If Arabs had wings
MIDDLE EAST LAURENCE MARTIN
By the end of the June war Israel had virtually destroyed the Arabs' powers of resistance and stopped only where it suited her for political and strategic reasons. In the past four weeks, however, the sinking of the `Eilat,' minor raid- ing and the continual cannonades across the truce lines have made it clear that armed clashes are likely to be endemic and frequently serious. Over all hang the grave questions whether fight- ing might begin again on a large scale and what the outcome would be if it did. The answers to these questions, important in themselves, must inevitably affect the prospects for a settlement in the area.
The Israelis, with their hands on large terri- torial gains and holding good strategic posi- tions, could hope to gain little from renewed fighting. They therefore view with alarm the rearmament of the Arabs and issue dire warn- ings as to what would befall the Arabs if fight- ing were renewed. Having lost so much, the Arabs must inevitably look forward wistfully to another and more successful round. Yet for the moment they must know that, with one dan- gerous exception, the forecasts of another Israeli victory must be justified for several years to come. Israel won easily enough in June and she is now much better placed than she was at the outset of the contest. In particular her fron- tiers, then highly unfavourable, are now shorter and in every way more defensible.
Thus Israel has no military incentive to alter frontiers which are not only defensible but which provide her with a ready hostage by bringing Suez, Ismailia and Port Said into gun range. To advance would mean becoming en- tangled in urban Arab areas and increasing difficulties of communication. Should the Arabs attack, one would expect the Israelis to sit tight and allow them to destroy themselves in a hope- less assault.
The Arab forces are, however, in no condi- tion to attack, although one cannot rule out the possibility that escalation from a local in- cident—these borders are now subject to the notoriously dangerous loi des capitaines—or sheer political desperation might draw them into a hopeless attempt. American sources seem to agree that Syria, Iraq and Algeria are back to their prewar strength. Egypt is said to have made good three quarters of its losses in tanks and to have received even more substantial re- placements of aircraft.
Nevertheless Egypt's task on the ground seems hopeless. With her allies good for little more than distracting an Israeli shield force, she would have to launch an attack that must be massed and prepared in open country on the wrong side of the Canal. Experts agree that it will take at least two years to train and restore the Egyptian Army even to its former readiness, given the losses of trained men, the lack of experienced men, the loss of faith in comman- ders and the general dissipation of morale. Even a good army would find the tactical task of assaulting Israeli positions a formidable one.
It is in the air, however, that the strain will be greatest and it is in the air that the one possibility of successful Arab action may lie. Here the results of victory and defeat are most fleeting. Because the mode of Israeli attack destroyed planes rather than airfields or crews, the quick supply of Soviet aircraft has largely restored the Arab air forces.
Israel lost some forty to fifty aircraft. If she receives, as she apparently will, the three or four dozen American A4 light strike aircraft, the most important gap in her armoury will have been filled. She may well be right in her claims to be able to repeat her blitz against the enemy air forces, even though the Arabs should surely have learnt something about dispersal by now, should be on the alert, and should im- prove their air defences.
The interesting question is whether the Arabs could hope to achieve the same success in re- verse. Technically there is no reason why they should not. Even with the capture of Sinai the Israeli air force is much more concentrated on its bases than are those of the Arabs. Prob- ably not even the Arabs or the Soviet Union know whether an attack would succeed. If it did not it would be a crushing humiliation and would very probably end all chance of a nego- tiated adjustment of the present territorial situa- tion in favour of the Arabs. But if it did suc- ceed it would revolutionise the balance; Israel would lie open to air attack and even the odds in the ground fighting would alter sharply. This possibility obviously imposes on Israel the need for a very high state of alert.
This is a very unstable situation. In the lan- guage of strategic deterrence each side may have a first strike capacity; neither has 'an assured and invulnerable second strike fora. This puts a premium on preventive and surprise attack. Moreover, the instability is technologic- ally determined and therefore largely beyond political control. If the great powers wanted to stabilise the situation we would have a test case of some theories of arms control. It might be argued that, rather than cutting off supplies of arms, the local states should be provided with defensive weapons such as anti-aircraft guns and missiles, to make successful surprise attack impossible. yet, to make such a proposal in a specific context is to reveal two intractable diffi- culties inherent in many schemes for arms con- trol. In the first place, if defensive weapons. made one side truly invulnerable, it would be free to go on to the offensive. From this point of view it might seem best to provide Israel alone with defences in the hope that its satisfac- tion with the present territorial situation would make it abstain from offensive action. It is pre- cisely here, however, that the second dilemma of arms control arises; any stabilisation of a military balance inevitably has political im- plications. To secure Israel from attack must necessarily appear to the Arabs as an effort to make their losses permanent.
Such a technically unstable military situation poses great difficulties for anyone trying to de- sign a lasting settlement in the Middle East. It is too much to hope for a political and terri- torial arrangement so satisfying to the Arabs that they lose all incentive to fight. They must therefore be restrained (if at all) by the belief that renewed conflict would be useless. There is little sign that the great powers are willing to cooperate in the kind of arms supply policy mentioned above as an aid to stability. Nor would great power ,guarantees be likely to re- assure local states against the threat of surprise attack, for they would fear a mortal blow before help arrived and have grave doubts whether even belated assistance would arrive once their enemy had achieved a fait accompli. Perhaps only a system of demilitarised zones and quite elaborate surveillance of military preparations could provide the reassurance within which the local powers could relax somewhat their own burdensome precautions. One cannot feel very optimistic about such a system emerging; quite apart from the political difficulties it would go considerably beyond the technical limits of any previous system of local peace-keeping machinery.
Yet unless some satisfactory international formula is forthcoming Israel must continue to rely entirely on her own efforts and it is hard to imagine her yielding up the conquests that add so much to her security. So long as this exacerbation of Arab grievances continues, Arab nations must dream of a revenge by arms. With the land campaign hopeless, with terrain unfavourable to guerrilla actions and with ter- rorism likely to result in reprisals, draconian suppression and the Israeli hand on the con- quered territories becoming consequently heavier, the danger is that Arab thoughts will increasingly turn to the hope, however illusory, of a Coup by air.
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