Heads in the sands
Mr .Brown's singlemindedness in the pursuit of his enthusiasms is his most appealing characteristic. But it can be dangerous in a Foreign Secretary, particularly when it is associated with emotional instability. With one of his current enthusiasms—Europe- frustration has led to brainstorms: with an- other—President Nasser—there is now a risk that the essential economic interests • of this country will be disregarded.
The Foreign Secretary believes that in Nasser this country has a valuable potential ally in the Middle East. In the light of past events the onus of proof is on Mr Brown. His view is certainly not shared by the us gov- ernment, which believes that if Nasser is only left to his own devices he will soon be re- placed by someone who would be far easier for the western nations to deal with—as has happened in Indonesia. Almost any display of independence from American thinking on the part of the Foreign Office 'deserves a cheer; it is sadly typical that our diplomats should choose a rare instance where Ameri- can policy coincides with our own self- interest.
• For Britain's dominant concern should be to secure the early reopening of the Suez Canal: this is now our only hope of postpon- ing the 'next looming sterling crisis. Through the good offices of the Israelis we are now presented with an opportunity to bring pres- sure on the Egyptians. It may be that refusal by the British government to assist the Egyptians in rebuilding their oil refineries or in relining their oil in Aden until the Canal has been reopened would not persuade them to act on the Canal. But it would be the ulti- mate in self-denial to render the assistance requested in the pallid hope that President Nasser might then, when the pressure was off, one day get round to reopening the Canal. This is one instance where economic sanc- tions might work, and work quickly.
Undoubtedly the courtship of President Nasser has also influenced the evolution of the Government's policy towards Aden. Here, however, albeit once again through no action of the British government, Nasser has al- ready been routed : and if the main objective of the British garrison in South Arabia was to deter Egyptian aggression, then Mr Brown is entitled to claim that this objective appears to be bettersetOtter4tp than at any time during the pasteve Nevertheles9z the B7MiciaidthgriiwilIMitrt' Aden will lee chaos it) *-1A it, and-rititiy pointless to 4tend other egrhis/96trt,an unprecedente4.ktuation, asLitoirge Brown re- minded the Holi4i4friVonmpr'a Tuesday —although he understandali19ftrborf4j4o add that the most obvious and sa.nguinar precedent was provided by the postwar Labour government's withdrawal from India. But he was fully entitled to ask his critics to explain what alternatives were open to us.
To postpone the departure of British troops, as the Opposition seems to suggest, would not prevent civil war in Aden: it would simply ensure that British troops were caught in the crossfire. It would theoretically be possible for the British garrison to be re- inforced to the extent necessary to reimpose order : but for how long? What guarantee is there. that British withdrawal in one or two years' time would not re-create the same con- ditions of chaos, with the addition of perhaps several hundred British lives and tens of mil- lions of foreign exchange to the debit side of the account, and the risk of a 'reversal of the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from South Arabia? .
Critics of the withdrawal from Aden com- plain that it is intolerable for us to leave our former colony in a condition of civil war But in truth it is not possible for us to fulfil 'responsibilities' for the maintenance of what we regard as suitable conditions of law and order in various corners of the globe in the post-colonial age. We do not imagine that we have a duty to intervene to prevent tribal bloodshed and massacres in Nigeria, the Congo or Burundi. In countries like Aden and Malaysia we may have been able to keep 43:00e peace for a time: but only at the cost of enormous and growing burden on our gfrecarious balance of payments; and in so far )s we have succeeded we have created a clan- lerous economic dependence on the British bases which makes it doubly difficult to close '4 them down. Finally we should remember, as - Senator Fulbright has recently reminded us, that We really do not have a God-given right to foist on other, less developed countries our own conceptions of parliamentary democracy.
