NEW DEAL WITH NASSER
ALTHOUGH Mr. Hammarskjold seems, for the moment at least, to have prevented Anglo- American intervention in the Lebanon, no one can be satisfied with ,Western policy during the last few weeks. The ultimate disaster of another Suez has been avoided; but what has. happened instead has not been much better. Instead of actual intervention we have had threatened intervention; and threats of armed force do nearly as much damage in the Arab world as armed force itself. Furthermore, in the present state of the Middle East, 'Lebanon' situations are likely to recur, so that unless British and Western policy is radically changed we shall once again soon be faced with the same barren courses of action— force or threats of force.
Luckily a constructive alternative does in fact exist; it is staring us in the face. But the Govern- ment does not adopt it because the Conservatives are concerned to save their face over Suez; and the Labour Party does not embrace it because it is preoccupied with Israel. The obvious and proper policy for Britain and the West is to come to terms with President Nasser. And now is the time.
If the West has not been prospering in the Middle East, neither has Russia. While there have been attacks in the Soviet press upon Egypt, and while the Syrian Communist leader Khaled Bagdash from his exile in Bulgaria has been attacking Tito for 'trying to keep the Arab National Liberation movement away from the line of struggle against imperialism,' Nasser has been visiting Yugoslavia. Nothing can be plainer than the intention of these neutrals to maintain their neutrality; to pursue effective detachment from the preoccupying struggle of East and West as the principal object of policy. One million propaganda blankets and miles and miles of official red carpet have signally failed to turn President Nasser into a Soviet satellite; just as a residual military occupation and the offer to finance the Asuan Dam failed to make him into a Western one. The big question is—can we do better with Nasser than the Russians have done with Tito? Can we do effective business—politi- cally and economically—with a professedly neu-, tral Middle East while recognising its neutrality?
To do so will of course demand a change of attitude. We shall have to stop regarding the Middle East as a sphere of influence, and start regarding it more as a neutral zone, such as India. The obstacle to this change of attitude, which is certainly in British interests, is not military, politi- cal or economic ; it is psychological. Our standing in the Middle East has been for so long a matter of self-respect that we have come to regard the region as quite different from the rest of the world. It is this which the Arabs so greatly resent; and this which brings our foreign policy to the sort of impasse it has been in during the last few weeks.
What would a change entail? For a start we should stop seeking, or even seeming to seek, to frustrate the purposes which, rightly or wrongly, we attribute to the Egyptian President. If the peoples of the Arabic-speaking world want to be united under the rule of Cairo, that is their affair. We have not the right to oppose it; nor is it in our interest to do so. If the peoples of Scandinavia or of Benelux seemed, however misguidedly, to be seeking political unity under the Legis of Stock- holm or Brussels, we should not dream of oppos- ing them in the way we oppose President Nasser. In a world where it is essential to regard nations, like individuals, as equal before the law, this kind of differentiation is stupid. Professing the views we do, it is indefensible to treat Egyptians as though they were in some way different from, say, Canadians or Venezuelans. President Nasser's present overwhelming popularity in the Arab lands of the Middle East arises mainly from the knowledge that he has resolutely, and so far suc- cessfully, refused to be treated on any basis other than that of equality. A thoroughgoing recogni- tion of the rights of the Arabic-speaking peoples to determine their own fate would tend to reduce rather than inflate his influence.
From the point of view of the cold war, there are no military objections to this course. Even under the present arrangements a Soviet invasion of the Middle East could not be met locally : a major war would be immediately precipitated whether the area was defended or neutralised. It is not, and could not be, protected from the Russians as it was from the Germans, by the presence of foreign troops. Infiltration—or con- version to Communism—is of course another matter. Potentially the danger is there, just as it is in India—or, for that matter, however remotely, in Britain, France or the United States. It will con- tinue to be there so long as any large number of people admire the Soviet system. But at present it seems exceedingly remote : all the more so since the Egyptians have shown that what they particu- larly value in their relationship With Russia is the fact that it helps them into a state of less depend- ence upon ourselves.
Naturally, as with any change of policy, there are objections. Some Arab governments, which have been the prirrcipal targets of Egyptian attack, have long enjoyed our support : they con- tinue to expect it. There is the Baghdad Pact to consider. There is also the evidence, afforded by Cairo Radio, that the Egyptian Government remains positively anti-British. It will certainly be argued that any accommodation with Nasser will imperil Israel, to which we have certain clearly specified obligations. The argument will also be heard that we should be placing our essential oil supplies in unnec the need to safcgu of Aden, and the To the first of that we should to ke our stand upon international law. Iraq, Jordan and Israel are sovereign and independent Stat As such they have each of them two rights which is our duty and interest to maintain : the rig it to settle their own affairs; and the right to call ur on their fellow-members of UN for help if they ar e faced with outside interference beyond their pow er to resist alone. If the security of, say, Iraq is m e .naced by outside force it would be entitled to, and should get, UN and British support. But if the Iraq Government cannot maintain itself ag tinst the desires of its own popu- lation it should ce rtainly not get that support from us. Similarly with Israel, our stand must be upon international law. Israel owes its legal existence to a resolution of th e UN, legally arrived at, and it is, even on that ground alone, entitled to such protection as the UN can afford.
