FAMILIES AT WAR

J. B. Kelly on the

hypocrisy of the Gulfs oligarchies

TO ANYONE even faintly inclined to- wards a cynical view of international rela- tions the past week's hullabaloo over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has been an instructive affair. When the deposed Emir, Sheikh Jabir Al Ahmad Al Sabah, appealed to any and all, including the Western powers, to recover his sheikhdom for him, one was moved to wonder whether this was the same Jabir Al Ahmad who, as crown prince 20-odd years ago, loftily proclaimed that Kuwait would never tolerate any foreign military or naval pre- sence in the Gulf after Britain's departure, since the countries of the region were perfectly capable of maintaining the peace themselves. (Not that this inhibited him a couple of years ago from flagging Kuwaiti tankers with the Stars and Stripes and allowing the US navy to ensure their safe passage through the Gulf. After all, les affaires sont les affaires.)

What, too, of Saudi Arabia, which has been assured by President Bush of support in the event that Saddam Hussein directs his tanks southwards towards the Hasa oilfields? Is this the Saudi Arabia which has spent more money on the acquisition of advanced weaponry than any other country of its size in the history of the world? Could it be that the Saudis are incapable of employing these weapons effectively? And now that the Al Saud have yielded to American entreaties to be allowed to defend them, how much have they com- promised themselves in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim worlds as guardians of the most sacred soil in Islam?

One final question, asked in all inno- cence. What is one to make of the bombast about forcing Saddam Hussein to 'dis- gorge' his conquest of Kuwait now issuing

from the very same quarters in Britain (the stirring leader in last Sunday's Observer is

a fine specimen) which strenuously opposed Anthony Eden's attempt in 1956 to make Gamal Abdul Nasser 'disgorge' the Suez Canal, and which 20 years ago applauded Britain's abandonment of the maritime protectorate of the Gulf on the grounds that it was an embarrassing anomaly in these enlightened post-imperial times? Why such moral outrage has been felt, or at least expressed, over Saddam Hus- sein's attack on Kuwait it is difficult to understand. Nothing much was heard from Western governments when he was gassing Kurds by the hundreds, if not thousands. A moment's reflection would surely lead to the melancholy conclusion that if there has been one outstanding characteristic of Arab political life in the past half-century (to go back no further) it is the propensity to resort to violence to attain one's ends. The Iraqi president stands squarely in the mainstream of this tradition. Did Nasser's attempted conquest of the Yemen between 1962 and 1967 elicit anything like the condemnation now being heaped upon the dictator of Baghdad? On the contrary, the Egyptian dictator's apologists in the West sought to justify his campaign, which in- cluded the use of poison gas, by reference to the barbarities committed by the de- ceased Zaidi imam.

The obvious difference, of course, is that whereas the Yemen was poor Kuwait is rich, fabulously rich, and thus of tender concern to the Western world. It is this very fact, however, Kuwait's wealth, which might lead the Western world to miscalcu- late Arab reaction to the Iraqi occupation. The impoverished Arab masses adored Nasser, as much for being a strong man and daring to defy the Western powers as for his undisguised ambition to subvert, if he could, the oil-rich principalities of the Arabian peninsula and replace their monarchical regimes with governments of a republican stripe. Who is to say that Saddam Hussein does not excite, even if in smaller measure, something of the same adulation among the same, still impover- ished, Arab masses?

It is the sheerest nonsense for the West- ern powers to prattle about international law, the sanctity of treaties, and the inviolability of frontiers in relation to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. International law and the comity of nations are Western concepts, not Muslim. Arab states may subscribe to the charter of the United Nations but they do not acknowledge the validity of the legal theories which lie at the heart of that document. (Nor do a lot of other members of the UN, but that is another story.) A glance at the record of Arab voting in the UN on issues involving respect for the rule of law will confirm the accuracy of this unflattering observation. The arbitrament of the sword is preferred to the more tedious processes of adjudica- tion or arbitration — especially when one's case might be less than watertight.

In any event, the Western powers have themselves compromised, if not fatally weakened, respect for the rule of law in the Middle East by their repeated failure over a long period of time to defend their own legitimate interests in the region. The dismal story began with the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British Petroleum) in 1951 and of the Suez Canal Company five years later. Although Bri- tain put up a fairly spirited resistance to these larcenies her efforts were under- mined and finally defeated by the United States. It was no coincidence that the years that followed saw an unending succession of arbitrary acts against Western agree- ments and undertakings. A particular target was the Western oil companies, which were subjected to a series of exprop- riations, sequestrations, and cancellations of concessions, all of them supinely ac- quiesced in by their own governments. If, as the record shows, the Western powers lack the resolution to uphold the rule of law in defence of their own interests, why should they expect a buccaneer like Sad- dam Hussein to show any more respect for it?

