PRINCE BISMARCK AND M. DE GLEES.
THE official journals in three capitals have been instructed flatly to deny the report that Prince Bismarck has - threatened to withdraw the German Ambassador from St.
Petersburg if the Panslav agitation against Austria is not suppressed. The denial is probably authentic, so far as formal diplomacy goes, but that informal representations have been made to Russia very much in the sense reported, though with- out menace, we do not doubt. The language of the Press in Germany shews that Prince Bismarck is both watchful and annoyed as to the agitation. As we understand the facts, which in part are still obscure, they run in this way. The Austrian Government, besides entertaining certain plans in the Balkan peninsula, is seriously moved by the attitude of part at least of its Slav subjects. It is, though a tenacious and sometimes rash Government, habitually apprehensive, well aware of the artificial character of the Empire, and morbidly sensi- tive to any danger arising from a conflict of nationalities, eepecially when one of the nationalities is Slay. It is aware that it is hated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, dreaded in Servia and Montenegro, and not loved in Gallicia ; and whenever a local insurrection occurs, it accuses "Rus- sians," whether officials or members of the Panslav party, of fostering discontent. That it honestly believes this charge we do not doubt, for otherwise the papers of Vienna and Pesth would not be so full of statements, only obtainable from the Military and Home Departments, of the presence of Russian officers among the insurgents, and of Russian intrigues in Lemberg, the capital of Gallicia. It may, too, have some reason for its fears. The Panslav party, which is very power- ful, from its hold over the religious feeling of the Russian people and its alliance with the party at Court determined to 4‘Bussianise Russia," is always interested in the fate of the Balkans, dislikes the occupation of Bosnia, and has recently been bitterly excited—as Madame Novikoff, who belongs to that party. admits in the Contemporary Review—by events in Servia. This feeling was recently expressed by the favourite and most able soldier of the party, General Skobeleff, who in a recent speech, intended for publicatidn—at least, he said it would be published, and he must therefore be cautious—talked of Germany as a Power founded on blood and iron, which made Might the only law ; of England as if she were an enemy, and of Austria as a Power now oppressing branches of the Slavonic race, about which " I will not express all my meaning, gentlemen. ify heart aches." Russians in General Skobeleff's position rarely say things which will give offence to the Czar, and this speech, following on Madame Novikoff's article on :Berrie, and on full accounts of the excitement created in Moscow by the dismissal of the Servian Primate for what in England would be called an ti-Erastianism, created great alarm in Vienna, and led, as we imagine, to an application to the German Chancellor. Prince Bismarck, who had been deeply offended with General Skobeleff's reference to himself, and who desires not only that the Austrian alliance should be durable, but that Austria should expand southward, and by becoming a Slav Power give up the hope of re-entering Germany, was not sorry for such an opportunity, and made some informal repre- sentations, which, whatever their tenor, influenced St. Peters- burg to check the Press. We do- not see that these representations, or even the original story, though they mark a difficult situation, involve anything new, or greatly increase the chances of disturbance. Every one knew that Prince Bismarck agreed to the occupation of Bosnia, which, of course, involved the suppression of any insurrection, though it did not involve the extraordinary series of blunders, rather than wilful oppres- sions, which has provoked the present movement. Every one knew, also, if only from Prince Bismarck's published speeches, that he wished Austria to move southward, that he despises the Balkan States, and that if a serious collision should occur, he would not only be willing, but would be forced by German opinion to protect Austria against any aggrandisement of the dreaded Slav power. The Germans, with their frontier all open on that side, their dislike of Slays—fostered by their standing feud with their own Polish subjects—and their painful sense of military necessities, can hardly judge Russia with equanimity, far less witness quietly any advance on her part at the ex- pense of a Power which, in spite of all that has passed, they regard as at least semi-German. " Austria," said Prince Bismarck, on one occasion, " is the pioneer of Germany." This permanent situation is not, however, aggravated by its announcement through the forms of diplomacy, whether open or secret. On the contrary, not only will Prince Bismarck's representations, if they occurred, disincline the Russian Government to intrigues visibly so dangerous, but they will strengthen its hands to restrain the Panslavic party in its own dominions. Men like General Skobeleff, however sincere and sanguine, must be thoroughly aware of the danger of attacking or even menacing such a mass of physical power as is represented by the alliance of Germany and Austria, and their combined armies of a million and a half, and of doing so at a moment when France is disinclined for any risky enter- prise. The Russian Government, even if inclined to foment disorder in the Balkans, of which there is no evidence, though there is evidence of unofficial Russian action, must post- pone its plans till it is a little more ready to face the results of their execution, and in all such crises postponement is favour- able to peace. The German Chancellor, with his perpetual hints, may be laying up a store of hatreds ; but there is no proof that they will explode at present, and much evidence that the ultimate rulers of Russia, the Czar and the small group around him who guide policy, sincerely desire peace. Their cry just now is not, " Ungrateful Austria!" but, " How reasonable Kalnoky is !"
It is said that the German Chancellor is persuaded that while the Russian Court is inclined to peace, it is liable to be overborne by one of those explosions of national or-Panslavic sentiment which are not infrequent in Russia, and of which two instances have occurred in twenty years,—namely, the uprising which summarily crushed Poland in her last and most serious insurrection, and the Turkish campaign. That statement may be erroneous, or the Chancellor's opinion may be wrong, but there can be no doubt that one, at least, of the most dangerous elements in the Eastern Question is the sort of contest always going on for influence in Servia. That Austria should be anxious for ascendancy in Belgrade is natural enough, for Belgrade, besides being the natural centre and capital of the South Slays, commands the Danube, the artery of the Austrian Empire. But Servia, neverthe- less, is not only Slav, but Greek Orthodox, and owing to her history, closely connected rather with St. Peters- burgh than Vienna. The Panslays regard the State as their outpost—as we saw in the Turkish war—and if it were seriously threatened, much more occupied, by Austrian troops, it might be most difficult even for the Czar to check the agitation among his people, or reject their cry for what they would consider a religions and defensive war. English- men, as we so repeatedly warned them four years ago, exag- gerate greatly the independence of the Czars, whose power is much more like that of Caesars—i.e., depends much more upon their interpreting the general will of their people— than we are accustomed to imagine. The Hapsburgs might easily do some act which would render the Russian people uncontrollable, and then we should witness one of the greatest and most deadly wars recorded in history. We cannot say we do not fear lest Prince Bismarck's outspoken support should encourage Vienna to such an action, but, for- tunately, the Austrian statesmen are trained from their birth to remember the composite character of their Empire, and to avoid enterprises in which the stake mast always be existence. Fighting France for a province like Lombardo-Venetia is one thing, though a great thing, and fighting Russia for the Slav leadership is quite another, more especially when great success to Austria is impossible, without the help of an ally who greatly desires provinces for himself, and might claim them from the old dominions of the House of Hapsburg.
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