TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE.
WE have only three criticisms to make on the proposed New Rules of Procedure, which are, in effect, very like those proposed last year by Mr. Dillwyn, and thoroughly wise and sound in their general scope. The first and most important of these criticisms is,—that we think the Govern- ment mistaken in throwing on the Speaker or Chairman of Committee the initiative in declaring that, in his opinion, the sense of the House is in favour of a division. In our opinion, it would have been better much to give the Speaker or Chair- man rather a veto on the proposal of the Leader of the House to the same effect, than the duty of himself moving in the matter. And we prefer it, for the following reason. If the declaration of the Speaker to the House that "it is the evident sense of the House that the question be now put," is merely to mean that it is the evident sense of a bare majority of the House, then it is hardly the proper function of a Speaker to become the spokesman of a bare majority ; and as a matter of fact, no right-minded Speaker would make such a declaration to the House, unless he thought that the minority had had a full and fair hearing. But if his declaration is to mean that in his opinion the minority have had a fair hearing, and that the debate ought, in reason, to close, then either an adverse decision by the House, or even a favourable decision which in- dicated that opinion was very nearly divided on the subject, would greatly prejudice the Speaker's or Chairman's posi- tion, and make it nearly impossible for him in the future to gain the confidence and deference of the party whose mouths had been shut, or well-nigh shut, by his decision. In our opinion, the duty of proposing that the debate should end, is one the responsibility of which ought clearly to rest on the Leader of the House, for this among other reasons, that he alone is fully aware what the pressure of the public business is, and how urgent a decision of the House may be ; and, again, that, if a wrong decision is taken, either upon such evidence as this, or on any other evidence that may be before him, the error committed, if committed by a Minister in the eagerness of admin- istrative duty, would be a much lighter error, and much more excusable, than the same error would be if committed by the Speaker or Chairman, in the interest merely of the dignity and order of the Assembly over which he presides. For this reason, we hold that the Government ought to have the responsibility of proposing the immediate closure of a debate ; indeed, only the Goverment would usually be in possession of all the reasons why a closure is advisable. Moreover, it seems to us very necessary that the Speaker should regard himself as representing the whole House, and should hold that it is his business rather to restrain the eagerness of the Administration itself for a division if, in his opinion, the case of the minority or minorities has not been properly heard, than to propose a division himself. We would, therefore, give the Speaker the right of refusing to put to the House a vote for the closure of debate, while we should greatly hesitate to give him the responsibility of declaring that the sense of the House was clearly favourable to it. For, this would be so responsible a declaration, that the Speaker might postpone it beyond all reasonable limits,—reasonable, we mean, in the interests of the public service. And yet, though he might not be prepared to make this declaration himself, he might be quite sufficiently satisfied that it was _true to acquiesce in it, when it was made by the responsible Government.
And we are the more anxious to see this proposal for a closure of debate lodged in the hands of the responsible Leader of the House, instead of the Speaker or Chairman, that the logic of the case seems to require this, if the closure is to be voted,— as we think it ought to be voted in a sufficiently full House, the Speaker not objecting,—by a bare majority. Let us recall the cases in which it becomes important that the closure of debate ought to be lodged in the hands of a bare majority, the Speaker not objecting. They are obviously the cases in which the great majority of the House are satisfied that further debate is useless for the purpose of deliberation, but in which, nevertheless, party feeling would be likely enough to lead a great many of those who think so, to absent themselves, if by so doing they could hamper the strategy of their opponents. Sup- pose a Conservative Government to be in power, and a very factious Radical Party to be, say, resisting the addi- tion of 20,000 troops to the Army, on the ground that they disapprove the war policy of the Government. Well, suppose the resistance to the vote carried-on night after night, till a decision became absolutely essential, surely it should not be left in the power of the official Liberals to defeat the closure of debate by walking out of the House when the time came, and so baulking the Government of a two-thirds or three- fourths majority, if that were the condition of success. That, under certain political contingencies, there might be a strong temptation to such a course, we do not deny. But it ought not to have any chance of achieving its purpose. Such a Con- servative Government ought undoubtedly to have the right of bringing the debate to an end, as soon as the Speaker had been satisfied that it was not a premature end, even by a bare majority. Well, but is it at all desirable that in such a case as this, it should be at the instance of the Speaker that the closure of debate should be carried by a bare majority ? Would it not inevitably weaken the authority of the Speaker, if a pro- posal for the closure of debate, originated by him, resulted in its favour by a bare majority, to say nothing of the case of its defeat ? It seems to us that the very right and wise pro- posal to close debate by a bare majority, in case the Speaker does not object, logically involves that the initiative taken should be taken by the leader of that bare majority, and not by the Speaker who ought to represent all parties in the House. We are deeply convinced that a majority should have the ultimate right to close debate. It seems to. us essential in the last resort to the guidance of business in. the House. And though, by a good leader, it would be a power very rarely used, the mere existence of it would strengthen the hands of Government, and diminish the sometimes serious temptation of the leaders of Opposition to lend themselves to• the purposes of a factious clique. But strongly as we holds this, we do not think that the Speaker is the proper person to initiate a motion which is to be carried by a bare majority. The proper leader of that majority should be responsible for using such a power as that, though we fully admit that he might often be justified in so using it, and even be required so to use it, in the most solemn interest of the State.
Our other criticisms on the New Rules are less important.. We do not think that so great a premium should be put on the policy of delay, as would be placed on it by allowing the closure to be voted in very empty Houses, by a majority, for instance, of 40 to 39. That would mean that a bad Government would put off all its most important Bills to the end of the Session,. and hurry them through by a bare majority, after most of the Members had gone down. We think that no House in which there were not at least 150 Members present, should have the power of voting the closure of debate. We would allow the Government to carry the closure of debate by 76 against 75, if need were, but not by 40 against 39. As regards the condition that if the minority be more than 40, then the majority must be more than 200, we think it a very excellent condition, and that the number is not placed too high. It is of the greatest importance that the power of bringing debates to a close should not be abused.
In the third place, we entertain great doubts whether the two large Standing Committees which it is proposed to create, one on Law and Justice; and the other on Trade, will really work well. These large Committees of 60 or 80 Members can only work as miniature parliaments ; and yet, working as miniature parliaments, that is, by set deliberation and party organisation, they will, nevertheless, not be truly representative of the country, and Parliament will probably review all their deci- sions with much jealousy. On the Legal Committee, no doubt, most of the lawyers of the House will be placed ; bat the House is very jealous of the opinion of professional lawyers, and is only too likely to wish to reverse the decisions of its own Committee on those subjects. And the same applies to Trade. Mere commercial men would be suspected of having interests of their own to pursue in such a Committee, and yet it will be very difficult to represent the interest of the consumer in it at all adequately. We confess that we entertain serious doubts as to the wisdom of this proposal. Otherwise, the New Rules appear to us to have been drawn with great judgment, great courage, and great sobriety of mind.
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