Saudi Arabia is on even weaker ground when it comes to reproaching the Iraqi dictator for his Anschluss with Kuwait. The entire Saudi kingdom was built upon the conquest and subjection of its neighbours in the Arabian peninsula — Jabal Sham- mar, Hijaz, Asir, and others — between 1914 and 1934. Nor was the late King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud content to stop there: if his way had not been blocked by Britain, he would have gone on to absorb the Trucial Sheikhdoms, Qatar and Kuwait as well. Success gained by the sword is what counts in the politics of Arabia.

Where does Kuwait itself stand in all this? The sheikhdom has survived since the 18th century by exploiting the endemic rivalry among its larger neighbours and by paying Danegeld to potential aggressors. The talents of the ruling Al Sabah family, as befits a dynasty of merchant-princes, relate more to the counting house than they do to the martial arts. Successive Al Sabah sheikhs in the 14th century made submission to the Ottoman sultan as a form of insurance, and were invested in return with the office of quaim-maqam (gov- ernor) and the rank of pasha. When, at the close of the century, the Turks moved to impose more effective control upon the sheikhdom the Al Sabah found a new protector in Great Britain. On the out- break of war with Turkey in 1914 Britain recognised the independence of the sheikh- dom and gave it a guarantee of protection. The Al Sabah responded by smuggling supplies to the Turks until they were forced to desist by the imposition of a British naval blockade.

The British guarantee stood the Al Sabah in good stead until 1961 when the agreement of 1914 was terminated as being inconsistent with Kuwait's new-found dignity as an oil-rich principality.Almost immediately Britain had to intervene to defend Kuwait against an Iraqi threat to overrun the sheikhdom (see 'When we did save Kuwait', page 15). Since that time the Al Sabah have conducted the principality's affairs at home and abroad according to their traditional principles of accommoda- tion and equivocation. Diplomatic rela- tions were opened with practically every country under the sun, east as well as west. Commercial contracts, arms purchases and foreign investments were liberally spread around, so that as many governments, industrial enterprises and financial institu- tions as possible would have an interest in sustaining Kuwait as a going concern.

The sheikhdom became all things to all manner of men: a welfare state, though most of the benefits were reserved to native Kuwaitis; a 'constitutional monar- chy' with a national assembly, election to which was restricted to Kuwaitis; a non- aligned state in world affairs, though tilted against the West (members of the national assembly, when it was allowed to meet, spent most of their time vilifying the West and all it stood for); an ardent advocate of restrictions on oil production so as to raise oil prices; a patron of fashionable radical causes — abroad, not at home; and a champion of Palestinian nationalism. These last two activities led Kuwait into some extremely murky political waters over the years, as the sheikhdom became a haven for terrorists and the paymaster of Palestinian extremists. When the Amer- ican ambassador in Khartoum and other diplomats were slaughtered by Black September terrorists in March 1973 the then Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al Salim, was asked whether, in the light of this atrocity, he would continue his financial assistance to the PLO. He replied, 'Of course it is continuing, and it is unlimited.' How gra- tifying that much of Iraq's intelligence for the invasion was donated by PLO suppor- ters in Kuwait.

How the non-Kuwaitis who make up half at least of the sheikhdom's population view the Iraqi invasion and the installation of a puppet regime it is impossible to judge. While it is highly improbable that they would relish living under the rule of Baghdad, it is also doubtful whether they would shed any tears for the demise of Al Sabah rule. Non-Kuwaitis, though they supply most of the skills and labour re- quired to keep the sheikhdom functioning, have always been treated as second-class citizens, or worse. Kuwaiti nationality is almost impossible of attainment for them, so onerous are the conditions attached to its acquisition; and the benefits which flow from the state treasury are reserved almost exclusively for native-born Kuwaitis, who are now for the most part a privileged caste of state pensioners. Whether they will fight, as the old French saying has it, `to defend their soup' remains to be seen.

As for the Western powers, they are almost as much to blame for the present sorry state of affairs at the head of the Gulf as Saddam Hussein is. If they had not paid such exaggerated deference to the Arab oil states as they have done over the past two decades, if they had not been so ready to swallow any and every insult offered them, especially by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, for the dubious privilege of being allowed to buy over-priced oil and peddle arms in return, it is unlikely that Saddam Hussein would ever have grown so bold as he has. Now these same Western governments will have to bite on the bullet and do what needs to be done to bring him down. But let us at least be clear about what we are doing and why. To banish Saddam Hussein from the Middle Eastern stage and to cut Iraq down to size might be worth the cost in blood and treasure for reasons of grand strategy. But to do it merely to save the fortunes of the Al Sabah and the Al Saud would be a monumental miscalculation .

J.B.Kelly is the author of Arabia, the Gull and the West (Weidenfeld), and Britain and the Persian Gulf (Oxford). His next book, Arabian Frontiers, is also to be published by the OUP.