The Baghdad Pact is more difficult. In strict logic its exi tence prevents the Middle East being regarded as a neutral zone. But except on obsolete theories of war it has never made any military or strateg is sense, and its military signifi- cance is small. It IT lay be diplomatically impossible for us to leave the pact—even though its Moslem members may wan it us to do so. Still, provided that the present tende Icy to emphasise the economic side of the pact is maintained, and provided that we make it clear th ;at we will not use it as a pretext for propping up a government which has lost the support of its pee )1e, there is no particular reason why the pact sho uld not continue as the diplo- matic folly it has a lways been. If Egypt demanded its dissolution as the price of a rapprochement with Britain it wo uld be indicative of a reluctance to reach a fair settl ement.
As for Cairo R tdio, it would be extraordinary if it had been f :iendly towards us. Since we bombed the Egyp tians at the time of Suez there has from our side been no gesture of friendliness whatever. There h as been a sustained press cam- paign here against Egypt and President Nasser, in which not even t he most elementary courtesies have been obsery ;d. It is, for instance, rare for The Times in its 1 :ading articles to call President Nasser anything b ut just 'Nasser,' though in the same article it will refer to 'President Chamoun.' The anti-Egyptian radios are quite as violent in their language as ; Cairo Radio. No Western government has admitted responsibility for their operation; b ut a hint from one of them would be enough to take their very low-level broadcasts off the air. Yet the British Government has not given that is hardly surprising 'Rule, Britannia.' If you treat somebody as an hint. In these circumstances it that Cairo Radio does not play pect him to behave like one. enemy you must ex n is comparatively straight- The oil questic ssue is not whether we get the forward. The real well aware that it needs to be oil—the Arabs are sold before they can enjoy the fruits of it—but whether we should get it merely as part of a normal commercial transaction, or whether there have to be political arrangements as well. The undoubted regional differences of the Arab world would be more likely to retain their political ex- pression, in the shape of independent States or sheikhdoms, if their rulers no longer incurred the discredit, in the eyes of their own populations, which goes with the belief that they enjoy non- Arab protection. And there is no reason to sup- pose that a Cairo-centred united Arab State, if and when it came into being, would seek to expro- priate the oil wells; in fact, there is every reason to believe that it would, in its own interest, try to maintain the flow of sales.
Lastly, the Gulf sheikhdoms and Aden. Our position in the sheikhdoms does not depend on ourselves alone. We have certain definite obliga- tions to the various rulers which cannot be shirked. But while the Gulf sheikhdoms are of paramount importance from the oil point of view, they are of only secondary importance politically; it is what happens in the larger Arab States that will determine their future. Provided therefore that we do not use our special position in the sheikhdoms to persuade them to interfere in the struggle (if there is a struggle) between other Arab States—and up to now we have wisely refrained from trying to push Kuwait into union with Iraq —there is no reason why our special position in the Gulf should prevent a reorientation of our policy. The problem of Aden and the protectorates is simpler. At least we have a well-established policy: to bring them to a state of development in which they can decide the problem of their own future. No one can pretend that this stage has yet been reached, either in the colony or in the pro- tectorate. Meanwhile, however, they are the target of attack by the unstable government of the Yemen, nominally a part of the United Arab Republic, but where Russian and Egyptian influ- ences are in fact in combat. The tentative British solution—a federation of the protectorates— has run into difficulties, of which the greatest Is the opposition of the Sultan of Lahej. His idea is to combine all the territories with the Yemen itself and to run the whole under some sort of Anglo-Egyptian condominium. In a con- text of Anglo-Egyptian rapprochement the idea seems promising. In any event the position of Aden and the protectorates would certainly not be worse if there were such a rapprochement than it is now.
A change in our Middle East attitude would, then, entail some disadvantages; but these would be fewer and smaller than are entailed by our present policy—less a policy than a series of rather apoplectic reactions, in accordance neither with our traditions nor our interests. It is foolish to alienate growing numbers of Arabs; foolish to encourage them to see in Russia their friend and protector. There are enormous opportunities wait- ing in the Middle East. It will be tragic if a false pride and dignity prevent us from taking them.
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