The War Surveyed
RUSSIA AND GERMANY AT GRIPS
By STRATEGICUS fp HERE were two main difficulties in the way of a satisfac- j tory estimate of the chances of Russia holding out against Germany during the rest of the campaigning-season when the offensive began. The first was the general ignorance of the Russian army, the quality of the rank-and-file, and the com- mand. It was the sudden collapse in France that made this a critical question, and not, as has been suggested, any bias against the Russians. Fortunately, this is a question that has already been answered. The Russians have not only fought magnificently, but they have also fought skilfully. They have never ceased to fight, even when they have been left behind the zone of main resistance ; and this is significant, because the problem of supply under such conditions is the very reverse of easy. The second difficulty was the general ignorance of the Russian preparations and resources ; and this still remains to make unsatisfactory any conclusion we may venture.
It is known that Russian equipment is very good. Infantry- weapons are excellent. Tanks are surprisingly good, and some of the heavier machines have astonished the enemy. The aero- planes are numerous, and certainly not notably inferior to those of the Luftwaffe ; and the same can be said of the airmen. But Russia has kept her secrets too well, and we do not know how deep this equipment goes. Wastage in modern war is so heavy that this is a critical matter. The most surprising of all our ignorances concerns the existence, siting and quality of the so-called "Stalin Line." We may assume that it lies within the rontier of pre-1939 Russia, that it is a deep defensive, and is built upon the natural features which characterise that country. Over much of this territory that " line " is intact. In the area of the two main thrusts there has been a penetration ; but there is reason to think that there are subsidiary belts of defensive positions farther back, and upon some of these the enemy is now meeting a resistance that almost defies description.
One's estimate of the outlook must, therefore, be empirical and tentative ; and here is one pointer that is not without value. When I wrote last week I pointed out that the second lateral line of Russian communications, running south from Lenin- grad through Vitebsk and Orsha (see map) might well be cut before the article appeared in print. That position is not sub- stantially changed as I write now. The line is threatened at a greater number of places ; but it remains intact and pre- sumably. serviceable. My impression last week was not unduly pessimistic ; and it might serve for today. This gives us a fairly reliable clue to the pace of the advance. It has, on the whole, been slightly more rapid than in France ; but on sectors that are critical there have been marked pauses. The first attack gained positions from which the Germans intended to mount fresh assaults upon the inner defences ; but the mounting of such attacks takes time, and the preparations, when the communi- cations are liable to continued disturbance, when wear and tear and wastage make their effect felt, involve delay. On the wastage of material, once more, there is no wholly reliable evidence. German figures have become a jest ; even the much more moderate Russian estimates do not help very much. The impression one gets is a roughly equal destruction ; and this, of course, throws one back upon the problem of final resources. From descriptions of the intensity of the fighting upon the main sectors, it seems reasonable to infer that the Russians have still numerous tanks, including many of the heaviest tonnage and gunning, and they have still a sufficient number of sufficiently good aeroplanes to deny Germany any effective superiority in the air. Local superiority has fallen to both sides at times ; but the claim of the Germans to have established supremacy in the air from the first day either. refers to a local sector or it is sheer moonshine. Of human wastage the evidence, while not decisive, is at least suggestive. The Germans appear to have claimed 300,000 prisoners and to have killed soo,000 in the Bialystok area. An advancing army gathers the opponent's wounded, and hence if we may assume that these figures have some relation to fact they would suggest a total casualty list of 800,000. The Russians, for the same period, claim to have killed or wounded about .750,000; and they have taken small bodies of prisoners. From these figures it might be judged that the losses have been rather heavy and pretty equal. As the human resources of Russia are enormously superior to those of Germany, the enemy has lost relatively more.
The two main thrusts remain the same. At one time the advance upon Leningrad appeared to be likely to develop into the most critical, since, at Ostrov, about 32 miles south of Pskov, the enemy was only two hundred miles from the city, and another converging attack was awaiting the signal to press forward ; but the Russian counter-attack was well timed, and so heavy that the Germans appear to be held at the crossing of the Velikaya. The Karelian thrust has never developed its full strength, and it seems that it will not be launched until the bridge at Ostrov is won. At Murmansk, the town is still in Russian hands and the frontier seems to be intact. The importance of this is the fact that, should Leningrad fall, the White Sea would remain the only way of escape for the Russian Baltic Fleet. The canal can take vessels up to 5,000 tons ; but an advance from Finland to the White Sea would make that fact an irrelevance. At the other end of the 1,800 miles of front, the enemy are across the Pruth ; but this is less a tribute to their force and ability than to the Russian need to avoid being outflanked by the advance on the immediate north. The Smolensk thrust seems to be still the most dangerous ; but even this cannot be said without qualification. At no place have the Germans at present ,penetrated as far towards Smolensk as they have towards Kiev ; but this important centre is now threatened on a front of about 240 miles, from Polotsk, in the north, to some point, east of Bobruisk, on the Dnieper. Polotsk, Lepel (nearly 50 miles to the south), Borisov and Bobruisk are all river-crossings ; and along this sector it is the bridges of the Dvina and the Dneiper that are the immediate objectives. Over almost the whole of the sector it would be difficult to cover ten miles without crossing a river-line or marshy ground ; and the Russians are making full use of these natural advantages. Minsk, according to German reports, was left a burning ruin. If that policy be followed the problem of supply will become increasingly diffi- cult for Hitler. It can hardly improve while the Germans march away from their bases and the Russians fall back upon theirs. It is still wise to take the situation as serious. The Germans cannot abandon the attack, whatever their losses. It is Hitler's special offensive ; and it will be carried out until it 'achieves some spectacular success. That, in the end, may possibly be his undoing in the larger sense. It is not the mere occupatioR of territory that he requires. He needs the territory on such conditions that he can gather and enjoy its resources. For this he must put the Russian armies out of action so completely that they can give no further trouble ; and he must reach that consummation without suffering losses that will immobilise him. If it is asked whether there is any sign of his achiev. ing such a victory, one can only say that it is not discernible. As far as one can judge, the Russians, while giving ground, are stiffening their resistance and inflicting as heavy losses as they suffer. But we know so little of Russia's resources of all sorts that this can be little better than a conjecture.
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