TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST.
SINCE we last wrote Europe has been thrown into violent agitation by two flagrant breaches of the Treaty of Berlin. Bulgaria has proclaimed her independ- ence of Turkey both in respect of Bulgaria proper and of Eastern Rumelia, and Austria has added Bosnia and Herzegovina, previously a part of Turkey, though in the occupation of Austria, to the dominions of the house of Hapsburg. At the same time, Bulgaria, contrary to inter- national right, keeps her hold upon that section of the Oriental Railway which passes through her territory. Finally, Crete, or rather a body of Cretans, has declared that the island is annexed to Greece. In these circum- stances, what course should be taken by Britain ? In our opinion, it was correctly outlined by Sir Edward Grey in his wise, firm, and yet conspicuously moderate speech on Wednesday night. Sir Edward Grey began by declaring that we cannot recognise the right of any Power or State to alter an international Treaty without the consent of the other parties to it. If, he went on, it is to become the practice in foreign politics that any single Power or State can at will make abrupt violations of inter- national Treaties, public confidence will be undermined, and the very greatest possible setback given to those who demand that the expenditure on armaments should be diminished by international Agreements. That is not in the least overstated. If a convenient opportunity and the desire to alter the status quo are to be held sufficient excuses for a refusal to be bound by Treaty obligations, then our whole elaborate system of diplomacy, of Treaties, Conferences, and international Agreements becomes a sorry farce. So much for principle. Sir Edward Grey's sug- gestion for action is equally satisfactory. He tells us—and here we will quote his words textually—that " we cannot ourselves recognise the result of any such action [i.e., the action of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary] till the other Powers have been consulted, including especially in this case Turkey, who is one of the other Powers most closely concerned." This clearly means that Sir Edward Grey looks to an agreement amongst the Powers to regularise the position, and to give Turkey as much reparation as possible for the wrong that has been done her. Pre- sumably such consultation with the Powers as Sir Edward Grey speaks of means an International Conference to deal with the situation as a whole, and to review the position created by the Berlin Treaty and the Treaties which have altered, developed, or supplemented that instrument.
On the whole, we think that Sir Edward Grey is right to favour such international consultation or Conference. But we would—and we have little doubt that he would be in agreement with our position here—make Britain's assent to the summoning of anything in the nature of a Confer- ence subject to Turkey's wish for such a meeting. Turkey is the Power wronged, and therefore it is primarily for her to say whether she desires that the wrong done her shall be treated in the manner proposed. If it should happen, as the Times in its leader of Wednesday seems to think likely, that Turkey would prefer to leave matters as they are lest worse befall her, and lest, instead of getting compensation for the misdoings of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, she should be forced to give com- pensation to other Powers, then clearly it is our business not to call a Conference, but to help Turkey to resist such a proposal. For ourselves, however, we think that it would probably be best for Turkey to agree to a Conference. What the reforming party in Turkey chiefly desire is time to carry out their reforms and the reconstruction of the Empire on a firmer basis. This work of reconstruction will most likely involve temporary internal weakness, and may thus provide more opportunities for external aggression. But in that case it will be of advantage to Turkey that the Powers by whom she is surrounded, Powers of whose predatory instincts we have just had so remarkable an example, should have very recently pledged themselves to neutrality, as it is almost certain they must pledge themselves at a Conference. Though we have had so unpleasant a reminder of the weakness of international Agreements, it still remains a fact that no Power quite likes to tear up a Treaty the moment it is made. The excuse always given for the violation of Treaty rights is that they have become anti- quated, and therefore we can be fairly sure that for a year or two after the signing of an international Agreement such Agreement would be kept, and that the time which the reforming party in Turkey desire would be thus secured. The problem of how to give compensation to Turkey is very difficult. Certainly there is no room for anything in the nature of territorial compensation. At the same time, Turkey is bound by a great many Treaties which hamper her freedom of action, and place her more or less in a strait-waistcoat. We allude not merely to the Capitulations, but to the interference with Turkish financial freedom, and also to those recent Agreements which derogate from Turkish jurisdiction in Macedonia. We should not like to say offhand that it would be possible, or even wise, to abolish the Capitula- tions at the present time, or to alter the arrangements which now control the public finance of Turkey. But at any rate these are questions to which Europe ought now to lend a sympathetic ear. In the same way, if there is a good assurance that the reform spirit will prevail in Turkey, and that there is no fear of a return to the autocracy of Abd-ul-Hamid, we see no reason why there should not be a new Agreement as to Macedonia.
