4 hope that his discussions with the Government about Egypt
will end in that settlement which is long overdue. Let us say at once that in our opinion matters have been allowed to drift so far, owing to the hesitations and equivocations of the Government, that nothing will meet the case now but a generous measure of independence.
Independence, however, is not really the universal benefit which it is assumed to be by some well-meaning persons. It may indeed be the truest kindness to withhold independence from countries which are unable to exercise it for their own advantage. No sane Englishman wishes to withhold self-government from those who are proved capable of it. Unhappily our present Government are constitutionally unable to say Yea or No plainly. How unlike they are to American officials, although they are in the habit of holding over our heads the threat of American disapproval if we should hesitate to hand out powers of self-government to subject races all over the world ! We have just received the full text of the Report of the American Special Mission to the Philippines which was led by General Leonard Wood. There is no nebulosity about this Report. General Wood says that the transfer of control to the Filipinos has been too rapid, and that though they are not wanting in the instincts for self- government they lack sufficient experience. The American Government, he says, would therefore "not be justified in relinquishing the supervision of the Government of the Philippine Islands." "The present status should continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands."- Finally, General Wood points out with great emphasis that " no circumstances should the American Government allow a constitution to come about which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority." The British Government, if they had not enough in- formation to make up their mind definitely whether it was or was not safe to give Egypt independence, ought to have sent a special commission of investigation like General Wood's Commission. Then having studied the report of the commission they- ought to have come to a decision and have informed the Egyptians precisely of that decision. Unfortunately they acted quite otherwise. They did indeed send a commission of investigation headed by Lord Milner, but they instructed it to draft a scheme for Egyptian independence, and then they made that scheme known to the whole world. The appetite of the Egyptians was immediately whetted by the bill of fare placed before them. -Then the Government began to have after-thoughts. Egypt was on the direct route to India and the East. What would happen if the Egyptians interrupted the service of the Suez Canal ? Then, again, we had made ourselves responsible for the nationals of many countries in Egypt. How could we be responsible for their interests and their personal safety if we withdrew all troops from the interior and -contented ourselves with sitting down and watching the Canal zone ? . And even then, would the troops in the canal zone be safe ? Might not the Egyptians cut off the sweet water supply ? It may be answered that brackish or salt water could be condensed for the troops in the Canal zone and that in any case the sweet water supply could not be cut off without doing irreparable damage to Egyptians themselves. But that is a small matter. The Government made endless difficulties for themselves by dangling a bait in front of -the Egyptians' noses and then snatching it away.
We do not want to exaggerate the physical difficulty of suppressing Egyptian unrest. We imagine that if sup- pression were decided upon our military task would be fairly easy. But the doctrine of nationalism has been popularized so fast and so widely since the war that it seems to us a hopeless policy to say that we will not en- courage national aspirations directly after having implied by the publication of the Mibier Report that we would encourage them. Nor is it only the spirit of self-deter- mination -which is working furiously in the brains of the Egyptians. All over the world the lesson -of Ireland has been watched and learned. It is impossible not to trace both in. Egypt and India imitations of the procedure which the Sinn Feiners adopted in opening. negotiations. We must not be understood to mean that there is a real similarity between India and Egypt. In India we have given all that we promised and more than we -ought to have promised. In Egypt, on the other hand, we have given a good deal less than we seemed to promise. The position, of course, ought to have been reversed, for Egypt is not like India—a congeries of peoples—but a compara- tively homogeneous mass. So far as we can see, the Government could have come to an agreement with Adly Pasha. He would probably have accepted a little less than the Milner scheme if only we had not insisted upon the importance of keeping garrisons in so many parts of Egypt. Adly knew perfectly well that Egypt could not prosper at all without us ; lie even knew that nothing would make his country more insecure than a British policy of leaving Egypt entirely without protection or advice. He valued the experience and good will of British officials. What he wanted, as we understand, was the form of independence. And that was - refused.
The riots instigated by Zaghlul Pasha were the sequel. And now Egypt has reached such a pass that no Egyptian dares to take office as Prime Minister unless he has in his hand a British promise of independenoe at least in name. - Lord Allenby seems to us in all the circumstances to have.
behaved with remarkable wisdom. He never confused - expediency and policy. He never forgot that the duty - of a Government was to govern and to maintain respect . for the law. He therefore at once vindicated the law, : put down the disorders and deported Zaghlul ; but at - the same time he kept telling the British Government that if anything was to be given to Egypt the gift must be a generous one. His combined courage and tolerance seemed to give hopes of a solution at last. But at the beginning of last week the Foreign Office published a statement which -was a little triumph in the art of giving and taking. It was stated that the Government would invite Parliament to end the Protectorate, to recognize the sovereignty of Egypt, to agree to the constitution of an Egyptian Parliament. which would hold Ministers responsible to it, and to the re-establishment of an Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. - But then followed conditions very vaguely expressed. We must guard our Imperial communications ; we must be able to protect the nationals . of foreign countries : and we must safeguard Egypt against outside aggression. In answer to this statement of policy, Sarwat Pasha, who is waiting to form a Ministry :if he can, asks that independence should be granted without antecedent conditions. Otherwise, he says, - popular opinion will not allow him to form a Government. . If as a result of Lord Allenby's visit to London the Government cannot at long last solve the Egyptian problem they will suffer deep discredit. The difference in substance between what Lord Allenby recommends and what the more reasonable Egyptians would be satisfied with seems to be slight. The Government ought to make the most of Lord Allenby's experience and advice. The Egyptians, we believe, would much rather be associated with us in such a way that they can rely upon protection, than be cut adrift altogether in the name of satisfying the idealism . of fools and fanatics. They know that in the latter case they , might soon be the prey of some designing foreign Power. , Faces no doubt have to be saved—both Egyptian faces and British faces. . We do not pretend to understand the - details. The Government have all the facts before them and we have not. What we do say is that the pacification . of public opinion in Egypt by Lord Allenby during the past few weeks has presented the Government with a . new opportunity. They may not deserve it, but they have got it. This time there must be no more hesitation - and no more want of clearness, whatever the Government may decide to do. In this matter ambiguity is the worst of all political sins.
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