been very disappointing: . . . . The explanation may he that the Food Council was never sure enough-of-its facts to feel justified in pillorying either wholesalers or retailers. At all events, the Food Council never really brought public opinion into operation, though that ought to have been its principal lever. Mr.
• Baldwh-Vs Government admitted that if publicity should -fail the next step would be to provide the Food Council with authority compulsorily to exact information. In this respect, therefore, the Consumers' Bill goes no :further than the late Government would have been willing ,to go if necessary. When the facts are known— or at -least known more accurately than has been possible hitherto, for an indisputable statement about any trading question is probably unattainable—public Opinion ought to do the rest.- The potency of publicity has • never. yet been adequately exploited.
. The Government, however, propose to fix prices which it would be a punishable offence- to exceed. • The Council would make recommendations, and the Board of Trade could fix a statutory maximum price. This pro- - mare Would apply to all articles of common use— food, fuel, clothes, and so on. The penalty for exceeding . a:maximum price would be for the first offence fine of £4, and for the Second offence 110,- with the alternative of three months' imprisonment.
. All this is unexpectedly drastic.. We should greatly like—if. only We could enjoy the entertainment without a serious thought of the issue—to hear a case argued -in Court in which the defendant was .determined to prove on- the evidence of his accounts that the Board of -Made was entirely wrong, and that he himself was being threatened with a fine or imprisonment because he refused to be ruined. Magistrates might hesitate to convict- some Hampden of a general store who seemed to be transparently honest and- public-spirited. And the law would not long enjoy the respect which is essential to all law if it was felt that justice could be done only by ignoring the law. Public feeling in such circum- stances, -in spite of- the obvious interest of the consumer in the success of the -Council,- might easily set in a strong .tide against the Board of Trade. Another example of bureaucratic tyranny, of departmental despots making their own laws and oppressing the small and weak !
: It may be objected that the Consumers'. Council would be made even more ridiculous if it recommended maximum prices and no power was given to anyone to fix . these prices by statute. The master bakers of London the other day successfully -defied the Food ,. council, and it. may be said that without statutory prices the same situation 'would he reproduced repeatedly. Our answer to such objections is that the control of prices by law is really a part of a much larger process. The complete process requires the control of supplies from the beginning by the same .authority that fixes - the prices.- But that is rank Socialism of a kind which we- hope will be sedulously avoided, and which is certainly not chargeable against the present Government.
- What is proposed is a partial process which we believe to - be unworkable just because it is partial. During the War the Minister of Food more or less successfully controlled prices because he controlled supplies. When a maximum price was fixed for an uncontrolled article the chief - sufferer was the consumer. -Everybody will remember the notorious ease of rabbits. For some time it was impossible to buy a rabbit in a shop. The Ministry had fixed the price at a level which, by universal consent - though without any concerted arrangement, the pro- ducers of rabbits considered unremunerative. Rabbits • for sale vanished as .corn vanished from the fields of the Russian peasant who did not think that the fixed Soviet price for his grain was good enough.
Nothing could be worse than such results in the view of the consumer, who would undoubtedly hold that whatever the functions of the Council might be in name, they- ought in practice to secure that there should be more food for sale, not less. We do not want to press any economic doctrine too far, for we know well enough that the economies of trade are 'so complicated to-day that" economic law" cannot be asserted as unequivocally • as was possible twenty or thirty years ago. The exceptions to rules multiply. Rationalization has become essential for the rescue of industry, yet Rationalization implies a heavy reduction of competition : We 'cannot in these new circumstances simply invoke the law of - supply and demand as decisive. Even so, the law of' supply and demand, though it has had its wings clipped, is a bird capable of soaring flight. It would be madness to think that it is pinioned. Whatever happens, it will not be possible to escape numerous and various demonstrations of the truth that when there is a scarcity - of necessaries prices are forced upwards, and that when producers rush in to benefit by the high prices the resulting increase of production brings prices down.
History has not yet pregented us with a single example of the successful fixing of prices by an authority which did not- control- supplies. One of the worst consequences of maximum prices is that they always tend to become minimum prices. The trader who feels that he is in the -grip of officialdom naturally wants to protect himself against all risks, and his simple plan of self-defence is to make every penny to which the law entitles him. Another danger to the consumer is that the producer, 'discontented with the maximum price,- puts worse material than before into the article. .
Altogether, we are convinced that the Government will do well to take one step at a time. Solvitur ambulando. Publicity, greatly reinforced by a com- pulsory exaction of information, could be brought to bear so that the public would be made aware of its wrongs. It would then be "up to "-the public to refuse to- pay profiteering prices. We have an impression that :wage-earners when shopping are much less determined about having their rights than they used to be. Their lethargy may be a result of the War, when wages rose in -direct proportion to the cost of living. However that may . be, many „retailers seem to be able to charge too much with the tacit consent of-the consumers,
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