A question which it is alleged would be certain to be raised if an International Conference were summoned is that of the Dardanelles. Russia, as M. Isvolsky told the journalist who interviewed him in Paris on Wednesday, feels that the Treaty of Berlin was an anti-Russian Treaty. In spite of that, Russia has not hitherto sought to alter it. Since, however, others have torn up that Treaty, she feels that those articles which are specially prejudicial to her should in justice be modified. For our- selves, we can see little or no objection to the reopening- of the question of the Dardauelles,—provided, of course, that the Turks are willing, and do not consider that they would be prejudiced thereby. If Russia were to propose that, since the Dardanelles lead to a sea which is inter- national, and not the private water of any one Power or combination of Powers, they should be open to the passage of the war-vessels of all nations, Britain ought not., in our opinion, as object. Even if Russia were to ask to be allowed, as the chief Power in the Black Sea, to send her ships of war through the Dardanelles, though that privilege were not accorded to other States, we do not know that any very great harm would be done in practice, although we admit that the proposal would bear an ugly appearance in the abstract. In the event of war, we do not think it at all likely that we should attempt to use the Dardanelles in defiance of an unwilling Turkey, or to force a passage for our ships, first through that narrow channel, and then through the Bosphorus. To do that would require the employment of a very large fleet, and in that case the risk would be so great as to render it incredible that we should ever make the attempt. Let us suppose that we got a powerful squadron into the Black Sea, and that it had accomplished there what- ever it was sent to do. Imagine the anxiety there would nevertheless be as to our ships getting back if the Turks were hostile. Unless we could have a land force sufficient to guard both sides of the Dardanelles, to occupy Constantinople, and to control the shores of the Bosphorus, we very much doubt whether any Government here would sanction so tremendous a venture. If, on the other hand, the Turkish Government were on our side and acting with us, we could rely upon the privilege given to Russia being extended to us whenever it was needed. To say this, of course, is to say that we must not bind ourselves never to send warships up the Dardanelles, for we, at any rate, must not set our signature to any international Agreement which we do not intend to respect in war as in peace. If, then, Turkey were first freed from her present obligations in regard to the Dardanelles, and then agreed to give Russia a right of passage, although for the time she withheld. it from other Powers, we should see no very great objection. Our only real objection would be to our becoming parties to .any declaration that Turkey should never extend the privilege in question. • Before leaving the subject we should like to say a word about a curious article in the Westminster Gazette of Monday, which, as far as we can gather, suggests that what has happened in the Near East is a proof of the fatuity of those who look with grave anxiety on the diplomatic actions and aspirations of Germany,—who make, as the Westminster Gazette would put it, a " bogey " out of Germany. We have chosen the wrong bogey, in effect, says the West- minster Gazette. We confess that we cannot read the lesson of recent events in this way. On the contrary, they seem to show how very necessary it is for us not to trust to the goodwill of other Powers, or to rely upon inter- national Agreements and obligations and the comity of nations. They teach, indeed, the hard lesson that our only true reliance is upon our own strength. We are always having it dinned into our ears by those whom we may perhaps call the " soporificists," in contradistinction to the " alarmists," that Germany cannot possibly wish to do us any harm, and that it is incredible that a civilised Sovereign like the German Emperor, or his enlightened advisers, could ever think of making a coup de main,, or launching a sudden attack upon this country. Such action, we have been told again and again, would be too monstrous a violation of international law, and it is suggested that we are insulting a great and friendly nation when we say that the only thing which can be absolutely relied upon to protect us from attack is the fact that the risk would be too great for any assailant to run. Yet, because the risks did not seem too great to Bulgaria, and to a Power by nature so little aggressive, and so inclined to observe the comity of nations, as Austria-Hungary, we see the most solemn international obligations treated with cynical indifference and contempt. Austria may in many ways be regarded as one of the best behaved and most honourable of Powers, and yet she has yielded to what, after all, was not a very great temptation, since she already possessed in Bosnia and Herzegovina all the substance of power and sovereignty. If these things happen in the case of Austria, what is likely to happen in the case of a State far more powerful and more ambitious, and with a diplomatic tradition of " blood and iron "rather than of Protocols and Pragmatic Sanctions ? Instead of the action of Austria-Hungary being used as a soporific, it seems to us that it should be used to enforce the lesson that it is unwise to rely too implicitly upon Conferences, Congresses, Arbitration Treaties, and all the other paraphernalia of sentimentalism and humani- tarianism. Our safety rests alone in our strong right arm, and in our honest determination neither to do wrong to other Powers nor to suffer them to do wrong to us.
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