TOPICS OF THE DAY.
GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA IN CHINA.
IT is coming rapidly to this, that Europe as a whole must make a serious agreement as to "spheres of influence" in China with well-defined boundaries, or the effort to prevent a general war will be a failure. We regret the necessity deeply, for we can foresee a terrible strain upon the resources of Great Britain, already some- what overtaxed ; but we can perceive no other way out of the impasse. For an impasse there is, though our people as yet scarcely perceive it. It is simply impossible for the Emperor of Russia, however devoted he may be to peace as a theory, to allow any European Power to inter- fere in Manchuria, or even to acquire influence there.
That grand province is the natural outlet of his Asiatic dominion, an acquisition without which Siberia is practi- cally valueless, the object and pivot of the policy of the present Czar's reign. He learned its value during his travels, and within the last ten years all governing Russians, including the financiers, have learned it too. Nicholas II., if driven to the wall, must fight for Manchuria or forfeit the respect of his subjects, and deepen in his Army, which is the bed-rock of his throne, a discontent already excited by his preference for the ways of peace over "war with its happy chances." He cannot retreat, and if we declare war on him France will be called to his assistance, and all Europe will speedily be in flames. On the other hand, the British position is extraordinarily difficult. British subjects have acquired railway concessions which interfere with Russian dominance in Manchuria. the Chinese threaten to modify those concessions under Russian pressure, and it is part of our policy when dealing with semi-civilised States to insist that industrial rights upon which large sums have been staked shall not be violently cancelled or subjected to unjust modification. We are not very logical, for we do not compel even half-civilised States to abstain from repudiation, but still we coerce them into respect for more private contracts. We distrust the policy, which is used locally as a means of making money, but it is the policy avowed by Ministers, and opinion does not permit the Government suddenly to alter it. Lord Salisbury must therefore press the Government of China to abstain from yielding to Russian pressure ; if he presses, he must in common justice guarantee Pekin against the consequences of refusal—to the chuckling delight of the rascally Mandarins, who desire above all things to see foreigners killing each other on their behalf—and in that guarantee lies hidden a collision with Russia, with all its far-reaching consequences. The position is intolerable, for we have no more business in Manchuria than in Ecuador, and we shall be making war solely for commercial gain ; but nevertheless that is the position, and out of it, we fear, there is but one road. We must define carefully the limits within which each European Power is to determine what it thinks interference and what not, and fight only when those limits are crossed or menaced, in which case we shall have the support of all interested in maintaining the agreement. In practice that means that Russia is to be acknowledged as the protector of Northern China, Germany of Shantung and a well-defined hinter- land, Great Britain of the Yangtse Valley and Thibet, Italy of Chekiang, and France of Southern China from Indo-China eastward to the Pacific. All must agree to certain fiscal rules, and all should " delimit " their " spheres " as accurately as if they were in actual possession. Then, war about China may be avoided for fifty years, and no statesman now dreams of forecasting, even in his own mind, what in fifty years will be the European situation. Perhaps the value of navies will have disappeared, the most terrible battleship being at the mercy of a single fulminating shell thrown from a minute howitter on a boat that can do sixty miles an hour.
The policy of "spheres of influence" is, in our judgment, as we have said, a policy open to very grave objections ; but States are bound, like individuals, in chains of circum- stance,—and what is the alternative ? We cannot stand quiet and look on while Europe divides China, abstaining from anything but criticism, and taking our chance that her trade would still fall mainly to ourselves, as that of Indo-China does. That might be wise policy, for we do not want to enrich traders at an equal cost to taxpayers, but it is prohibited by opinion. The Government which adopted it would be overthrown. The Brieish people never like abstinence when much is being shared out, and our mercantile classes have got it fixed in their heads that the future of British commerce—not the present, mind— depends upon free and slightly taxed access to the largest market in the world. They are wild, to supply all China- men with shirts. We think that they will supply that market whatever happens, but they do not, and the easy policy of total abstinence from armed interference is there- fore barred. Another alternative policy, that of "the open door," which at one time was received with general approval, really means that we are to insist on the five Powers all keeping on the same external duties and not putting on internal duties, and would, in the end, with the madly Protectionist convictions of the Continent, involve dangers as serious as those we are now facing. The third policy, the Beresford policy, as we may call it, is that of keeping an open door by reviving China, and so obtaining at Pekin a dominant influence, and is, in our judgment, impossible. Corpses never revive. It could only be carried out by assuming a direct Protectorate of all China, in defiance of all other Powers, forming and controlling her Army, and reorganising and keeping re- organised her whole civil administration. The dynasty is decadent, the Mandarins are corrupt and jealous of Europeans, and there is no class virile enough to be safely entrusted with the daily work of the Monarchy. We are told every day, it is true, of the excellence of the average Chinaman, but it is, we fear, an excellence like that of the average Turk, who as peasant and private soldier is a model of the useful virtues, but the moment he becomes an official, becomes also a brigand and a. voluptuary. He is, in fact, a most excellent man while he is not tempted. To revive such a State without governing it is beyond our power, nor, were it not so, have we the right to lend the irresistible strength of civilisation to men so cruel and so corrupt. The only remaining policy is, as we have said, that of "spheres of influence," which would, of course, end in partition, and it is, we fear, that, and that alone, which will avert an other- wise inevitable war. The quarrel over the Niuchwang Railway is only one of a score which will arise, and which will be fostered by financiers who want to enjoy the ad- vantage of Oriental rates of interest under the protection of a British guarantee. The policy of "spheres of influence" is, we repeat, a dangerous policy for this country, for we have not the force to govern so many more millions as inhabit the Valley of the Yangtse-kiang, but it is less dangerous than any other yet suggested, and it promises, as they do not, some definite result. By ruling the Yangtse Valley we may do some little good to ourselves and to humanity. "Backing up" China as we used to back up Turkey promises none. Even if it succeeded in a way and for a time, all that we should have gained would be that a dying Empire would be buried half a century after the world had declared its continuance above ground to be intolerable. To pursue such a policy once, as we have already done in Constantinople, was foolish, but to pursue it twice when we know its results would be absolutely fatuous. If speculators wish to trade or build in Man- churia or South China, let them build or trade, but let them do it at their own risk, and add that risk to their prices. To give guarantees for their adventures outside the territory we intend to govern and be responsible for, is only to plunder the British taxpayer.
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